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ABSTRACT 
 
GENEVIEVE ROMEO: Vessels of Vengeance: Divine Wrath and Human Instruments in 
Early Modern Revenge Tragedy 
(Under the direction of Jessica Wolfe) 
 
This dissertation examines the intersections between human anger and divine wrath in Tudor 
and Stuart revenge tragedies. Traditional scholarship on Renaissance drama looks to the 
philosophical foundations of the passions, while more recent criticism focuses on the 
physiological origins of early modern conceptions of emotion. My work combines both of 
these approaches with a sustained investigation into the theological foundations and 
implications of the passions—specifically the passion of wrath as it finds both divine and 
human expression in revenge tragedy.  My dissertation explores instances where divine and 
human anger collide—or, perhaps, collude—on the early modern stage by contextualizing 
plays such as William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy, and 
John Marston’s Antonio’s Revenge with theological writings by John Calvin, Martin Luther, 
and Thomas Jackson, among others. My study analyzes the way authors used the 
anthropopathic conception of divine wrath as both an exhortation against human anger and as 
a metaphorical accommodation that legitimizes and sanctifies sinful, passionate human 
emotion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Gail Kern Paster begins her ground-breaking study of the early modern passions, 
Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage, with an excerpt from Bishop 
Edward Reynolds’ A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man (1640): “The 
Passions of sinfull men are many times like the tossings of the Sea, which bringeth up mire 
and durt, but the Passions of Christ were like the shaking of a pure Water in a cleane 
Vessell, which though it be thereby troubled, yet is not fouled at all.”1 As Paster notes, 
Reynolds uses this metaphor to counter the Neostoic condemnation of human passions; his 
words reveal that “it is human sinfulness that makes immoderate passions an instrument of 
self-harm—an instrument of excess and indecency—not the passions themselves.”2 Paster 
also observes that in comparing Christ to a “vessel of liquids,” Reynolds demonstrates the 
early modern understanding of “the nature of the passions as liquid—contained or 
uncontained, clear or muddy.” 3 This notion of the passions as literal forces within our body 
is reflected in Galen’s understanding of the passions as “one of the six factors (along with air, 
diet, repletion and evacuation, sleeping and walking, and exercise) that together determined 
the immediate state of well-being in a given body.”4 The fact that several of these “non-
                                                 
1 Edward Reynolds. A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man, ed. Margaret Lee Wiley 
(Gainesville: Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1971), 49.  
 
2 Gail Kern Paster. Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage. Chicago: University of 
Chicago P. (2004): 1. 
 
3 Ibid., 4. 
 
4 Ibid., 4. 
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natural” factors depend on environment marks a significant divergence between modern and 
early modern concepts of emotion. As Mary Floyd-Wilson explains:  
We understand emotion as internal, or part of our self, and not 
as an ecological or physiological force that moves in and out of 
the body. And yet early modern passions do cross the self’s 
shifting and fluid boundaries. The heart dilates or constricts in 
response to certain stimuli. When the emotions are stirred, 
people are moved to act or withdraw. Indeed, some early 
moderns construed the passion as residual environmental 
impressions, originally induced by an ecology that undermines 
any conception [of] a solid, static, or contained self. 5 
 
The work of Paster and Floyd-Wilson, among others, clearly establishes that, for the early 
moderns, passions and emotions were physical forces that could be influenced not only by 
religious restraint or recta ratio, but by environmental factors. Indeed, as Pastor argues, “the 
passions had an urgent practical character” of coequal importance to “their overarching 
theological significance.”6 But what is the nature of this “theological significance”?  Do the 
passions have a “theological significance” beyond the “traditional” Neostoic castigation of 
passions? Furthermore, while the above passage from Reynolds reflects an early modern 
understanding of Christ’s passions, how did contemporary authors and theologians 
understand the emotions of God when He is not clothed in the flesh of Christ?  
A complete investigation into the divine valence of every significant emotion is 
certainly beyond the scope of this present study. Instead, this dissertation takes a necessarily 
narrow approach by examining the portrayal of anger in select revenge tragedies as a case 
study. Drawing extensively from both pagan and Christian sources, revenge tragedies are a 
rich source for any discussion of the early modern passions; however, the violence that 
                                                 
5 Mary Floyd-Wilson. “English Mettle” in Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History 
of Emotion. Ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania P. 2004): 134. 
 
6 Ibid.,7.  
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permeates these plays makes them a particularly productive location for a scrutiny of anger. 
However, while the Stoic dimension of anger in Renaissance tragedy has been thoroughly 
examined by critics such as Gordon Braden and Geoffrey Aggeler, sustained analyses of 
Judeo-Christian notions of divine wrath and human anger in revenge tragedy seem to have 
fallen out of current critical favor.  The renewed interest in the physical valence of emotion 
that has been sparked by Gail Kern Paster and Mary Floyd-Wilson, among others, provides 
an opportunity for future scholarly consideration of how early modern Christian theology 
complicates or contributes to the physiological understanding of passion. 
 Richard Strier observes that “it is often taken as a basic truth about the whole 
‘Western Tradition’ that the control of ‘passion’ by ‘reason’ is its fundamental ethical-
physiological ideal.”7 Strier’s article, “Against the Rule of Reason,” dismantles this notion by 
providing a panoply of authors—from Aristotle to Herbert—who offer eloquent apologiae 
for the passions. Strier notes that “both the humanist and the Reformation traditions provided 
powerful defenses of the validity and even desirability of ordinary human emotions and 
passions.”8 These “defenses” suggest, among other things, that emotions like sorrow or grief 
are necessary elements of empathy, and thus, Christian charity.  
 Strier’s catalogue of apologists rightly begins with Aristotle, whose Nicomachean 
Ethics does not advocate quashing the passions, but moderating them. While immoderate 
emotions can be destructive, moderate versions can be beneficial to both the self and society. 
Aristotle argues that the individual “who is angry at the right things and with the right 
                                                 
7 Richard Strier. “Against the Rule of Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to Luther to Shakespeare to 
Herbert.” in Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion. Ed. Gail Kern 
Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania P. (2004): 23. 
 
8 Ibid., 32.  
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people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised.”9 
According to Aristotle’s argument, a moderate anger is not only acceptable, but 
praiseworthy. This notion was, of course, rejected by the Stoics, who argued that any 
passion—but especially one as potentially destructive as anger—should be held in check by 
reason.10  In De Ira, Seneca calls anger “the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions” 
and describes it as “all excitement and impulse.” Building on this depiction, he offers this 
vivid portrait of anger: “Raving with a desire that is utterly inhuman for instruments of pain 
and reparations in blood, careless of itself so long as it harms the other, it rushes onto the 
very spear-points, greedy for vengeance that draws down the avenger with it” (I.1.i).11 Anger 
is thus man’s enemy, as “man was begotten for mutual assistance, anger for mutual 
destruction” (I.5.i).12 Whereas Juvenal argues that the vir bonus must be angered by 
indignation, Seneca contends that the good man will not even be angry if his father has been 
slain and his mother raped (I.12.i).13 In a similar vein, the Epicurean philosopher Lucretius 
argues that “the nature of the gods enjoys everlasting in perfect peace, sundered and 
separated far away from our world. For free from all grief, free from danger, mighty in its 
own resources, never lacking aught of us, it is not won by virtuous service nor touched by 
wrath.”14  For both the Stoics and the Epicureans, then, anger is contrary to both reason and 
                                                 
9 Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. (Trans. David Ross. London: Oxford ,1998) 96-97. 
 
10 For a thorough examination of the differences between Aristotelian and Stoic notions of passion, see Martha 
C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1994). 
 
11 Seneca. Moral and Political Essays. Translated by John M. Cooper and J.F. Procope. Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP (1995), 17.   
 
12 Ibid., 23. 
 
13 Ibid., 30. 
 
14 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura. Trans. Cyril Bailey. London: Oxford (1926):  87. 
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happiness. An angry individual is tainted by immoderate passion, and therefore acts with 
rashness instead of virtue.  
Unlike the Stoics and Epicureans, who viewed anger as a necessarily destructive 
force, the early Christian writer Lactantius defines anger as “an emotion of the mind arousing 
itself for the restraining of faults,”15 and argues that being overly merciful or restraining a 
righteous anger can be just as sinful as being overly wrathful.  Just as God made sex 
pleasurable for the sake of propagating the species, God gave us anger “for the sake of 
restraining faults.”16 However, anger can be misappropriated just as easily as sexual desire. 
For this reason, Lactantius advises that the “anger which we may call either fury or rage 
ought not to exist even in man, because it is altogether vicious; but the anger which relates to 
the correction of vices ought not to be taken away from man; nor can it be taken away from 
God, because it is both serviceable for the affairs of man, and necessary.”17 Anger is thus a 
necessary component of both human and divine justice; without anger, sins go unpunished.   
Aquinas similarly sees the passion of anger as natural and potentially beneficial. He 
makes this argument in the Summa Theologicae by, like Lactantius, linking anger with the 
pursuit of justice. Aquinas begins his argument by defining anger as a desire for vengeance, 
and vengeance as a means of corrective punishment. He reasons that “the desire for revenge 
is a desire for something good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
15 “A Treatise on the Anger of God” The Works of Lanctantius, Vol II. Trans. William D. Fletcher. Ed. 
Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,  1871): 36. 
 
16 Ibid., 37.  
 
17 Ibid., 36. 
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is good.”18  He uses this definition of anger to counter Seneca’s claim that the angry man is 
irrational. According to Aquinas, desiring vengeance implies the ability to identify “a 
comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done.”  Making such a 
judgment requires reason; therefore, an angry man in the pursuit of vengeance is necessarily 
a rational man.19  
Aquinas also argues that anger is beneficial because it can indirectly bring a man 
pleasure:  
Anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which 
sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon 
as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the 
greater as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be 
really present, perfect pleasure ensues ….  An angry man takes 
pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This pleasure, 
however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and 
consequently anger.  The angry man does not grieve and 
rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while 
he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance. 
Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while 
pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.20  
 
The anger that yields vengeance, which is a rational act of justice, is thus a positive passion 
and not a sin. Vengeance is not only just in itself, but it also cures sorrow: an angry man can 
only gain perfect pleasure by acting on his anger. This directly contradicts Seneca’s appraisal 
of retribution. When his adversarius interjects: “ ‘But there is pleasure in anger – paying 
back pain is sweet,’” Seneca’s moralist replies: “Not in the slightest! …. ‘Retribution’ – an 
inhuman word and, what is more, accepted as right—is not very different from wrongdoing, 
except in the order of events. He who pays back pain with pain is doing wrong; it is only that 
                                                 
18 Q 46. Article II, p 509. All quotations from Thomas Aquinas refer to Summa Theologica: literally translated 
by fathers of the English Dominican province. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920-1925). 
 
19 Q 46, Article IV, p. 512. 
 
20 Q. 48, Article I, p 532.  
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he is more readily excused for it” (II.32.i).21 According to Seneca, vengeance, which is not 
the same as anger, should therefore be viewed as something “useful,” but not “sweet.” 
Bishop Edward Reynolds’ Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man 
(1640) offers a middle way between Aquinas’ apology and Seneca’s castigation. Reynolds 
observes that properly “obedient” anger excites reasonable judgment and helps one formulate 
a proper “means of Redresse.”  Without an intact reason, however, one succumbs to anger’s 
“suddenness” and “violence.”22 When a man finds himself or his friends “sleighted and 
despised,” he experiences a desire to “make knowne unto the persons, who thus contemne 
him by some manner of face or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head … that there is in him more 
courage, power, and worth than deserves so to be neglected.”  Reynolds asserts that as long 
as this passion is governed by reason, that it is “alwaies allowable and right.” If, however, it 
springs from “Pride and Ambition,” it is “Irregular and Corrupt.”23 Reynolds therefore allows 
for the possibility of anger as a means to righteous vengeance, but does not afford vengeance 
the same automatic guarantee of rationality that Aquinas does. On the contrary, he observes 
that anger, above all other passions, “hath the least recourse to Reason, being hasty, 
impetuous, full of Desires, Griefe, Selfe-love, Impatience, which spareth no persons, friends, 
or foes, no things, animate or inanimate, when they fit not our fancy.”24  Reynolds then 
illustrates this dubious link between anger and reason with this colorful metaphor: 
[Just as] Dogs, which, as soon as ever they heare a noise, barke 
presently before they know whether it be a stranger at the 
doore, or no: so Anger attends Reason thus long, till it receive 
                                                 
21 Seneca. Moral and Political Essays, 70. 
 
22 Reynolds 317. 
 
23 Ibid., 318.  
 
24 Ibid., 319. 
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warrant for the justness of seeking redresse, and then suddenly 
hastens away without any further listening to the rules of 
Decorum and Justice, which it should always observe in the 
prosecution thereof.25 
 
Reynolds explains that Anger uses Reason only so far as it provides justification for 
retributive punishment. Any advice that Reason might offer in the way of justice or mercy is 
summarily dismissed.    
 Even though anger lacks an intrinsic connection with reason, Reynolds does not 
contend that it is necessarily always destructive. Instead, he provides the reader with a 
thorough list of ways that one might be angry without sinning. He first instructs readers to 
imitate Moses by letting anger have “an Eye upward,” as a righteous anger is aroused only 
by “injury directly aimed at God and his honour.”  He then suggests that one should “convert 
[anger] Inward” into self-discipline, “for the more acquainted any man is with himselfe, the 
lesse matter he will find of Anger with other men.” Reynolds also advises, among other 
things, to avoid both rashness and brooding, to ignore false rumors, and to “bee Candid in 
Interpreting the things wherein thou sufferest.”26 His last bit of counsel on conquering Anger 
is to 
wrastle not with that which pincheth thee. If it bee strong it will 
hurt, if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. Hee that 
strives with his burden makes it heavier. That Tempest breaks 
not the stalkes of Corne, which rends asunder the arms of an 
Oake, the one yeelds, the other withstands it. A humble 
weakness is safer from injury, than a stubborn strength.27 
 
Where Aquinas sanctions and Seneca condemns the angry man, Reynolds ultimately suggests 
that one bear indignities with patience and humility. Reynolds’ preference for “humble 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 318-9.  
 
26 Ibid., 320-322. 
 
27 Ibid., 323-4.  
9 
 
weakness” recalls Aristotle’s observation that those who err on the side of excess make for 
unpleasant companions.    
Robert Burton’s initial definition of anger in The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) 
resembles that of Aquinas: he first glosses it as “a desire of revenge.”28 He then, however, 
refers to it as “a pestiferous perturbation” that can heat the body too quickly, thus leading to 
madness.29 Burton cites a wide variety of philosophers, theologians, and figures from both 
history and scripture as evidence of anger’s negative impact on human affairs. “Look into our 
Histories,” Burton advises, “and you shall almost meet with no other subject, but what a 
company of hare-brains have done in their rage!”30 Burton describes the choleric as being 
“bold and impudent … apt to quarrel and think of such things, battles, combats, and their 
manhood; furious, impatient in discourse, stiff, irrefragable, and prodigious in their tenents; 
and, if they be moved, most violent, outrageous, ready to disgrace, provoke any, to kill 
themselves and others.”31 
In his discussion of anger, Burton also describes how choler is created and 
disseminated through the body. Choler, which is “hot and dry,” is “begotten of the hotter 
parts of the chylus, and gathered to the gall.”32 Aquinas partially bases his equation of anger 
with vengeance on these properties of heat and dryness. Aquinas observes that every 
                                                 
28 Robert Burton. The Anatomy of Melancholy. Ed. Holbrook Jackson. (New York: New York Review of 
Books.2001), I.161. 
 
29 Ibid., 269-71.  
 
30 Ibid., 270. 
 
31 Ibid., 401. Burton notes that Jerome Cardan seems to admire the choleric, describing them as “bold, hardy, 
fierce, and adventurous” and that they are prepared “to endure death itself, and all manner of torments, with 
invincible courage, and ‘tis a wonder to see with what alacrity they will undergo such tortures.” Burton’s 
response to Cardan’s praise: “he ascribes this generosity, fury, or rather stupidity, to this adustation of choler 
and melancholy: But I take these rather to be mad or desperate” (401-2).  
 
32 Ibid., I.148. 
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“appetite” tends to use greater force to repel its contrary “appetite.” Because “the appetitive 
movement of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present,” the 
appetite uses the desire of vengeance to repel the injury. However, 
because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which 
corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution, which 
corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the 
movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital 
spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul’s 
passions.33   
 
Aquinas thus argues that the body naturally experiences vengeance as a counter to 
indignation. The heat of this emotion agitates the “vital spirits” surrounding the heart, which 
then directs the passions of the body.  
   The fact that anger is rooted in human physiology, however, does not prove that it is 
a beneficial passion. Seneca suggests that one of the causes of anger is “a natural endowment 
of heat in the mind” (II.19.ii).34  He admits that the “natural” quality of this anger makes it 
difficult to overcome, as “once the elements have been mixed at birth, to alter them is out of 
the question,” but asserts that one can do things to avoid fanning the flames, so to speak, such 
as avoiding too much wine or food and getting plenty of exercise (II.20.i).35  Contrary to 
Seneca’s estimation, Lactantius interprets this physiological connection as a divine 
sanctioning of anger.  He argues that if God did not intend for us to be angry, then he would 
not have “inserted anger in the liver of man, since it is believed that the cause of this emotion 
is contained in the moisture of the gall.” Lactantius does add, however, that although God 
“does not altogether prohibit anger,” he does forbid us to “persevere in anger. For the anger 
                                                 
33 Q. 48, Article 2, p 534.  
 
34 Seneca, De Ire 58. 
 
35 Ibid., 59. 
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of mortals ought to be mortal; for if it is lasting, enmity is strengthened to lasting 
destruction.”36 Milton’s appraisal of human anger in “An Apology” follows Lactantius’ 
interpretation. He argues that the passions are “made the proper mould and foundation of 
every mans peculiar guifts, and virtues.” Because the sanguine individual is not forced to 
“empty out all his sociable livelinese,” therefore, neither should “the cholerick to expel quite 
the unsinning predominance of his anger.”37  
While opinions as to the sinful nature of human anger differ, early modern writers 
and theologians share in a general consensus that God’s anger is good, righteous, merciful, 
and ultimately loving. This depiction of God’s perfect anger may seem somewhat at odds 
with the way God is portrayed in the Bible, especially the Old Testament. Although Nahum 
1:3 gives us a Yahweh who is “slowe to angre,” Isaiah warns:  
Beholde, the days of the Lord cometh cruel, with wrath and 
fierce anger to lay the land waste: and he shal destroy the 
sinners out of it …. Everie one that is found, shalbe striken 
through: and whoesoever joyneth him self, shal fall by the 
sworde. Their children also shalbe broken in pieces before their 
eies: their houses shalbe spoiled, and their wives ravished. 
(Isaiah 13:9;15-16)38 
 
Philosophers and theologians have examined this problematic notion of the “wrath of 
God” for millennia. As the Anchor Bible notes, the influence of Hellenic philosophy, such as 
Stoicism, gave rise to notions of God as detached or impassive.39 This perception struck 
                                                 
36 De Ira Dei 42. 
 
37 “An Apologie,” The Works of John Milton. Vol III. Ed. Frank Allen Patterson. (New York: Columbia UP, 
1931): 3:313.  
 
38 Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from the Bible are from The Geneva Bible, a facsimile of the 1560 
edition.  (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).  
 
39“Wrath of God,”Anchor Bible Dictionary Vol 6. Ed. David Noel Freedman. (New York: Doubleday, 1992): 
989. 
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many early modern theologians as inconsistent with the Biblical portrait of God, who clearly 
experienced anger, pity, sorrow, and love. But what is the nature of this experience? Does 
God “feel” these emotions, or do human beings simply use this familiar terminology of 
emotion to describe his actions? Erasmus addresses this question in his 1524 “Diatribe or 
Sermon Concerning Free Will”: 
Holy Scripture knows how to adjust its language to our human 
condition.  In it are passages where God is angry, grieved, 
indignant, furious; where he threatens and hates.  Again in 
other places he has mercy, he regrets, he changes his 
intentions. This does not mean that such changes really take 
place in the nature of God. These are rather modes of 
expression, benefiting our weakmindedness and dullness.40 
 
Erasmus thus characterizes the Bible’s depiction of God’s wavering emotions as a human 
accommodation. God’s nature is never in flux; He does not feel angry one day and then 
merciful the next. Rather, human “weakmindedness” demands a portrait of God’s mind that 
we can understand. The Bible thus gives us a God whose emotional experience is at least 
somewhat similar to our own.  Because of this, we should not understand God to suffer wrath 
as an emotional phenomenon, but as part of His ineffable nature. Erasmus does not deny the 
ontological reality of God’s wrath, but instead argues that we must never assume that it bears 
any legitimate correspondence to the human experience of anger or other emotions. 
 Thomas Adams makes a similar point in his aptly-named 1652 sermon, “God’s 
anger.” Although the majority of this sermon is devoted to reminding the audience that God 
is only angered by man’s sin (“There can be no cause but sin; we never read that God was 
angry for any thing else.”), Adams also draws a nuanced distinction between God’s anger 
and man’s:  
                                                 
40 Erasmus, “A Diatribe or Sermon Concerning Free Will.” Discourse on Free Will. Trans. Ernst F. Winter.  
(London; New York: Continuum, 2005):8. 
. 
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Man may be angry without sin, not without perturbation: God 
is angry without either perturbation or sin. His anger is in his 
nature, not by anthropopathie, but properly; being his 
corrective Justice, or vindicative Justice …. Our anger is an 
impotent passion: His a most clear, free, and just operation. By 
this affection in our selves, wee may guesse at the perfection 
that is in God.41 
 
While human beings can feel anger without sinning, it is impossible for them to be angry 
without also suffering “perturbation”—some sort of agitation. God, however, experiences 
anger free of both sin and “perturbation.” Furthermore, where our anger is an “impotent 
passion,” God’s is a “just operation.” In other words, we feel anger imperfectly; God does 
anger perfectly. Anger is part of God’s nature because it is a necessary part of His Justice. 
Whereas Erasmus argues that the Bible uses human language and ideas to frame God’s mind 
in a way our own can comprehend, Adams suggests that we may look to our own “affection” 
of anger for a “guesse” at what God experiences. Our anger, then, is a hazy mirror of God’s.  
Despite providing a rigorous apologia for anger, Aquinas is similarly quick to admit 
that man’s anger is not the same as God’s. He reminds us that “we speak of anger in God, not 
as of a passion of the soul but as a judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take 
vengeance on sin.”42 Following his earlier argument, Aquinas equates anger with vengeance. 
Because the perpetrator of this revenge is God, there is no “passion” involved with either the 
formulation or execution of this vengeful justice. Whereas human anger can potentially be 
just, God’s anger is justice. Thomas Jackson expands on this idea by arguing that whatever 
affection God has is perfect in Him and imperfect in us, because God has these affections 
without passion. For example, God is loving, but is never “moved with love,” because He is 
                                                 
41 Thomas Adams. “God's anger; and, Man's comfort” (1652). Union Theological Seminary (New  
York, N. Y.) Early English Books Online. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Library. 15 Feb 2010. 6-
7. 
 
42 Q.47. Article I. p 524.  
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Love. This argument also extends to the “irascible” passions: “He is most jealous of his 
glory, and a revenger of iniquity most severe; yet never moved with jealousy, yet never 
passionate in revenge; because, to such as provoke his punitive justice, he is eternally 
severity and revenge itself.”43  Furthermore, Jackson stresses that God takes no pleasure in 
wreaking wrath, thereby contradicting both Thomas Aquinas and Seneca’s adversarius.  
 Jackson essentially argues that because God is dispassionate, He experiences the 
perfect Aristotelian mean of anger. He observes that although man usually returns God’s love 
with “unkindness and despite,” God is never swayed to exact “sudden revenge: quite contrary 
to the corrupt nature of man, (whose goodness usually is ill-thriven by his overgrowing 
greatness,) the unresistible strength of his almighty power is the unmovable pillar of 
moderation and merciful forbearance.”44 This description recalls Aristotle’s depiction of the 
praiseworthily angry man, “who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, 
further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought.”45  Even Lactantius, who 
elsewhere defends human anger, admits that “the anger of man ought to be curbed, because 
he is often angry unjustly; and he has immediate emotion,” while God, who is “eternal and of 
perfect virtue … is never angry unless deservedly.”46 
Another major question for early modern writers is, to borrow phrasing from the 
Anchor Bible, whether God’s wrath constitutes “a permanent attribute of God co-equal with 
love, or something more transient that is precipitated by man’s behavior.”47 In other words, is 
                                                 
43 A Treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes. Vol V. (Oxford, Oxford UP: 1844): 205. 
 
44 Ibid., 129 
 
45 Nicomachean Ethics 96-97. 
 
46 “A Treatise on the Anger of God” 41.  
 
47 “Wrath of God” 989.  
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divine wrath the necessary counterpart to divine love, or is it merely a reaction to human sin? 
In some ways, this question is a false dilemma, as many writers argue that God’s goodness is 
coeval with His justice: a good God punishes the wicked and rewards the virtuous. For this 
reason, Lactantius criticizes the Epicurean notion of a God who never experiences anger, as 
this suggests a God who never experiences kindness. In refusing to “concede to Him a vice,” 
Lactantius argues, Epicurus “deprived Him also of a virtue.”48  He makes a similar argument 
against the Stoics, who claim that because God does not suffer, He is free from the earthly 
taint of anger. Lactantius contends that if God is not angered by “the impious and the 
unrighteous, it is clear that He does not love the pious and the righteous …. The loving of the 
good arises from the hatred of the wicked …. Because God is moved by kindness, therefore 
He is also liable to anger.”49 God’s anger is thus a necessary element of his goodness, for if 
human sins went unpunished, we could not consider him to be good or just. It therefore is 
right for God to “take vengeance upon the wicked, and destroy the pestilent and guilty,” so 
that the interests of “all good men” are furthered.  “Thus,” Lactantius concludes, “even in 
anger itself there is also contained a showing of kindness.”50 God’s wrath is indeed the 
necessary counterpart to both His goodness and the larger idea of divine justice. 
 Lactantius’ depiction of God is fraught with emotional terms: he ascribes to God 
feelings of love, hatred, anger, and kindness. Indeed, Lactantius never claims that God does 
not feel emotion; instead, he argues that God feels only “virtuous” emotions. God is not 
susceptible to “desire, fear, avarice, grief, and envy,” but can and does experience “anger 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
48 “A Treatise on the Anger of God.,” 5.  
 
49 Ibid., 7-8. 
 
50 Ibid., 32.  
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towards the wicked, regard towards the good, pity towards the afflicted.”51 Lactantius also 
stresses that because God is “eternal and of perfect virtue,” He exercises complete control 
over His wrath, and is “never angry unless deservedly.”52  In a similar vein, Thomas Jackson 
argues that wrath and severity are “the proper effects of his consequent will; that is, they are 
the infallible consequents of our neglecting and despising his will revealed for our good, or 
sweet promises of saving health.”53  
 This notion of anger arising in God only as a reaction to man’s sin provides an 
inexorable link between divine wrath and divine vengeance that, in some ways, mirrors 
Aquinas’ link between human anger and the desire for vengeance. Interpreting God’s wrath 
as punishment necessarily eliminates the idea of divine anger as a wanton emotion and 
reinforces a providentialist reading of history. This interpretation was extremely popular in 
early modern England. As Alexandra Walsham notes, God was held responsible for “every 
inexplicable occurance; He regularly stepped in to discipline sinners and bestow blessings 
upon the righteous and the good. History was the canvas on which the Lord etched His 
purpose and intentions.”54  This reading of Providence into history had its roots in the 
Hebrew Bible. In Chronicles, for example, an impersonal wrath of God is portrayed as the 
driving force of history. War and other indirect misfortunes that befall Israel are explained as 
the result of God’s anger. On occasion, this wrath is described in such general terms that it is 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 32. 
 
52 Ibid., 41. 
 
53 A Treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes 189. 
  
54 Alexandra Walsham. Providence in Early Modern England. (Oxford: Oxford UP. 1999), 2. 
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not even specifically ascribed to God.55 As the Anchor Bible argues, reading God’s wrath as 
an act of justice requires one to draw distinctions between “passion” and “pathos.” Passion is 
“an emotional convulsion” that makes it “impossible to exercise free consideration of 
principles and the determination of conduct in accordance with them.”56 Whereas passion 
signifies “a loss of self-control,” pathos is  
an act formed with care and intention, the result of 
determination and decision. It is not a ‘fever of the mind’ that 
disregards standards of justice and culminates in irrational and 
irresponsible action; it is intricately linked to ‘ethos’ and 
approximates what we mean by ‘righteous indignation.’ The 
wrath of God tends to be portrayed in this way in the Old 
Testament, especially in the prophets; it seems not to be an 
essential attribute or fundamental characteristic of Yahweh’s 
persona but an expression of his will; it is a reaction to human 
history, an attitude called forth by human (mis)conduct.57 
 
According to the Anchor Bible editors, ascribing historical events to divine will requires an 
understanding that God acts with pathos, not passion. Or, in the words of a modern 
theologian, for God, “wrath is punishment, not the divine emotion which prompts or 
accompanies punishment.”58 God’s anger is not a capricious whim but a just reaction to 
human sin that creates providential order.  
 This divine punishment was often delivered via natural disasters, such as famines, 
floods, or plagues. However, the Bible also contains examples of God using human beings as 
agents of His vengeance. In Romans 6.13, Paul urges his readers to “give your selves unto 
                                                 
55 See, for example, 1Chron. 27:24: “And Ioab the sonne of Zeruiah began to number; but he finished it not, 
because there came wrath for it against Israel, nether was the number put into the Chronicles of King David.”  
 
56 “Wrath of God” 991. 
 
57 Ibid., 991. 
 
58 Anthony Tyrell Hanson . The Wrath of the Lamb (London: SPCK, 1957) 97. 
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God … and give your members as weapons of righteousness unto God .”59  This notion is 
even clearer in Romans 13:4, where Paul reminds the wicked man to fear the sword of his 
earthly King, for “he is the minister of God to take vengeance on him that doeth evil.” In 
addition to using a just ruler as an implement of wrath, God can also use a wicked tyrant for 
the same purposes. Although this concept of the “scourge of God” appeared in both Plutarch 
and Plotinus, the idea gained far greater popularity with the advent of Christianity.  The trope 
of the flagellum dei provided an answer to the question of how a just God could allow a 
wicked tyrant to wreak havoc on His beloved creation.  Christian authors explained that the 
role of the scourge was to punish, but ultimately lovingly reform, His people. By allowing—
or, perhaps, causing—a despot to torment His followers, God uses a human instrument to 
show His wrath for man’s sinfulness. As most theologians argued, the suffering that the 
people endured either made them more aware, and thus more repentant, of their wicked 
natures or caused them to draw closer to God in their pain.60  
This idea that a human being may serve as God’s righteous “weapon” is also reflected 
in Bishop Joseph Hall’s 1627 work, “Heaven Upon Earth.” Hall writes: “God strikes some 
                                                 
59Where the Geneva translation has “weapons,” the King James version has “instruments,” Wycliffe “arms,” 
Luther  “waffen”, and the Vulgate arma. The original Greek word is όπλα (weapons). 
 
60 Perhaps the most famous Biblical example of this is in Exodus, where God hardens Pharaoh’s heart to 
prevent him from freeing the Israelites. This incident sparked lively debate amongst early modern theologians 
as to whether Pharaoh had any say in the matter of acting as the “scourge of God.” Did God create in Pharaoh 
ambition and obduracy, or did these traits merely incline God to choose him as His scourge. In On Free Will, 
Erasmus argues that Pharaoh “turned evil on his own account, since he preferred to follow his own inclination, 
rather than to obey God’s commandments. This malice of Pharaoh God has utilized for his honor and for the 
salvation of his people” (48).  Pharaoh’s nefarious nature, therefore was not God’s doing, but His opportunity.  
Luther, on the other hand, contends that because all men are wicked, and God’s Omnipotence works in and 
through all men, then all of the men God works through are indeed wicked (130).  Therefore, Pharaoh’s 
particular nature played no part in God’s choice of him as a scourge.  For his part, Calvin argues in his Institutes 
that God used the evil will of Pharaoh and other scourges for His own purposes, as “while they [the scourges] 
were obeying their own unbridled lust, they were serving, unknowing, God’s righteousness. See! There is God; 
there they are—authors of the same work! But in the same work shines God’s righteousness; their iniquity” (46-
7). God can use the unjust, even the pagan, as his scourge. However, this does not make either them or their 
work good; God is the only source of righteousness in this equation. 
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immediately from Heaven with his own arm, or with the arm of angels; others he buffets with 
their own hands; some by the revenging sword of an enemy; others with the fist of his dumb 
creatures: God strikes in all: his hand moves in theirs.”61 This notion raises an array of issues. 
God’s anger may be pure and passionless, but can it remain so when it is channeled through a 
human instrument? One might first look to Christ as an example of God’s dispassionate 
emotion channeled through a human instrument. Early modern translations of the 
Nichomachean Ethics suggest that the “anger” of Christ is, in fact, the perfect Aristotelian 
mean. 
As with other passions, Aristotle advises that one should try to find the mean 
temperament between an excess and deficiency of anger; however, he seems unable to find 
precise terms for any of these states. A modern translation of Aristotle reads “Good temper is 
a mean with respect to anger; the middle state being unnamed, and the extremes almost 
without a name as well, we place good temper in the middle position, though it inclines 
towards the deficiency, which is without a name. The excess might be called a sort of 
‘irascibility.’”62Early modern translators, on the other hand, had an easier time in supplying 
names for these temperaments. John Wilkinson’s 1547 The ethiques of Aristotle reads: “In ire 
is a meane & an extreme, & the extremities have proper names, and the meane is called 
Mekenes, and he that kepeth the meane, is called meke, and he that doth habound in ire is 
called Irefull. And he that is lesse angery then he ought to be is called Iniracible or 
                                                 
61 Qtd. in Bowers, Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy, 198. 
 
62 Ibid., 96. 
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irelesse.”63 Meekness, a quality commonly associated with Christ, thus becomes the 
moderate ideal of anger.  
 Although Christ is indeed typically known for his “mekenes,” there are instances in 
the Bible where Christ shows anger, such as when he overturns the moneychangers’ tables in 
the temple. For his part, Aquinas uses the link he established between anger and vengeance 
to prove that the anger of Christ was just and holy. Aquinas admits that “it would seem that 
there was no anger in Christ,” and refers to James 1:20: "The anger of man worketh not the 
justice of God."  However, he contends that  
when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him 
a desire of the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought 
upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of 
sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said (A6) that 
sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is 
sometimes with sin, i.e. when anyone seeks revenge beyond the 
order of reason: and in this way anger could not be in Christ, 
for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however, this desire 
is without sin—-nay, is praiseworthy, e.g. when anyone seeks 
revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For 
Augustine says (on Jn. 2:17) that "he is eaten up by zeal for the 
house of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil 
in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs." Such 
was the anger that was in Christ.64 
 
Aquinas thus establishes that because Christ experiences both sorrow and a sinless desire for 
revenge, he feels anger. 
If we follow Aquinas’ argument and the precedent set in the Old Testament, Christ’s 
divinity makes his anger sinless and a just King can dispassionately execute a criminal. But 
can an ordinary individual who has suffered indignation righteously convey God’s wrath 
                                                 
63 The ethiques of Aristotle, that is to saye, preceptes of good behauoute and perfighte honestie, now newly 
tra[n]slated into English. Trans. John Wilkinson. 1547.  Early English Books Online. University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill Library. 14 February 2010. 
 
64 Q. 15, Article IX. 
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while simultaneously exacting personal vengeance? Can a passionate human being be a 
legitimate conduit of God’s dispassionate anger?  To what degree did early moderns consider 
“the wrath of God” to be a metaphorical accommodation instead of an ontological reality? 
 This dissertation examines the way Elizabethan and Jacobean revenge tragedies 
answer these questions by exploring instances where these two types of wrath collide—or, 
perhaps, collude—on the early modern stage by contextualizing plays such as William 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy, and John Marston’s 
Antonio’s Revenge with theological writings by John Calvin, Bishop Edward Reynolds, and 
Thomas Jackson, among others. My study treats the relationship between divine and human 
anger as a spectrum. I begin by discussing plays that feature explicitly divine or explicitly 
human acts of wrath. I then engage two complicated amalgamations: human anger mediated 
through divine wrath and divine wrath conveyed through human agents. 
The first chapter discusses revenge tragedies that feature ostensible acts of divine 
intervention: the accidental suicide of D’amville in Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy 
and the well-timed lightning bolt that strikes down Malefort Senior in Phillip Massinger’s 
The Unnatural Combat.  In both of these plays, the wicked characters are felled not by heroic 
protagonists but by God Himself. Tourneur’s noble Charlemont refuses to avenge his father’s 
death, constantly reminding both himself and the audience that vengeance belongs to God 
alone. In Massinger’s play, the wronged Malefort Junior actually asks God not to intervene 
so that he himself can exact revenge. Junior’s request for God to “forebeare [His] thunder” is 
granted, albeit with ironic timing, as God kills Senior after both Junior and his innocent half-
sister are dead. By analyzing these plays alongside key passages from the Book of Isaiah, I 
22 
 
argue that these works function as exhortations against anger, rashness, and despair while 
simultaneously portraying human beings as inappropriate vessels for divine wrath. 
 In chapter two, I contend that the excessively emotional temperament of John 
Marston’s Antonio is reflected in both his obsession with the physical body and the brutally 
sadistic punishment he levies against his enemies. The ending of Antonio’s Revenge 
represents a marked departure from traditional revenge tragedy tropes, as the revengers not 
only survive, but vow to take holy orders. While many critics read this self-imposed exile as 
a rejection of corrupt society, I contend that it represents an attempt to retroactively instill 
their actions with heavenly approval, replacing their bodily fixations with apparent devotion 
to the spiritual. In so doing, Marston’s play portrays divine wrath as a human construct, 
easily adapted to suit the characters’ motivations.  
 The amalgamation between human and divine anger is first explored in chapter three, 
which discusses the way the construction of the “villain revenger” in Henry Chettle’s 
Hoffman and Cyril Tourneur’s The Revenger’s Tragedy is informed by the imprecatory 
psalms. In these plays, the protagonists act on the belief that heaven applauds even their 
bloodiest deeds. Similarly, the writer of the imprecatory psalms assumes that God shares in 
his personal outrages, thus revealing a human wrath that is so thoroughly mediated through 
divine anger that the two become indistinguishable, perhaps even inseparable. Here, wrath 
connects the human mind and the divine. Vindice, Hoffman, and the psalmist willfully locate 
correspondences between their emotions and God’s; however, only the villains believe that 
God wants them to personally exact His vengeance.  
My final chapter approaches this amalgamation from the opposite view: a God-
initiated link between divine wrath and human anger. I develop this argument by approaching 
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Hamlet as a secular Jeremiah. Many early modern authors, such as John Milton and John 
Donne, generally treat Jeremiah as either a righteous prophet promising destruction to the 
reprobates or as a distraught pariah who must watch his recalcitrant city perish. I argue that 
Shakespeare uses both of these Jeremiahs in developing Hamlet’s character. Both Hamlet 
and Jeremiah are given supernatural directives to reform a wicked society: the Ghost impels 
Hamlet to revenge his murder and Yahweh uses Jeremiah to urge the Judeans to repent. This 
message from an otherworldly force stirs a range of emotions in both men. Hamlet and 
Jeremiah doubt themselves, dread their tasks, seethe with anger, and wish for their own 
deaths. In presenting figures who experience—and eloquently communicate—such intense 
personal anguish, both Hamlet and the Book of Jeremiah suggest that human emotion is 
necessary for connecting with the divine pathos. The massive body count at the end of 
Hamlet, however, indicates that human anger remains a defective articulation of the divine 
model.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 Waiting on the God Who Waits: Divine Anger in The Atheist’s Tragedy and The 
Unnatural Combat 
 
 
 In A Treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes (1628), Thomas Jackson argues 
that God’s “displeasure” is not “clothed” with the same passions that taint human anger. 
Despite this fact,  
the motions of the creatures appointed to execute his wrath are 
more furious than any man’s passions in extremest fury can be. 
What man’s voice is like his thunder? What tyrant’s frowns 
like to a lowering sky, breathing out the storms of fire and 
brimstone? Yet are the most terrible sounds which the creatures 
can present but as so many echoes of his angry voice; the most 
dreadful spectacles that heaven or earth, or the intermediate 
elements can afford, but copies of his ireful countenance: 
howbeit this change or alteration in the creature proceeds from 
him without any internal passion or alteration; Immotus movet; 
‘He moveth all things, being himself immovable.65 
   
In this passage, Jackson suggests that earthly agents of divine wrath, be they forces of nature 
or human beings, are poor imitations of God’s anger. No human voice can compare to 
thunder, no tyrant’s frowns can be as terrible as fire and brimstone. But while these 
“intermediate elements” pale in comparison to God, they themselves undergo an exponential 
increase in passion: they become “more furious than any man’s passions in extremest fury 
can be.” Therefore, although God Himself remains emotionally detached during this process 
of inspiration, the agents appointed to “execute his wrath” are filled with even more passion.  
These earthly intermediaries are imperfect versions of the divine analogue because they are 
                                                 
65 197-8. 
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earthly. Human beings may be able to deliver “echoes” of God’s anger, but they are 
incapable of divorcing God’s anger from their passion. 
 Jackson makes these observations without condemning the human agents. He seems 
almost bemused by humankind’s futile attempts at conveying divine wrath: a lowly tyrant 
frowns while God rains down brimstone.  Jackson thus uses this comparison between God’s 
anger and man’s to praise God for being “Immovable.” In a similar vein, Cyril Tourneur’s 
The Atheist’s Tragedy (c.1611) and Phillip Massinger’s The Unnatural Combat (c.1625) 
dramatize this scenario in a way that presents God as the only legitimate agent of wrath. 
However, these plays also vividly demonstrate that human passions corrupt divine anger to a 
destructive degree.    
 The main plot of The Atheist’s Tragedy involves the (non)conflict between the noble 
Charlemont and his wicked uncle, D’Amville. Critics have traditionally suggested that this 
play is an overly simplistic dramatization of triumph of faith over atheism,66 and that 
Tourneur has so thoroughly “bled” Charlemont of “every serious human weakness” that he is 
“neither believable nor tragic.”67 But while Tourneur is no Shakespeare, The Atheist’s 
Tragedy is more than just a thinly veiled morality play. The essential conflict within this play 
is not necessarily between God and D’Amville, but between what Charlemont terms “the 
passion of / [his] blood and the religion of [his] soul” (III.ii.35-6).68 
                                                 
66 See, for example, Fredson Bowers’ discussion of The Atheist’s Tragedy in Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy 
1587-1642. Princeton: Princeton UP (1940), 139-44.  See also Richard Levin’s The Multiple Plot in English 
Renaissance Drama. (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1971), 75-85. 
 
67 Charles A. Hallett and Elaine S. Hallett. The Revenger’s Madness: A Study of Revenge Tragedy Motifs. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (1980), 273. 
 
68 All citations from this play refer to The Atheist’s Tragedy. Eds. Brian Morris and Roma Gill. London: Ernest 
Benn, 1977. 
  
26 
 
Hungry for wealth and power, D’Amville murders his brother, Baron Montferrers. As 
in other revenge tragedies, the ghost of Montferrers visits his son, Charlemont, but his 
message is a stark departure from that of other ghosts. Instead of commanding Charlemont to 
avenge his foul and most unnatural murder, Montferrers’ spirit gives this bit of advice:  
Return to France, for thy old father’s dead 
And thou by murder disinherited. 
Attend with patience the success of things, 
And leave revenge unto the King of kings. 
(II.vi.20-4) 
 
Unlike other revenge tragedy ghosts, Montferrers urges not revenge, but “patience.” It seems 
that the only reason Montferrers would have his son return to France is to observe inertly the 
way events unfold.  If his murder is to be avenged, it will be done by God.  Charlemont first 
assumes the apparition to be “a vain dream,” for as far as he knows, his father is safe under 
the watchful eye of dear uncle D’Amville. When the Musketeer not only sees the ghost but 
challenges it to a scuffle, Charlemont becomes starkly convinced of its reality. After an 
attempt to “fearfully avoid” (II.vi.60) the ghost, Charlemont swiftly apologizes for his doubt 
and the scene abruptly ends.  Tourneur does not provide any glimpse into Charlemont’s 
thought process in the aftermath of the Ghost’s appearance.  There is no ostensible inner 
struggle on the part of our hero; Charlemont’s a soldier, not a philosopher. Granted, the ghost 
of Montferrers is never mistaken for a spirit of evil, and his directive (i.e., go back to France 
and see what happens) is both perfectly clear and seemingly innocuous.  
 In the next scene, we see that Charlemont has dutifully followed the Ghost’s advice 
and returned to France, where he is assumed to be dead. Charlemont happens upon his 
beloved Castabella, who is mourning at his grave. He greets her with the efficient, but 
understandably startling: “I am not dead” (3.1.72).  As Charlemont tries to revive her from 
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the resulting swoon, he curses himself for acting with “rash / And inconsiderate passion,” in 
not realizing that his sudden appearance “might affright her sense” (3.1.73-6). But 
Charlemont is not a character one might perceive as overly rash or inconsiderately 
passionate.  Nor is he violent, choleric, or even particularly impetuous. There is really no 
danger of him, say, butchering one of D’Amville’s sons in a fit of rage and then serving him 
for dinner later.   His one act of recklessness comes in the third act. Disinherited, orphaned, 
and with his paramour married to another man, Charlemont bemoans his situation at his 
father’s grave: 
 I prithee, sorrow, leave a little room 
 In my confounded and tormented mind 
 For understanding to deliberate   
 The cause or author of this accident 
 ……………………………………… 
 These circumstances, uncle, tell me you  
 Are the suspected author of these wrongs, 
 Whereof the lightest is more heavy than 
 The strongest patience can endure to bear.  
     (III.i.135-145) 
 
Charlemont’s lament that the least of his woes is too much for his patience to bear is true at 
the present moment; in the very next scene, he comes to blows with D’Amville’s son 
Sebastian.  It can conceivably be argued that Sebastian starts the fight, taking Charlemont for 
a ghost and stabbing at him in wild fear.  However, Charlemont’s exclamation “Th’art a 
villain and the son of a villain” (III.ii.28), followed by the stage direction “[They] fight. 
Sebastian is down” strongly suggests this is more than self-defense.  So does, of course, the 
proclamation that follows: “Revenge, to thee I’ll dedicate this work” (III.iii.31). 
Charlemont’s momentary lapse in patience is immediately corrected by the ghost of 
Montferrers, who reminds his son to leave the avenging to God: “Let Him revenge my 
murder and thy wrongs / To whom the justice of revenge belongs” (III.ii.32-3).   
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 Dutiful, moderately intelligent, and somewhat smug, Charlemont is perhaps not the 
most dynamic character ever to grace the stage, but his response to this warning reveals a 
greater depth than most critics have traditionally allowed him. After the ghost prevents him 
from killing Sebastian, Charlemont exclaims: “You torture me between the passion of / My 
blood and the religion of my soul” (III.ii.35-6).  This response reflects the early modern 
understanding of the difference between human anger and divine wrath.  Charlemont 
perceives two forces warring within him: the mortal coil and the immortal soul.  His 
passionate blood is excited by the desire to avenge his father’s death; his soul is immune to 
passion and thus understands the need for patience. Charlemont does not merely understand 
that vengeance belongs to God alone, he understands why.  God can carry out vengeance 
without letting emotion interfere with justice. Human beings, bogged down with blood and 
passion, cannot.  
We also see this principle illustrated in Castabella’s explanation of the connection 
between mercy and justice: 
  mercy is an attribute 
 As high as justice, an essential part 
 Of His unbounded goodness, whose divine 
 Impression, form, and image man should bear, 
 And methinks man should love to imitate 
 His mercy, since the only countenance  
 Of justice were destruction, if the sweet 
 And loving favour of His mercy did  
 Not mediate between it and our weakness. 
     (III.iv.4-12) 
 
According to Castabella, there are two visible signs of God’s justice on earth: mercy and 
destruction.  Although our sinful nature deserves destruction, mercy intercedes on our behalf.  
Man should strive to imitate God in His goodness, and because we are creatures of “blood,” 
we can only hope to do so in the most superficial way.  If a human being is incapable of 
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delivering dispassionate justice, it is better to err on the side of love, making mercy the best 
form of divine justice for man to appropriate. Justice can only be attributed to God if you 
remove affection from Justice.  
Although Charlemont obediently chooses “religion” over “blood,” he is imprisoned 
for wounding Sebastian. Charlemont bemoans the injustice of his situation: 
  I grant thee, Heaven, thy goodness doth command 
  Our punishments, but yet no further than  
  The measure of our sins. How should they else  
  Be just? Or how should that good purpose of  
  Thy justice take effect by bounding men  
  Within the confines of humanity, 
  When our afflictions do exceed our crimes? 
  Then they do rather teach the bar’brous world 
  Examples that extend her cruelties  
  Beyond their own dimensions, and instruct 
  Our actions to be more, more barbarous. 
      (III.iii.1-11) 
 
Charlemont seems mired in a universal conundrum: why do bad things happen to good 
people?  If God is just, how can an innocent and pious man be in prison while his father’s 
murderer is free?  Critics have seized upon this soliloquy as an example of Charlemont’s 
unspectacular intellect. As Brian Morris and Roma Gill note, “Charlemont is no theologian: 
ten minutes with the Book of Job would have taught him that this line of enquiry is not only 
fruitless, it is naïve.”69  Indeed, were Charlemont to end there, his words might certainly 
seem naïve.  However, he follows this petition to heaven by chastising himself for doing so: 
  O my afflicted soul, how torment swells 
Thy apprehension with profane conceit 
Against the sacred justice of my God! 
Our own constructions are the authors of 
Our misery. We never measure our  
                                                 
69 The Atheist’s Tragedy.Introduction (xxiii). They go on to say: “Tourneur, in his handling of the revenge them, 
does not attempt to explore the inner recesses of any character’s soul. He is far more concerned with outward 
display, with the demonstration—sometimes in quite sketchy terms—of a proposition and its necessary 
outworking” (xxiii).  
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Conditions but with men above us in  
Estate, so while our spirits labour to 
Be higher than our fortunes, th’are more base. 
      (III.iii.12-19) 
 
Charlemont here recognizes that his physical discomfort in being incarcerated has led him to 
presumption and blasphemy instead of supplication. He controls his perception, and thus, 
allows himself to suffer.  God is not punishing him; rather, he perceives that he is suffering, 
and assumes that it is God’s work. If he did not see his situation as affliction, he would not 
consider it the unjust actions of a cruel God.  Charlemont demonstrates the understanding 
that God is a dispassionate actor and that in ascribing emotion to God’s judgment, human 
beings commit blasphemy. Furthermore, because God is, to recall a phrase from Thomas 
Jackson, “the unmovable pillar of moderation and merciful forbearance,”70 His wrath is just 
and moderate. If we perceive it as immoderate, then the problem is with our skewed human 
understanding, not the judgment itself. 
 In the first half of his soliloquy, Charlemont seems have a simplistic understanding of 
divine judgment: the worse your sin, the harsher your punishment, and vice versa. However, 
as he moves towards self-reflection, he swiftly develops a Stoic resolve that temporarily 
removes God from the equation. When Sebastian comes to taunt him, Charlemont asserts that 
his heart is “above the reach” of Sebastian’s enmity, even though “Fate is pleased” to have 
him suffer it (III.iii.34-7).  In discarding the notion that God is responsible for his suffering, 
Charlemont holds both himself (for perceiving it) and Fate (for serving it to him) culpable. 
Charlemont imagines Fate, whom he later credits for springing him from prison, as separate 
from God’s justice. This shifting of blame away from God not only avoids blasphemy—
Charlemont no longer shakes his fist at the heavens—but it also allows him to think of 
                                                 
70 A Treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes, 129. 
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himself as both a Stoic and a Christian hero. Indeed, as he expounds to Sebastian, he has 
become an “emp’ror” of himself: “My passions are / My subjects, and I can command them 
laugh, / Whilst thou dost’ tickle ‘em to death with misery” (III.iii.44-47).  By being the 
master of his emotions, he mirrors the “undisturbed judgement” of Christ admired by Bishop 
Reynolds: 
There is more honour, in the having Affections subdued, than 
in having none at all; the business of a wise man is not to be 
without them, but to be above them. And therefore our Savior 
himself sometimes loved, sometimes rejoiced, sometimes wept, 
sometimes desired, sometimes mourned and grieved, but these 
were not Passions that violently and immoderately troubled 
him; but he as he saw fit, did with them trouble himself. His 
Reason excited, directed, moderated, repressed them, 
according to the rule of perfect, cleare, and undisturbed 
judgement.71 
 
In gaining control of his passions, Charlemont solves the conflict between the “passion of 
[his] blood / and the religion of [his] soul.”  With his emotions in check, Charlemont can 
theoretically make decisions that are more in line with divine justice than human concepts of 
vengeance. In this case, the decision requires calmly and freely accepting an undeserved 
death sentence. Unlike the vessels who, as Thomas Jackson describes, grow “more furious 
than any man’s passions in extremest fury can be,” Charlemont becomes the picture of Stoic 
restraint or Christian meekness.  
However, The Atheist’s Tragedy does explore this notion of God using human beings 
as “intermediate elements” for his wrath in the character of D’Amville. An atheist,72 
                                                 
71. A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man, 48.  
 
72 For a thorough discussion of D’Amville’s atheism, see Robert Ornstein. "The Atheist's Tragedy and 
Renaissance Naturalism.” Studies in Philology, 51:2 (1954), 194-207. Ornstein describes D’Amville as “a very 
curious compound of atheist, materialist, sensualist, nature worshipper, and politician” (195). John S. Wilks 
contends that D’Amville is a “post-Reformation consequence” of an “aggressive Renaissance secularism” 
earlier dramatized in Marlowe’s Dr. Faustus. (The Idea of Conscience in Renaissance Tragedy. Routledge: 
London, 1990): 171.  
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D’Amville’s only means of securing any sort of “eternal life” is by accruing wealth and then 
passing said wealth unto his progeny.  In an effort to attain this pseudo-afterlife, D’Amville 
murders his brother Montferrers and imprisons the rightful heir, his nephew Charlemont. He 
also marries his sickly son Rousard off to Charlemont’s beloved, Castabella.  The murder of 
Montferrers seems like the perfect crime.  Montferrers is dejected over the apparent death of 
his son, the night is dark, the servants are drunk, and there just happens to be an open gravel 
pit right where he and his ill-intentioned brother are taking their late-night stroll. When the 
inebriated servants start using their torches to swat at one another, D’Amville has a ready 
excuse to send them (and their helpful light) out of the way.  The moment they are offstage, 
D’Amville pushes the hapless Montferrers into the pit, where Borachio bludgeons him with a 
stone. His bloody deed accomplished, D’Amville then calls for the servants to return, 
blaming Montferrers’ fall on the dark.   
When the servants report that Montferrers has died, D’Amville launches into an 
ostentatious tirade against the night’s darkness.  For his part, Borachio congratulates 
D’Amville on the murder of Montferrers, calling it the “most judicious murder that / The 
brain of man was e’er delivered of” (II.iv. 101-2).  D’Amville is only too happy to bask in his 
success: 
  Ay, mark the plot. Not any circumstance  
  That stood within the reach of the design 
  Of persons, dispositions, matter, time 
  Or place, but by this brain of mine was made  
  An instrumental help, yet nothing from  
  Th’induction to th’accomplishment seemed forced 
  Or done o’ purpose, but by accident. 
      (II.iv.103-109; emphasis added) 
D’Amville realizes that his success depended on the help of “instruments.” In the above 
lines, he cites “persons, dispositions, matter, time, [and] place” as aids to his scheme. As the 
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scene continues, he identifies the “instruments” specifically as Montferrers’ depression, the 
servants’ drunkenness, and the darkness. Both Montferrers and the servants are ignorant 
accomplices; the darkness, however, seems to D’Amville as an indication that Nature was 
complicit with his scheme.  D’Amville heralds the “thunder and lightning” at line 140—
signs often interpreted as evidence of divine displeasure—as applause and “encouragement” 
from Nature. Had the thunder sounded earlier, it would have caused Montferrers to retreat 
indoors; had the lightning flashed at a less fortunate time, it would have illuminated the 
dangerous pit in Montferrers’ path.  Although D’Amville the atheist does not believe in 
providence, he does not seem to believe in coincidence either.  Because Nature is 
sympathetic with D’Amville’s designs (for, as Borachio explains at II.v.164-5, she “herself 
decay doth hate,” and therefore favors “those that strengthen their estate”), she willingly 
serves as the “beauteous mistress of a murderer” (l. 177).  This “mistress” Nature is just one 
of several instruments that aid D’Amville in his crime.  In seeing himself as the great user of 
these devices, D’Amville places himself in the role of God, wielding any instrument 
necessary to achieve his grand designs.   
In marveling at the seemingly accidental nature of his success, D’Amville 
foreshadows his own inadvertent suicide at the play’s end. Furthermore, his boast of 
receiving “instrumental help” is linguistically echoed throughout the final scene. After 
Charlemont climbs the scaffold, D’Amville professes to be so moved by his courage that he 
deems the Executioner’s hand too ignoble to end Charlemont’s life, saying: “The instrument 
that strikes my nephew’s blood / Shall be as noble as his blood. I’ll be / Thy executioner 
myself” (V.ii.227-229; emphasis added). Here, “instrument” refers to both the executioner’s 
ax and D’Amville himself.  Although the ax will literally be striking Charlemont’s blood, the 
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weapon per se is not noble in the hands of the executioner.  When D’Amville wields the ax, 
he imbues both it and the murder itself with nobility, thus making himself the “noble 
instrument” of Charlemont’s demise.  This use of “instrument” echoes D’Amville’s words 
during the murder of Montferrers, where he cited the darkness and the servants’ drunkenness 
as instruments of his murder.  His intellect and desire for self-advancement gave him super-
human status, causing Nature and circumstance to act in concert with his plans. In this scene, 
D’Amville is not merely acting with ambition or jealousy, but on the belief that Charlemont’s 
death will somehow answer for the death of his sons.  Therefore, D’Amville here sees both 
the ax and himself as instruments of a justice that transcends earthly logic, making him the 
sole arbiter and executor of a godlike justice.  As we have seen, however, human beings are 
incapable of doling out divine justice (even, it seems, D’Amville’s own perverse brand of 
“divine” justice) without tainting it with passion.  The Judge’s plea for someone to “restrain 
his fury” (V.ii.230) indicates that D’Amville is obviously not acting rationally, as does 
D’Amville’s retort: “I’ll butcher out the passage of his soul / That dares to interrupt the 
blow” (V.ii.231-2).  
As Charlemont and Castabella bend to accept the blow, D’Amville commits his 
notoriously inadvertent suicide: “As he raises up the axe strikes out his own brains, staggers 
off the scaff” (V.ii.241-2). Because the bizarre spectacle of D’Amville’s self-murder is what 
makes the play famous (or, at the very least, infamous), it has been a source of much critical 
contention. Hallett and Hallett concisely sum up most scholarly opinion by referring to it as a 
“crude deus ex machina.”73 Most critics argue that aside from evincing Tourneur’s lack of 
skills as a dramatist, D’Amville’s unique stage death was seen by early modern audiences as 
                                                 
73 The Revenger’s Madness 277.  
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a “fitting” end for an atheist. Robert Ornstein, for example, suggests that D’amville’s death 
dramatizes the fate for all atheists outlined by prose writers during the period.74  Ornstein 
draws particular attention to this excerpt from Martin Fotherby’s Atheomastix:  
none of them doe die faire and naturall deathes; but all violent 
and unnaturall. By which immediate iudgements of God, 
falling down so certainly, and so directly upon the heads of 
Atheists, more than upon any othe wicked ones; yea, and so 
generally too, upon everyone of them, without all exception; 
God doth much more effectually proove himselfe to be, in the 
evidence of those workes; then all the Atheists in the world can 
proove God not to be, by the efficacy of their words.75 
 
Ornstein’s argument connects Fotherby’s reference to the “heads of Atheists” with 
D’Amville’s errant axe-blow to his own head.  As for the weapon itself, Huston  
Diehl argues because the axe was a traditional symbol of death, “D’amville’s desire to use it 
may associate him and his atheism with death, with what is life-denying.” Furthermore, 
because the head is the traditional seat of human reason, D’Amville’s fatal wound “may 
therefore call to mind the conventional belief that the atheist in his denial of God murders his 
own God-given reason.”76  
Although these arguments are insightful, they overlook a potential allusion to Isaiah 
10.15-6, where Isaiah proclaims: 
Shal the ax boast it self against him that heweth therwith? Or 
shal the sawe exalt itself against him that moueth it? As if the 
rod shulde lift up it self against him that taketh it up, or the 
staffe shulde exalt it self, as it were no wood.  Therfore shal the 
Lord God of hosts send among his fat men, leanenes, and under 
his glorie he shal kindle a burning, like the burning of fyre. 
 
                                                 
74 Robert Ornstein. “The Atheist's Tragedy and Renaissance Naturalism.” Studies in Philology, 51: 2 (1954).  
194-207. 
 
75 Qtd. in Ornstein 201. 
 
76Huston Diehl. “’Reduce Thy Understanding to Thine Eye’: Seeing and Interpreting in The Atheist's Tragedy." 
Studies in Philology 78.1 (1981):55. 
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In this passage, Yahweh rebukes Assyria for boasting about his prowess against Israel. The 
Lord is the wielder, and Assyria His ax, an instrument used to punish the Israelites for their 
sins.  Assyria himself has no power, but has only succeeded because the Lord has allowed 
him to do so.  The ax, therefore, should not “boast itself” against the one who uses it, nor 
should the rod “lift up it self” against the one who wields it.  As the commentary to the 
Geneva Bible elucidates: “Here we se that no creature is able to do anie thing, but as God 
appointeth him, and that they are all but his instruments to do his worke, thought the 
intentions be diverse.”77  Although Assyria claims to have defeated Israel with his strength 
and wisdom, he was merely acting as the instrument of God’s wrath.  God unleashed Assyria 
to reveal His justice to the Israelites.   
In this play, the ax indeed does “raise itself” against the wielder, as D’Amville wields 
an ax, and is accidentally killed by a wayward ax-fall. On a more figurative level, however, 
one could read D’Amville as the ax, and God as the wielder.  If The Atheist’s Tragedy were 
to adhere to the traditional revenge tragedy protocol, Charlemont would kill the villain, thus 
serving as God’s “ax.” But because D’Amville accidentally offs himself, he is the instrument 
of his own demise; he is his own Assyria.  If we follow the model provided in Isaiah, 
Charlemont would not be an appropriate instrument for divine wrath because he is not a 
heathen, as was Assyria and as is D’Amville.78  Furthermore, as Thomas Jackson observes, 
human beings are imperfect vessels of divine wrath because their judgment is clouded with 
passion, which is no more keenly illustrated than in this scene: D’Amville is so fraught with 
rage that he accidentally kills himself in his attempt to exact justice.  In believing that his 
                                                 
77 Isa. 10:15. Comment K, 286. 
 
78 For an in-depth analysis of the  connection between Isa. 10:5 and early modern ideas of the “scourge of God,” 
see Roy W. Battenhouse’s article “Tamburlaine, the ‘Scourge of God’” PMLA, 56.2. (1941), 337-348.  
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own naturalistic, self-serving definition of “justice” supersedes Christian doctrine, the “ax” 
that is D’Amville boasts itself above his wielder, God.  And, just as He did with Assyria, 
God strikes down the boasting instrument.79  Ultimately, the death of D’Amville serves the 
same purpose as the routing of the Israelites: God’s justice is revealed.   
 Upon realizing that his plan to execute Charlemont has gone horribly awry, 
D’Amville asks: “What murderer was he / That lifted up my hand against my head?”  When 
the Judge says that it was D’Amville himself, he responds “I thought he was / A murderer 
that did it” (V.ii.242-6). It was, of course a “murderer” who dropped the ax on D’Amville, 
and D’Amville comes to recognize this:  
  1 JUDGE   
   God forbid. 
  D’AMVILLE 
   Forbid? You lie, judge; he commanded it. 
   To tell thee that man’s wisdom is a fool. 
   I came to thee for judgement, and thou think’st 
   Thyself a wise man. I outreached thy wit 
   And made thy justice murder’s instrument.  
   In Castabella’s death and Charlemont’s, 
   To crown my murder of Montferrers with 
   A safe possession of his wealthy state. 
      (V.ii.245-254; emphasis added) 
 
In these lines, D’Amville not only admits that there is a God, he understands that his death is 
part of God’s plan to reveal the folly in human wisdom, human law, and, most importantly, 
human judgment.  The Judges were poised to execute Charlemont and Castabella while a 
murderer went free.  D’Amville planned to use the justice system to achieve the deaths of his 
enemies, thus making “justice murder’s instrument.”  Ironically, however, D’Amville 
realizes that his self-murder is the instrument of God’s justice: 
  There was the strength of natural understanding. 
  But Nature is a fool. There is a power 
                                                 
79 See also Isa. 10:12-16; 10:24-27. 
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  Above her that hath overthrown the pride 
  Of all my projects and posterity. 
  For whose surviving blood I had erected 
  A proud monument, and struck ‘em dead 
  Before me, for whose deaths I called to thee 
  For judgement. Thou did want discretion for  
  The sentence, but yond’ power that struck me knew 
  The judgement I deserved, and gave it.   
     (V.ii.257-266) 
 
D’Amville admits that God has struck him down for two reasons: to show that man’s wisdom 
is folly (he outwitted the judges, but God outwitted him) and because he deserved 
punishment, and only God could serve it to him. God has made a fool out of D’Amville for 
his faith in naturalism and his attempt to achieve an earthly eternity through wealth and 
progeny. But He has also shown the folly of the judges, and, by extension, all of human 
justice.  God uses D’Amville not only as an instrument of divine justice, but as an instrument 
of divine revelation.  This revelation does not arise merely out of D’Amville’s death, but in 
his precise manner of death.  
 The greatest irony in the play is that after receiving his deathblow, the evil D’Amville 
understands God’s designs better than any of the “good” characters in the play:  
 1 JUDGE 
  Strange is his death and judgement. With the hands 
  Of joy and justice I thus set you free.  
  The power of that eternal providence  
  Which overthrew his projects in their pride 
  Hath made your griefs the instrument to raise 
  Your blessings to a greater height than ever. 
       (V.ii.269-274; emphasis added) 
  
These lines perhaps reveal why it was so easy for D’Amville to deceive the judges in the first 
place.  Although the judges have seen D’Amville acting eccentrically, to say the least, surely 
they should have words more incisive than “Strange is his death and judgement.”  
Furthermore, D’Amville’s admittedly “strange” death and judgment has proven, if nothing 
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else, that the judges have no legitimate claims to true justice, thereby rendering the Judge’s 
“With the hands / Of joy and justice I thus set you free” a laughably empty pronouncement.  
If D’Amville had not intervened, the Judge would have used those same “hands of justice” to 
send Charlemont to his death. The Judge’s assertion that providence has raised Charlemont’s 
blessings to unprecedented heights seems somewhat specious, considering that Charlemont 
has lost his father, his uncle, two cousins, and just barely avoided the scaffold himself.  
Providence may have used Charlemont’s greifs as an “instrument” to achieve a greater good, 
but certainly not in the way the Judge describes it. Charlemont’s response is not much more 
insightful: 
  Only to Heaven I attribute the work, 
  Those gracious motives made me still forbear 
  To be mine own revenger. Now I see 
  That patience is the honest man’s revenge. 
      (V.ii.279-284; emphasis in original) 
 
We see that Charlemont too has missed the mark. God may have kept Charlemont from 
immediately revenging his father’s death, but it was not merely so God could do it Himself.  
God could have just as easily struck D’Amville with lightning, or had him exit, pursued by a 
bear.  D’Amville’s death via self-axing, with its parallels to Isaiah 10:15, and the timing and 
location of this act (in a courtroom right before innocents are about to be executed) shows 
that The Atheist’s Tragedy is more about the failure of human judgment than the triumph of 
human patience.  
 Charlemont’s simple platitude also reveals that he has a rather unchristian 
understanding of “patience.”80 Irving Ribner suggests that the word “patience” in this play 
                                                 
80 Morris and Gill argue that “one would expect Tourneur, who is quite precise and detailed about D’Amville’s 
brand of atheism, to be equally detailed about Charlemont’s patience. But this is not the case. Where he uses the 
word, Tourneur ascribes no precise (and certainly no theological) meaning to it.  …. The nearest he comes to 
describing the virtue is … where he speaks of suffering the blows of Fate with fortitude …. Not until the very 
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refers to “uncomplaining acceptance of fate as a manifestation of divine will, coupled with 
faith and hope in a future felicity promised by Christ.”81 Although Charlemont does 
demonstrate an “uncomplaining acceptance” of his death sentence, he does not necessarily 
interpret “patience” the same way that Ribner suggests. Instead, he seems to view patience as 
his key to personal revenge; because he patiently put off killing D’Amville, God rewarded 
him with the spectacle of D’Amville’s demise. While the original scriptural location of 
“vengeance is mine” is Deuteronomy 32:35, where Moses reminds the Israelites that God 
will eventually punish their enemies. The more famous version (and one the more oft-quoted 
in Renaissance) hails from Romans 12:19: “Dearly beloved, avenge not your selves, but give 
place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine: I wil repaye, saith the Lord.” As 
Morris and Gill note, this verse is followed by “Therefore, if thine enemie hunger, feede him: 
if he thirst, give him drinke: for in so doing, thou shalt heape coles of fire on his head. Be not 
overcome of evil, but overcome evil with goodness.” Morris and Gill argue that “Tourneur’s 
play resolutely avoids this area of ethical concern. There is no question that Charlemont is 
seeking by his patience and his forbearance to ‘heap coals of fire’ on the head of 
D’Amville.”82 Indeed, Charlemont’s belief that he in some way “deserves” to see D’Amville 
die does not reflect a Christian understanding of “patience,” even as this play presents it. Let 
us return to Montferrers’ two bits of post-mortem fatherly advice:  
Attend with patience the success of things, 
And leave revenge unto the King of kings. 
(II.vi.22-4) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
end does Charlemont relate his patience specifically to the Grace of God, and the theme is not in any sense a 
dramatic counterweight to the naturalistic atheism of D’amville” (xxi-xxii, n. 31).  
 
81 The Atheist’s Tragedy 55.  
 
82 Introduction to The Atheist’s Tragedy xx. 
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Let Him revenge my murder and thy wrongs  
To whom the justice of revenge belongs. 
 (III.ii.32-3) 
 
On both occasions, Montferrers specifically says that the revenge belongs to God alone. No 
matter how “honest” a man Charlemont is, he never has a claim to any part of the revenge 
process. God exacts vengeance because it is God who has been wronged.  Like Assyria 
before him, D’Amville is a covetous, hubristic, murderous heathen who brags of his own 
intellect and power.83  It is God’s prerogative to dispense justice as He sees fit, and, as 
Castabella noted in Act III, this justice can take the form of either mercy or destruction.  
Perhaps the reason that God does not strike down D’Amville immediately after his crime is 
because He is showing mercy in the form of patience.  
 As Thomas Jackson explains, human beings lack patience because we have a limited 
scope of understanding. Because God is omniscient, He never runs out of patience. However,  
as man's wit in this case is but finite, so his patience cannot be 
complete. Even the wisest will be moved to wrath or violence, 
or other foul play, if the game whereat he shoots be fair and 
good, and most of his strings already broken; nor can he be 
absolutely secure of good success so long as the issue is subject 
to contingency, and may fall without the horizon of his 
foresight and contrivance. But wisdom infinite doth completely 
arm the Omnipotent Majesty (if I may so speak) with infinite 
patience and long-suffering towards such as every minute of 
their lives violently thwart and cross some or other particular 
means which he had ordained for his glory and their good.84 
 
Our impatience is a result of our lack of foresight. Because we do not know what will come 
of our present misfortunes, we either rush to right them ourselves or grow frustrated when 
                                                 
83 See Isa. 10:12-13, where the Lord promises to punish “the proude heart of the King of Asshur, and his 
glorious and proude lokes, because he said, By the power of mine owne hand have I done it, and by my 
wisdom, because I am wise: therefore I have removed the borders of the people,and have spoiled their treasures, 
and have pulled down the inhabitants like a valiant man.” 
 
84 A Treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes  87. 
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God takes too long to punish the wrongdoers. Jackson thus credits impatience with causing 
“wrath or violence” in even the “wisest” of human beings, and urges us to trust that God will 
eventually make things right.  
 This notion is thoroughly supported throughout the Old Testament, but particularly by 
the book of Isaiah, where Yahweh is depicted as both requiring patience from and having 
patience for His people.  In Isaiah 30:15-18, the prophet says:  
In rest and quietnes shal ye be saved: in quietness and in 
confidence shalbe your strenghth, but ye wolde not. For ye 
have said, No, but we wil flee away upon horses. Therefore 
shal ye flee. We wil ride upon the swiftest. Therefore shall 
your persecutors be swifter. A thousand as one shall flee at the 
rebuke of one … til ye be left as a shippe mast upon the top of 
a mountain .… Yet therefore wil thy Lord waite, that he may 
have mercy upon you, and therefore wil he be exalted, that he 
may have compassion upon you: for the Lord is the God of 
iudgement. Blessed are al they that waite for him. 
 
Although the Lord has promised salvation for His people, they choose expediency over faith.  
As a result, they are persecuted and isolated by their enemies. The Lord, however, shows 
mercy and delivers them from their troubles. The Geneva commentary on this passage lauds 
“the great mercies of God who with pacience waiteth to call sinners to repentance.”85  
Similarly, in Romans 9:22-23, Paul writes: 
What and if God wolde, to shewe his wrath, and to make his 
power knowen, suffer with long pacience the vessels of wrath, 
prepared to destruction? And that he might declare the riches of 
his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hathe prepared 
unto glorie?  
 
Thus, in both the Old and New Testaments, God is depicted as a patient wielder of wrath. In 
Isaiah, His patience is mercy: He waits for Israel to recognize their sins and repent. In 
Romans, His patience is both mercy and a way for Him to reveal His glory to the faithful and 
                                                 
85 Commentary on Isa. 30:18. Comment Q (293).  
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the wicked alike. In the same vein, Lactantius reminds us that “He who ceases to sin renders 
the anger of God mortal. For this reason He does not immediately punish every one who is 
guilty, that man may have the opportunity of coming to a right mind, and correcting 
himself.”86  
 This concept of “waiting on the God who waits” has several implications for a 
discussion of early modern revenge tragedy.  Montferrers, like Isaiah, warns Charlemont to 
patiently await God’s intervention instead of hastily rushing to avenge his murder. 
Charlemont should assume that God is aware of the injustice and that He will take action 
when He deems the time appropriate. Most revenge tragedies begin with the same elements 
of societal disarray: a wicked leader has murdered the protagonist’s close relative (usually a 
father). This act seems to have gone unpunished, leaving it up to the protagonist to set things 
right.  More often than not, the protagonist’s widowed mother is also somehow aggrieved by 
the villain.  This pattern of tyranny, fatherless-ness, and abuse of widows is described 
throughout Isaiah, but most specifically in 10:1-4: 
Wo unto them that decre wicked decrees, and write grievous 
things, To kepe backe the poore from iugement and to take 
awaie the iugement of the poore of my people, that widowes 
maie be their praie, and that thei maie spoile the fatherless. 
 
The prophet also describes the consequences of such sin: 
  What wil ye do now in the daie of visitation, and of   
  destruction, which Shal come from farre? To whome wil ye 
  flee for helpe?  And where wil ye leave your glorie?  Without 
  me everie one shal fall among them … thei shal fall downe  
  among the slaine: yet for all this his wrath is not turned awaie, 
  but his hand is stretched out stil. 87 
                                                 
86 “A Treatise on the Anger of God” 43. 
87 See also Isa. 1:23-4: “Thy princes are rebellions and companions of theves: every one loveth gifts, and 
followeth after rewards: they judge not the fatherless, nether doeth the widowes cause come before them. 
Therefore saith the Lord God of hostes, the mighties one of Israel, Ah, I wil ease me of mine adversaries, and 
avenge me of mine enemies.” 
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God is thus depicted as recognizing the troubles on earth, being moved by them, and 
promising to punish the wicked.  The action in a revenge tragedy arises when a revenger 
either doubts this promise to avenge, becomes impatient in waiting for it to be fulfilled, or 
believes that it is his duty to carry it out on God’s behalf.  But part of having faith in God’s 
omniscience is also having faith in His mercy: perhaps sinners seem to go unpunished 
because God is patiently, mercifully waiting for them to repent.  If this is so, then revengers 
who “rush” God by killing the murderers themselves commit a heinous sin. Furthermore, 
most revengers erroneously believe that God’s vengeance must equal the villain’s death, 
precluding the possibility of the villain’s repentance.  
In virtually every revenge tragedy, the villain is given time, opportunity, and impetus 
to repent; The Atheist’s Tragedy is no different. After being frightened by the disguised 
Charlemont in the graveyard, D’Amville “starts at the sight of a death’s head” and feels a 
pang of conscience. He marvels that the sky once drew “the curtains of the clouds between / 
Those lights and me about this bed of earth / When that same strumpet, Murder, and myself / 
Committed sin together,” but now that he wishes for darkness to “steal from [his] shame 
unseen,” the sky accosts him “I’ th’ face with all her light corrupted eyes / To challenge 
payment o’ me” (III.ii.216-230).  Worse than this, D’Amville mistakes a cloud for the 
sheeted ghost of Montferrers hovering above him in the sky. A crisis of conscience has thus 
thrown D’Amville’s naturalistic worldview out of joint. Whereas he once saw Nature as both 
his mistress and accomplice, he now sees her as an adversary, shining light on his misdeeds 
and tormenting him with his victim’s likeness. 
With Nature no longer acting as a co-conspirator, D’Amville instead wishes for 
obliteration by her hand: he longs to have his body “circumvolved” inside a cloud so that 
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“when the thunder tears / His passage open, it might scatter me / To nothing in the air!” 
(IV.iii.249-52). D’Amville’s desire to be destroyed by what consumes him is an ironic 
foreshadowing to his actual demise at the play’s end, where his passionate hatred for 
Charlemont indeed becomes his own undoing. Furthermore, his wish to be incorporated into 
a cloud and then shattered by thunder echoes Castabella’s plea roughly 80 lines earlier for a 
bolt from the heavens to strike D’Amville down and recalls the common connection between 
divine wrath and thunder.   
D’Amville also has a more subtle confrontation with his conscience when faced with 
the deaths of his sons. D’Amville murders his brother to create and perpetuate his own 
dynasty, thus securing a worldly “eternity.”  He likens this process to building a house, and, 
presumably brandishing the rock used to bludgeon Montferrers, proclaims: “Upon this 
ground I’ll build my manor house, / And this shall be the chiefest corner stone” (II.iv.99-
100). Samuel Schuman identifies these lines as “a rather obvious parody of the New 
Testament,” and describes the building imagery as “a bit pedestrian,” but “perfectly 
workmanlike tools to communicate the notions of grand rise and ruinous fall.”88 But both 
Schuman and earlier critics of the play miss a crucial set of lines that relate to this imagery. 
As Castabella is accosted by D’Amville, she cries: 
  O patient Heav’n, why doest thou not express 
  Thy wrath in thunderbolts, to tear the frame  
  Of man in pieces? How can earth endure 
  The burden of this wickedness without  
  An earthquake, or the angry face of Heaven 
  Be not enflamed with lightning?  
      (IV.iii.162-8) 
 
                                                 
88 Cyril Tourneur, p. 123-4.  Schuman also cites the work of Una Ellis-Fermor, who contends that imagery of 
“the founding, raising and subsequent fall of a building … illustrate[s] the founding, rearing, and overthrowing 
of the family of D’Amville.” See Fermor’s “The Imagery of The Revenger’s Tragedie and The Athiest’s 
Tragedie.” Lodern Language Review. 30.3 (Jul 1935): 290. 
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In these lines, Castabella wonders why God has not shown wrath for D’Amville’s sins. 
Castabella describes heaven as being so “patient” with D’Amville that God seems unmoved 
by his wickedness.  But God does supply all three signs Castabella asks for—thunderbolts, 
“tear[ing] the frame of man in pieces,” and an earthquake; He just does so according to His 
own time frame and, in the case of the earthquake, figuratively instead of literally.  We will 
recall from Act II that there was thunder and lightning immediately after the murder of 
Montferrers, a sign D’Amville interpreted as Nature’s approval instead of God’s anger. The 
“tearing” of D’Amville’s frame will come at the end of the play. The metaphorical 
“earthquake” that Castabella calls for comes figuratively in the form of the destruction of the 
D’Amville family line. 
 In Act V, D’Amville learns that his son Sebastian has been slain by the jealous 
Belforest. His other son, Rousard, is swiftly succumbing to illness.  As Rousard moans in 
agony, D’Amville laments: 
  His gasping sighs are like the falling noise 
  Of some great building when the groundwork breaks. 
  On these two pillars stood the stately frame  
And architecture of my lofty house.  
An earthquake shakes ‘em; the foundation shrinks. 
Dear Nature, in whose honore I have raised 
A work of glory to posterity, 
O bury not the pride of that great action 
Under the fall and ruin of itself. 
 (V.i.75-83) 
 
Although D’Amville ascribes the death of his sons to “Nature,” he himself makes the 
rhetorical link between his misfortune and God’s wrath by referring to an earthquake, a 
common sign of God’s wrath in the Old Testament.  
 It is this end of the D’Amville family line—completed, of course, by the death of 
D’Amville himself—that serves as God’s vengeance.  The fact that D’Amville himself 
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makes the link between his sons’ deaths and an earthquake is significant, as it shows that he 
might, subconsciously at least, understand that his sins might be the reason for his 
misfortunes. The death of Rousard causes D’Amville’s atheism to falter:  “Sure there is some 
power above / [Nature] that controls her force” (V.ii.102-3).  Unfortunately, this doubt does 
not propel D’Amville to belief in God; instead, it leads him to seek out earthly justice for his 
losses. D’Amville’s passion for revenge against Charlemont causes him to be the one who 
rushes to revenge, thereby securing for himself the same fate that awaits almost every 
impatient revenger. Just as He does with the Israelites, God gives D’Amville time and 
opportunity to repent, thus reiterating Castabella’s earlier claim that the two sides to God’s 
justice are mercy and destruction.  D’Amville’s rejection of the former is an invitation to the 
latter.  
 Castabella’s wish for God to “express [His] wrath in thunderbolts” is not literally 
granted in The Atheist’s Tragedy. D’Amville’s death—and thus, God’s wrath—is delivered 
by means of a human instrument: D’Amville himself. In Phillip Massinger’s The Unnatural 
Combat, however, God makes no use of human “intermediate elements”: the villainous 
Malefort Senior is indeed struck by lightning. At the play’s inception,  
Malefort Sr. is challenged to a duel by his son, the notorious pirate Malefort Jr. At this point 
in the play, only the Maleforts know precisely why Junior is so incensed against his father.  
Junior’s insistence on keeping his reasons a secret only adds more ignominy to his already 
tarnished name and casts more sympathy upon his father. Although the audience witnesses 
Malefort’s anger, ambition, deceit, and lustful pursuit of his own daughter, we remain 
oblivious to his original crime until the very last scene, where it is revealed that Malefort 
murdered his first wife so that he could marry another.  At the outset, however, Malefort 
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appears guilty only by association with his mutinous son, who has blockaded the harbor. In 
fact, Malefort invites God to strike him down if he is indeed guilty of treason: 
  Thou searcher of mens hearts, 
  And sure defender of the innocent … 
  If I in this am guiltie strike me dead, 
  Or by some unexpected meanes confirme, 
  I am accused unjustly. 
      (I.i.342-6)89 
 
Malefort is, in fact, not guilty of treason, and has indeed been “accused injustly.” Thus, the 
fact that he is not stricken dead on the spot can not strictly be attributed to a lack of divine 
justice. However, immediately after delivering these lines, Malefort is presented with his 
son’s challenge to a fight to the death. He welcomes this missive as a “second life in curing 
[his] wounded honour,” and thanks the “Immortal powers” for the “merciful” removal of his 
“shame for being the father to so bad a sonne” (I.i.376-84). Malefort then kills his son in 
combat and mutilates his corpse in a further effort to distance himself from his ignoble 
progeny. Here, Malefort’s plea for justice is a bit of public posturing: he avows his innocence 
before God and the Marseilles court. The fact that he survives the invocation and triumphs 
easily over his son “proves” that he is innocent.  
 However, as the play progresses, Malefort succumbs to a lustful longing for his own 
daughter, Theocrine. Troubled by this desire, Malefort worries that he will eventually be 
judged for his crimes. As “a storme” begins to rage in the last act, Malefort welcomes the 
advent of “blustring Boreas,” likening the tempestuous weather to his inner turmoil:  
I am posess’d  
With whilre-windes, and each guilty thought to me is 
A dreadfull Hurricano; though this centre  
Labour to bring for the earthquake, and hell open 
                                                 
89 All quotations from this work refer to: The Unnatural Combat. Ed. Robert Stockdale Telfer. (Princeton:  
Princeton UP, 1932). 
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Her wide stretch’d jawes, and let out all her furies, 
They cannot adde an atom to the mountaine 
Of feares and terrors that each minute threaten 
To fall on my accursed head. 
    (V.ii.264-271) 
 
Aside from referencing both possession and hell, Malefort also calls for mountains to fall 
upon him, which, as Morris and Gill observe, is a “common cry of distracted or repentant 
atheists, deriving perhaps from Hosea 10:8: ‘And they shall say to the mountains, Cover us; 
and to the hills, Fall on us.’”90 Malefort’s tempting of hell to release her furies is readily 
answered, as the bloody ghosts of both Malefort Junior and Malefort’s first wife appear 
before him. The ghosts communicate to Malefort that their presence is to “launce [his] sear’d 
up conscience” and that his present misfortunes were “forg’d upon the anvile of [his] impious 
wrongs.” He then finally confesses to poisoning his first wife, which was the reason that his 
son was forced to “shake off [his] filial duty” (V.ii.280-9) in the first place. But perhaps the 
most interesting part of this revelatory speech is Malefort’s assessment—which the ghosts 
confirm—that the reason Malefort defeated Junior in combat was that Junior’s status as 
Malefort’s son rendered him “not a competent judge mark’d out by heaven / For her 
revenger” (V.ii.295-6).   
It would seem by these lines that heaven’s proscription is not against revenge per se, 
but against the “unnatural combat” of a son murdering his father.  Malefort’s description of 
Junior as an incompetent “judge” suggests that the problem is not in the physical action of 
revenge, but in the discretion necessary to carry it out according to heaven’s standards.  
Junior’s decision to avenge his mother’s death is obviously not a rash one; although we do 
not know exactly when he discovered his father’s treachery, he does describe his plans as 
                                                 
90 Morris and Gill are commenting on a similar speech made by D’Amville at IV.iii.246, n80.  They also note 
the reference in Dr. Faustus, V.ii.150-1. 
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being “long since resolv’d on” (II.i.46).  Furthermore, as the duel approaches, Junior entreats 
his captains to “not entertain a false beleef / that I am mad,” and says his intact “discourse 
and reason” only makes his situation more devastating. This clear disavowal of madness (or 
even the pretense of madness) is quite a departure from most other characters charged with 
the prospect of revenge and obviously speaks to Junior’s rationality. The audience does not 
see Junior’s reaction to learning of his mother’s murder, therefore, nor are we privy to any of 
his internal debate about the ethics of revenge. By the time we encounter Junior, he has 
boiled his moral dilemma down to a simple axiom: “I can nor live, nor end a wretched life, / 
But both wayes I am impious” (II.i.58-9)—basically, Junior is damned if he does, and 
damned if he does not.   
Junior’s case therefore seems unique among revengers in that he does not appear 
frustrated, impatient, or doubtful about God’s ability to avenge his mother’s murder; in fact, 
he asks God not to intervene on his behalf: “Thou incensed Power, / A while forbeare thy 
thunder, let me have / No aid in my revenge” (II.i.189-191).  The fact that he asks God not to 
interfere demonstrates that Junior believes that God will act on his behalf. The repercussions 
of such a petition are readily evident: Junior is summarily killed by his father. Perhaps, then, 
Junior is deemed an incompetent “judge” by heaven because he usurped God’s prerogative 
not out of impatience, wrath, or the belief that he is God’s instrument of vengeance, but out 
of pride. Junior here positions himself as God’s peer: equally deserving of revenge and 
equally capable of killing Malefort. In staying God’s hand, Junior puts his personal desire for 
revenge above any sort of “pious” duty he might once have felt.  Junior’s request for God to 
“forebeare [His] thunder” is granted, albeit with ironic timing. God saves His vengeful 
thunder until both Junior and his innocent half-sister Theocrine are dead.  
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This scene can be taken as evidence that Massinger’s God has a deep-seated 
appreciation of irony. However, the precise timing of the lightning bolt may also serve as a 
reminder that God patiently awaits the repentance of a reprobate. Although Malefort admits 
his guilt and need for penance, like Faustus, Claudius, and D’Amville before him, he never 
actually repents: 
 Can any penance expiate my guilt? 
 Or can repentance save me? They are vanished.    
 Exeunt Ghosts. 
 What’s left to do then?  I’ll accuse my fate 
 That did not fashion me for nobler uses: 
 Or if those stares crosse to me in my birth, 
 Had not deni’d their prosperous influence to it, 
 With peace of conscience like to innocent men,  
 I might have ceased to be, and not as now, 
 To curse my cause of being.   
     He’s kill’d with a flash of lightning. 
      (V.ii.298-306) 
 
Malefort takes the Ghosts’ departure as a sign that repentance is impossible, and therefore 
does not even make the attempt, instead blaming fate and the stars for his sinful acts.91  God 
decides that He’s heard just about enough and finally takes matters into His own hands.  The 
other characters arrive on the scene shortly thereafter, and deduce from the unpleasant aroma 
wafting up from Malefort’s crispy corpse that he has been struck by lightning, a sure sign of 
God’s displeasure. Theocrine’s body, on the other hand, “retaines her native innocence,” 
never having “call’d downe heavens anger” (V.ii.336-8).  Beaufort Senior sums up the play’s 
moral message for any audience member still unsure about the ethics of homicide and incest: 
“There cannot be a want of power above / To punish murther, and unnatural love” (V.ii.342-
3).    
                                                 
91 A pointed reversal of II.i.200-215, where Malefort mutilates his son’s corpse, reveling in his “power to be 
unnaturall” and proclaiming himself impervious to the buffets of Fate.  
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There is indeed no “want of power” by the play’s end. But it might perhaps seem that 
way to the audience until Malefort is struck down by that fatal bolt.  After all, his son was the 
only other person aware of his original crimes, and only the unsavory Montrevile was aware 
of Malefort’s incestuous impulses. It would seem, then, that God is both the only appropriate 
and only available revenger left.  However, just because He does not punish murder and 
incest immediately should not signal a “want of power above.”  Like D’Amville, Malefort is 
subtly warned about the dangers of his actions. The more enamored he becomes of his 
daughter, the more irrational he becomes, prompting Montrevile to speculate about the cause 
of his distraction. Montrevile likens Malefort’s religion to “a nose of wax / To be turn’d 
every way” (V.ii.134-5).  Malefort agrees with this assessment, and admits kneeling to 
Montrevile on knees “that have beene ever stiffe to bend to heaven” (V.ii.126).   
Despite this apparent atheism, Malefort does recognize the vile nature of his lust, but 
attempts to assuage his guilt by remembering that he is an accomplished sinner: “there’s 
something here that tels me / I stand accomptable for greater sinnes, / I never checked at” 
(V.ii.15-17).  Malefort continues to quell his guilt by presenting a catalogue of felicitous 
partakers of incest, including the pagan gods and several animals, concluding that only 
impotent old men and “solemne superstitious fooles” are unfortunate enough to forsake such 
pleasures, which suggests that Malefort does indeed know that his desires and actions are, on 
some level, wrong.  In trying to “help” his friend, Montrevile suggests that madness can be 
treated with charms and herbs, bewitching with spells and rites, and “heavens anger” with 
“penitence and sacrifice” (IV.i.200-4).  Lumping magic spells and penitence into the same 
cache of cures does little to establish the legitimacy of overt Christian overtones in the play, 
but, at the very least, it present Malefort with the idea that repentance is possible. Malefort 
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does get a chance at repentance; he even recognizes it as such before diverting his attention 
(as he does when contemplating incest) to “easier” thoughts of fate and stars. Perhaps God’s 
forbearance of thunder, then, is not a response to Junior’s request, but evidence of God’s 
merciful patience as Malefort is given the opportunity to repent.   
There is no question of “a want of power above” in either The Unnatural Combat or 
The Athiest’s Tragedy. In both plays, the villains are punished—either by the law, as is the 
case with Levidulcia and Montreville—or by God Himself, as with D’Amville and Malefort 
Sr.  There is no “want” because, as Beaufort Senior words it in The Unnatural Combat, there 
“cannot be.” God is presented as the ultimate punisher of these wrongs because He is the 
only legitimate punisher. Human beings are too passionate, too impatient, too merciless, and, 
as is especially evident in the case of Malefort Junior, too affected by pride and personal 
indignation to effectively carry out divine justice. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Votaries of Vengeance: Human Anger and Human Cruelty in Antonio’s Revenge 
 
 
A play brimming with linguistic superfluity and spectacular gore, John Marston’s 
Antonio’s Revenge has been portrayed by critics as everything from a brilliant burlesque of 
revenge tragedies to a grotesquely overwrought literary disaster.92 While the play is, as the 
title might suggest, a revenge tragedy, the degree to which its author intended it to be 
seriously received as one is a matter of persistent critical contention.93 Part of this confusion 
lies in the play’s notorious excesses in language, characterization, and violence.94 Most 
modern critics find the play problematic because of its bizarre ending: Antonio and his 
friends not only torture and kill the villainous Piero, they also murder and cook an innocent 
child. Furthermore, the revengers are heaped with praise, offered rewards, and then announce 
their plans to become religious hermits. While some critics argue that this ending belies 
                                                 
92 For an excellent summary of Marston’s critical reception , see T.F. Wharton’s The Critical Fall and Rise of 
John Marston (Columbia: Camden House, 1994).  
 
93 For a condensation of several persuasive arguments that Marston did not employ a burlesque style in this or 
any play, see Ann Blake’s  ‘The Humour of Children’: John Marston’s Plays in the Private Theatres.” The 
Review of English Studies. 38:152. (1987): 471-82.  
 
94 Some critics have attributed these excesses in language and characterization to the fact that the play was 
written for child actors. R.A. Foakes argues that the exaggerated histrionics in both Antonio plays allowed the 
child actors to mock their adult counterparts performing revenge tragedies in other theaters. In his article, “John 
Marston’s Fantastical Plays: Antonio and Mellida and Antonio’s Revenge,” Foakes contends: “The plays work 
from beginning to end as vehicles for child-actors consciously ranting in oversize parts, and we are not allowed 
to take their passions or motives seriously. Their grand speeches are undermined by bathos and parody, and 
spring from no developed emotional situation, so that we are not moved by them, and do not take them 
seriously enough to demand justice at the end” (224).  In contrast, Ejner J. Jensen argues that “the history of the 
plays, playhouses, and actors of the early seventeenth century supplies a forceful argument that the boy actors, 
far from being inferior ‘apes’ capable only of the piquant charm of a masquerade, were in fact possessed of skill 
and talent sufficient not merely to achieve what the adults achieved—vital, moving drama—but to achieve it by 
the same means” (“The Style of the Boy Actors,” Comparative Drama, 2, 1968: 106). 
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Marston’s own personal sadistic bent,95 others simply see it as evidence of his lack of skills 
as a dramatist.96  T.S. Eliot, for example, has noted that this play, along with its predecessor 
Antonio and Mellida “give the effect of work done by a man who was so exasperated by 
having to write in a form he despised that he deliberately wrote worse than he could have 
written, in order to relieve his feelings.”97      
Eliot’s notion of Marston writing “to relieve his feelings” is not without merit when 
one considers the character of Antonio, who spends the entirety of the play either describing 
his feelings in melodramatic ecstasy or “relieving” them through murder. Antonio is perhaps 
one of the Jacobean stage’s most overtly emotional characters; thus, Antonio’s Revenge is, at 
least in part, a play about the effects of excess emotion. This idea is established in the 
Prologue, which promises that the play is not suited to those who are “uncapable of weighty 
passion.” Those who have lived comfortable lives are advised to “hurry amain from our 
black-visaged shows.” However, those who possess breasts “nailed to the earth with grief” or 
hearts “pierced through with anguish” are “most welcome” (Prol. 14-27).  
In these first lines, the Prologue makes explicit the early modern connection between 
human emotion and human anatomy. This notion of emotion as a physiological phenomenon 
is reinforced in both Antonio’s Revenge and its predecessor, Antonio and Mellida. Both plays 
are laden with descriptions of grief’s effects on the heart, veins, arteries, entrails and blood 
itself. Furthermore, Antonio’s Revenge is also laden with references to—and scenes 
featuring—the mutilation of these body parts. The extravagantly brutal nature of Antonio’s 
                                                 
95Samuel Schoenbaum seems especially keen on this opinion. See “The Precarious Balance of John Marston.” 
PMLA, 67 (1957): 1078. 
 
96 In his article, “John Marston at the ‘Mart of Woe: the ‘Antonio’ Plays,” Rick Bowers instead argues that 
Marston’s “oddities” should be regarded as “theatrical assertions” designed specifically for an audience familiar 
with the revenge tragedy tradition (19).   
 
97 “John Marston,” in Selected Essays, 3rd ed,, London (1951): 224.  
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actions is mirrored in both his emotions and in the exceedingly physical way that he 
describes his emotions. In portraying human rage as a shockingly cruel force, Marston 
vividly illustrates the differences between human wrath and its divine analogue.  
 In both Antonio plays, Antonio presents himself as a highly emotional character. He 
passionately delineates his woes, pronouncing himself “the most grief-full, despairing, 
wretched, / Accursed, miserable” before aposiopetically exclaiming “O, for heaven’s sake, / 
forsake me now” (II.ii.14-17).98 Antonio seems to take a special delight in his miserable 
condition; he almost proudly proclaims that he has neither friends, nor country, nor father, 
but merely sits “In the dark cave of dusky misery” (A&M I.ii.211).  Like many other 
revengers, Antonio uses this dramatic grieving to convey the depth of his suffering to the 
audience and the other characters. Unlike other revengers, however, Antonio is surrounded 
by those who share his grief: Maria has lost a husband, Pandulfo has lost a son, and Mellida 
has been falsely imprisoned for adultery.  Antonio cannot claim any didactic purpose to his 
ostentatious lament, as most of the other characters sympathize with his grief. Rather than 
being comforted by this shared sorrow, Antonio rejects the idea that anyone else might suffer 
as intensely as he. Falling to the ground and weeping, Antonio wails: “Let none out-woe me; 
mine’s Herculean woe” (II.ii.134).  He believes that his pain sets him apart from all other 
men, declaring: “May I be more cursed than heaven can make me / If I am not more 
wretched than man can conceive me,” and cannot imagine any act of “omnipotence” that 
might make a “sore forlorn orphan” like himself happy (II.ii.135-8). He also refuses to allow 
other characters to believe that they might be suffering to the extent that he does. When 
Pandulfo has the gall to utter “I am the miserablest soul that breathes,” Antonio, who has 
                                                 
98 All quotes from Antonio’s Revenge and Antonio and Mellida are from The Malcontent and Other Plays, ed. 
Keith Sturgess. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997.   
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been lying on his back, “sits up” and says: “By th’heart of grief, thou liest! / I scourn’t that 
any wretched should survive / Outmounting me in that superlative: Most miserable / Most 
umatched in woe. / Who dare assume that, but Antonio?” (IV.ii.75-81). 
Antonio also chastises others for attempting to console him, wishing instead to be 
stricken with more grief: 
Comfort’s a parasite, a flatt’ring jack, 
And melts resolved despair. O boundless woe, 
If there be any black yet unknown grief,  
If there be any horror yet unfelt, 
Unthought-of mischief in thy fiend-like power, 
Dash it upon my miserable head; 
Make me more wretch, more cursed if thou canst. 
    (I.ii.284-290) 
 
Here, Antonio describes despair as a positive quality—it is “resolved”: firm, deliberate, and 
secure. Antonio thus wishes for more grief, as increased wretchedness yields increased 
stability. This property of grief as a hardening agent is also imagined in more overtly 
physiological ways.  In Antonio and Mellida, Antonio wonders why his “veins, sinews, 
arteries” have not yet “burst and divulsed with anguish” (A&M I.i.3-4).  He reports that 
“impatience cramps my cracked veins, / And curdles thick my blood with boiling rage!” 
(A&M II.i.195-6). In Antonio’s Revenge, he describes his “spirit” as feeling “heavy,” and 
observes that “the juice of life / Creeps slowly through my stiffened arteries” (I.ii.101-2).  He 
further explains that his formerly “moist entrails” are parched with grief and that his heart is 
“punching anguish” through his ribs (I.ii.277-9). In these lines, grief is portrayed as a 
physical force that dries, weighs down, and threatens to burst the veins. Anything that 
dissipates this despair, such as comfort, “melts” it, thereby transforming a solid and resolute 
mindset into something watery and inconstant.  
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 Although Antonio does describe impatience as curdling his blood, he does not 
necessarily suggest that patience, like comfort, acts as a softening agent. When Alberto urges 
him to be patient, Antonio retorts: “Patience is slave to fools, a chain that’s fixed / Only to 
posts and senseless log-like dolts” (I.ii.270-1). Patience is here described as something only 
appropriate for the “senseless”—those bereft of emotions. By describing it as a “chain that’s 
fixed,” Antonio appropriates the stoic language of the centered self. He rejects patience—and 
thus also stoicism—because he is neither a post nor a “senseless dolt.”  Anguish, then, 
stiffens the body, but does not make it “senseless.” Comfort weakens resolve, but patience is 
only suitable for those who are so resolved that they lack emotion.  
 Alberto and Pandulfo, the voices of stoicism early in the play, remind Antonio that 
reason must triumph over affection. When Pandulfo learns that his son Felice has been 
unjustly executed, he informs Antonio that crying is an inappropriate response: 
Wouldst have me cry, run raving up and down 
For my son’s loss? Wouldst have me turn rank mad, 
Or wring my face with mimic action? 
Stamp, curse, weep, rage, and then my bosom strike?  
Away! ‘Tis apish action, player-like. 
If he be guiltless, why should tears be spent? 
Thrice-blessed soul that dieth innocent.  
   (I.ii.311-17) 
 
Because Felice was innocent, his soul is doubtlessly in heaven. Pandulfo therefore sees no 
reason to express any sort of hyperbolic emotion, which Antonio certainly has. However, 
Pandulfo’s criticism of “mimic action” or “apish action, player like” perhaps strikes a chord 
with Antonio. In the next act, Antonio meets his beloved Mellida outside of her prison. In 
their brief conversation through the grate, Mellida informs Antonio that she must die 
tomorrow and swears that she has remained faithful to him. She then asks that if Antonio 
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loves her, he will “welcome Heaven’s will.” Antonio, who either does not hear or does not 
regard this counsel, responds: 
  I will not swell like a tragedian 
  In forced passion of affected strains. 
  If I had present power of aught but pitying you, 
  I would be as ready to redress your wrongs 
  As to pursue your love. Throngs of thoughts 
  Crowd for their passage; somewhat I will do, 
  Reach me thy hand; think this is honour’s bent, 
  To live unslaved, to die innocent. 
     (II.ii.105-112) 
Antonio seems to have taken Pandulfo’s rant against “mimic action” to heart; he vows not to 
put on any “forced passion.” But who, at this point in the play, could take this promise at face 
value?  Antonio is a notorious purveyor of passion, be it forced or genuine. He is the essence 
of a swelled tragedian, both as his character is written as his character must necessarily be 
acted.99 Antonio’s second point is also somewhat confusing. He claims that if he “had present 
power” to do anything besides pity Mellida, he surely would help her. This professed 
impotence can be read in several ways. First, we can understand that Antonio is powerless to 
free Mellida from her prison. He has neither the key nor the legal acumen to plead her case. 
But on another level, Antonio is admitting that he is only presently capable of pitying 
Mellida; he’s simply too overwhelmed by grief to do anything else. The “throngs of 
thoughts” that crowd his mind make render impossible any assertive action on his part.  The 
only words of consolation he can muster echo Pandulfo’s earlier lauding of Felice as a “soul 
that dieth innocent.”   
 For her part, Mellida urges Antonio to “be patient” and “do not weep,” and that he 
should try to “drink and securely sleep,” to which Antonio simply replies: “I’faith, I cannot; 
                                                 
99 For a thorough discussion of Antonio’s melodramatic (or possibly meta-dramatic) persona in Antonio and 
Mellida, see Allen Bergson’s “Dramatic Style as Parody in Marston’s Antonio and Mellida.” Studies in English 
Literature. 1500-1900, Vol. 11, No. 2, Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama (Spring, 1971), 307-325.  
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but I’ll force my face / To palliate my sickness” (II.ii.115-7).  By responding in this fashion, 
Antonio informs Mellida that he will not be comforted. He will, however, pretend to be 
comforted. Antonio here completely contradicts his earlier disavowal of “affected strains.” 
Some editors argue that Antonio speaks these lines as an aside so as to allow Mellida the 
illusion of his well-being. If his words are an aside, that illusion is shattered—along with his 
promise to put on a strong façade—when Antonio flops down on the grate weeping ten lines 
later.  This display suggests that Antonio simply cannot “force [his] face” to mask his 
feelings.  Not only is he far too emotional—and far too pleased with his own wretchedness—
to allow comfort, patience, or reason to palliate his misery, he is also too emotional to 
maintain a stoic façade for any measurable length of time. 
 It would seem then that Antonio disregards Pandulfo’s advice because it requires him 
to rise above—and not wallow in—emotion. Pandulfo extols the virtues of the man whom 
“fortune’s loudest thunder cannot daunt,” who relies on “discretion” instead of “giddy 
humors.” Doing so reveals a heart that “in valour even Jove out-goes; / Jove is without, but 
this ‘bove sense of woes” (I.ii.329-5).  Because God (Jove) either exists outside the scope of 
troubles or simply does not have them, it is no great feat for Him to be dispassionate. Man, 
on the other hand, must suffer. In rising above this suffering, man commits the more valorous 
action. Antonio does not respond to this idea here, but he does provide a retort upon later 
reading a related passage in Seneca: 
Ferte fortiter: hoc est quo deum antecedatis. Ille enim extra 
patientiam malorum; vos supra. Contemnite dolorem: aut 
solvetur, aut solvet. Contemnite fortunatam: nullum telum, quo 
feriret animum habet.”   
[Endure with fortitude; in this you may surpass God; for he is 
beyond suffering of ills, you are above it. Despise grief; either 
it is relieved, or it relieves you. Despise fortune; it has no 
weapon with which to strike your soul] 
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 (II.ii.46-9)100  
 
This passage reinforces Pandulfo’s earlier words: God is outside (extra) grief. Human beings 
can rise above (supra) that grief and use it to fortify themselves.  Antonio sees little value in 
this counsel, as he and Seneca obviously have nothing in common: 
Pish! Thy mother was not lately widowed,  
Thy dear affied love lately defamed  
With blemish of foul lust when thou wrot’st thus. 
Thou, wrapped in furs, beeking thy limbs ‘fore fires, 
Forbid’st the frozen zone to shudder. Ha, ha! ‘Tis nought  
But foamy bubbling of a phlegmy brain.  
Nought else but smoke. O, what dank, marish spirit 
But would be fired with impatience 
At my— 
No more, no more; he that was never blessed  
With height of birth, fair expectation 
Of mounted fortunes, knows not what it is 
To be the pitied object of the world. 
O poor Antonio, thou may’st sigh! 
(II.ii.50-63) 
 
Because Seneca knows nothing of Antonio’s troubles, his advice is completely irrelevant. Of 
course, Seneca is not alone in his irrelevance, as Antonio perceives himself to be a veritable 
phoenix of misery—no one else could possibly understand his unique position of being “the 
pitied object of the world.”  But Seneca seems particularly unqualified to give Antonio 
counsel: Antonio imagines the philosopher happily basking in front of a fire while chastising 
those who live in “the frozen zone” for shivering. Antonio paradoxically reverses this 
language of warmth and cold when he disregards Seneca’s words as the “foamy bubbling of 
a phlegmy brain.” Antonio here portrays the philosophy as flimsy and insubstantial, but also 
as cold and moist. Foam and bubbles arise from liquids; here, they are the product of a 
phlegmy brain. Here, as before, patience is an unwelcome intrusion; the fires of impatience 
keep the spirit from becoming “dank” and “marish” (marsh-like). Seneca’s advice, because it 
                                                 
100 All translations from Latin are by Sturgess.  
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is from a cold, patient, rational mind, can offer no guidance for Antonio, who basks in the 
heat of impatience and emotion. As it is, Antonio accuses Heaven of being unkind by 
allowing him to feel. Were he a “senseless dolt,” then he would be spared “the stings of 
anguish” that “shoot through every vein” (IV.i.50-52). 
 Antonio’s tendency to link his emotions with his body is, of course, not unique to this 
play. The physical valence of emotion has been well documented in the work of many 
scholars of humoral theory. But Marston’s exploration of the physiology of suffering extends 
beyond Antonio bemoaning his own pain. Consider, for example, the very first lines of 
Antonio’s Revenge. Piero, “smeared in blood, a poniard in one hand, bloody,” instructs his 
lackey to tie Felice’s freshly dead corpse to “the panting side” of his daughter Mellida (I.i.1-
2).  These first lines do indeed set the stage for the rest of the play, as every character seems 
to take equal delight in using grotesque imagery to describe grief, anger, frustration, anxiety, 
or spiteful glee. Marston’s favorite word in these plays seems to be “gore,” often paired with 
adjectives such as “reeking,” “warm,” “fresh,” “putrid,” and “bubbling.” He also enjoys the 
words “ulcer,” “entrails,” “trunk,” and, of course, several charming variations on “blood.”   
 References to the body in this play are almost always negative: corpses rot, gelid 
wounds cry out, and ribcages burst with anguish. Because the human body is both the cause 
and conduit of this pain, emotions that arise from the body, such as rage or lust, are also 
necessarily negative. [I don’t think I’m saying this right. It might be easier to express this 
once I’ve laid some things out in the introduction]. In promising to avenge his father’s death, 
Antonio invites the desire for revenge to become part of his physical body.  When the ghost 
of his father Andrugio instructs him to “revenge my blood,” Antonio vows: 
May I be cursed by my father’s ghost 
And blasted with the incensed breath of heaven 
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If my heart beat on aught but vengeance! 
May I be numbed with horror and my veins 
Pucker with singeing torture, if my brain 
Digest a thought but of dire vengeance! 
May I be fettered slave to coward chance, 
If blood, heart, brain, plot aught save vengeance! 
    (III.ii.85-92) 
 
In these lines, Antonio urges his blood, heart, and brain to be wholly consumed with revenge. 
His heart will “beat on” vengeance—that is, it will be both fixated on and be powered by the 
thought of revenge. He imagines that his brain will “digest” his thoughts, creating a doubly 
corporeal image. Furthermore, the consequences he imagines for himself—being “numbed 
with horror” and having his veins “pucker with singeing torture” reinforce the physicality of 
his vow to avenge his father’s death. But the language here also recalls his earlier dismissal 
of patience. In Act I, Antonio refers to patience as “a slave to fools, a chain that’s fixed / 
Only to posts and senseless log-like dolts.” Here, he suggests that if he fails to revenge, he 
will instead be a slave “fettered” to “coward chance.”  Antonio thus recasts Pandulfo’s 
definition of a valorous man: one triumphs over fortune not by being patient, but by being 
impatient and taking vengeance. Avenging his father’s death is act of valor; it will also, 
however, be an act of bodily necessity. By committing all of his major organs to the act, 
Antonio makes revenge part of his physiology. In binding vengeance to the human body, 
Antonio builds on traditional early modern concepts of the dichotomy between the body and 
the soul. As the seat of sin, corruption, and decay, the body houses the base elements of 
human existence. Antonio uses this theory to justify all of the ghastly violence that follows.  
Antonio’s gore de force, if you will, begins with his brutal slaughter of Piero’s son 
Julio. Of course, few revengers manage to murder only their enemies; innocent characters 
often become unsuspecting casualties.  Polonius, while not the most laudatory figure in 
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Hamlet, does not necessarily merit Hamlet stabbing him behind the arras.  An even less 
culpable figure is Castile in act IV of The Spanish Tragedy.  Although never even suspected 
of murdering Horatio, Castile still falls victim to Hieronimo’s vengeful fury.101 In Antonio’s 
Revenge, Julio is not only a completely innocent child, he also professes to love Antonio 
“better than [his] father” (III.iii.5).   Antonio responds: “Thy father?—Gracious, O bounteous 
heaven! / I do adore thy justice. Venit in nostras manus / Tandem vindicta, venit et tota 
quidem [at last vengeance has come into my hands, and come in full]” (III.ii.145-152). 
Antonio evidently sees Julio’s presence as a gift from heaven given specifically to aid him in 
his pursuit of justice. He then embraces Julio and exclaims: 
Time, place, and blood,  
How fit you close together!  
………………………………. 
O that I knew which joint, which side, which limb 
Were father all and had no mother in’t, 
That I might rip it vein by vein and carve revenge 
In bleeding rases! 
     (III.ii.157-166) 
 
Circumstances have finally aligned themselves with “blood”—his bodily passion for 
vengeance.  Antonio then proceeds to mentally dissect Julio in the hopes that he can discern 
exactly which parts of his body were wholly generated by his father.  Julio pleads for his life, 
but the Ghost of Andrugio appears to egg Antonio on.  In a misguided attempt to comfort 
Julio, Antonio reasons “were thy heart lapped up / In any flesh but in Piero’s blood, / I would 
thus kiss it” (III.ii.181-2). Julio pitifully responds that as long as Antonio loves him, he can 
do what he will. Antonio takes this as his cue and stabs the boy to death. He then says that he 
has freed the “sprite of Julio,” and all that remains is his body, which belongs completely to 
                                                 
101 M.D. Faber and Colin Skinner argue that Hieronimo’s bloody rampage in Act IV of The Spanish Tragedy 
“makes perfect dramatic sense—psychologically, theatrically, structurally …. Hieronimo’s frustrating, 
unsuccessful efforts to communicate his grievance lead steadily, inexorably to the outbreak of explosive 
violence.” “The Spanish Tragedy: Act IV.” Philological Quarterly, 49 (1970): 444.  
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Piero: “He is all Piero, father all; this blood, / This breast, this heart, Piero all” (III.ii.199-
200). In this exchange, Antonio reveals the grotesque consequences of his bodily fixations. 
By locating corruption, grief, and revenge wholly within the body, Antonio deduces that he 
can simply extricate evil from Julio’s flesh by killing the parts of him authored by Piero. 
Because Antonio cannot tell which particular parts of Julio this would include, he decides to 
be generous with his appraisal: since he cannot identify Piero-infected joints or limbs, the 
body must be thought of as “Piero all.” Antonio further reasons that Julio’s spirit is now free, 
no longer tainted by the presence of his father’s blood in his body. By killing Julio, Antonio 
has committed a doubly blessed act: he has begun the process of justice and sent Julio’s soul 
to heaven.  
After committing the murder, Antonio revels in his deed. He sprinkles Julio’s “gore” 
around the tomb like incense, then cries aloud: “Lo, thus I heave my blood-dyed hands to 
heaven; / Even like instatiate hell crying ‘More!’ / My heart hath thirsting dropsies after gore 
/ … Blood cries for blood, and murder murder craves” (III.ii.211-215). Ironically, this 
immersion in bodily fluid leads Antonio to a renewed appreciation for his soul. In the next 
scene, he enters his mother’s bedroom with “his arms bloody, [crying] a torch and a 
poniard.” He proudly exclaims: 
O, my soul’s enthroned  
In the triumphant chariot of revenge. 
Methinks I am all air and feel no weight 
Of human dirt clog. 
    (III.iii.76-80)  
 
Antonio thus perceives himself as an entirely spiritual being, free from the corrupting “clog” 
of human flesh. This transformation was made possible by murder: acting on the anger and 
grief that he earlier described as causing a heavy spirit and slowing the pace of blood through 
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his “stiffened arteries” (I.ii.101-2).  Antonio’s response is, then, the complete opposite of 
Charelemont’s in The Atheist’s Tragedy. Charlemont defined revenge as a contest between 
“the passion of / My blood and the religion of my soul” (III.ii.35-6).  For Charlemont, the 
soul cannot be satisfied by murder; Antonio obviously believes that the only way to free his 
spirit is to indulge in the blood’s passions. 
 The death of Mellida causes Antonio to reappraise this philosophy, but only 
momentarily. Upon hearing a rumor of Antonio’s drowning, Mellida faints and then dies. 
Despite the fact that Antonio is partially responsible for this—he could have informed her of 
his plan so that she would not take the news so harshly—he attributes her death to heaven’s 
will. “Ay, heaven,” he says, “thou may’st; thou may’st, Omnipotence.”  Antonio reluctantly 
defers to God, realizing that as a “vermin bred of putrefacted slime,” Antonio should not 
“dare to expostulate” with heaven’s decrees (IV.ii.1-2). He then promises not to blaspheme 
and lies prostrate on the ground so that he can “vent a heaving sigh.” He provides further 
discourse about how miserable he is, then realizes that the only reason he is still alive is so 
that he can “numb some others’ cursed blood / With the dead palsy of like misery” (IV.ii.19-
20). Antonio’s short-lived consideration of heaven’s claim to justice is immediately 
overwhelmed by his desire to inflict misery on others.   
 This brief mention of an Omnipotence calls attention to the fact that divine justice 
does indeed seem to be at work offstage. The dumb show at the beginning of Act V reveals 
that the senators and other nobles have all turned against Piero. Secret letters detailing the 
intricacies of Piero’s plot against Andrugio, Felice, and Mellida have been discovered, 
revealing the depths of Piero’s villainy and clearing Antonio’s name. Pandulfo even reports 
that the people are sick of “swallowing the bloody crudities” that is Piero’s government and 
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seek to oust him (V.ii.32). By the time the final act begins, Piero is set to be deposed and 
tried for his crimes. Even the Ghost of Andrugio seems satisfied by this turn of events; he 
enters the scene “tossing his torch about his head in triumph” and declares: “O, now 
triumphs my ghost, / Exclaiming, ‘Heaven’s just!’ for I shall see / The scourge of murder and 
impiety” (V.i.23-5).  It would thus appear that there is little need for Antonio and the others 
to take the law into their own hands. This fact, coupled with the brutal nature of their 
punishment, makes the murder of Piero an even more sadistic act, and casts an extremely 
negative light on the enacting of human anger.  
 As the final scene begins, Piero has no idea that anything is amiss. He drinks wine 
and calls for song. Antonio, Alberto, and Pandulfo arrive disguised as a group of masquers. 
Pleased with their appearance, Piero he wonders aloud where his son Julio is: “Call Julio 
hither; where’s the little soul? / I saw him not today. Here’s sport alone / For him, i’faith; for 
babes and fools, I know / Relish not substance but applaud the show” (V.iii.33-6). These 
lines are ironic on several levels. By referring to his son as a “little soul,” Piero recalls the 
language Antonio used when he slew Julio, freeing Julio’s “sprite.” Piero’s choice of words 
creates an ironic—and, perhaps, grotesquely comic—focus on Julio’s body, which, as the 
main course, is closer than his father knows.102   
Poised to unfurl his plan, Antonio is barely able to contain his joy. After confirming 
with his mother that the special dinner has been prepared, Antonio utters: “Then I will dance 
and whirl about the air. / Methinks I am all soul, all heart, all spirit” (V.iii. 47-8). Antonio’s 
mindset here evokes his earlier claim of bodilessness: being free from the weight of “human 
                                                 
102 These lines can also be read a commentary on the play itself. Although Piero seems pleased with their 
appearance, he suggests that only children and fools truly enjoy their “sport,” as it merely a “show” that lacks 
“substance.”  This criticism could also be applied to Antonio’s Revenge itself; as a cavalcade of overwrought 
speeches, senseless violence, and egregious gore, the play—especially the acts of the masquers in this final 
scene—is perhaps meant to be taken as insubstantial entertainment. 
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dirt clog.” As before, this giddy, airy, light spirit owes itself to Antonio’s decision to act on 
murderous impulses.  As the masquers dance, Piero calls for the meal to be served. When the 
plates arrive, the masquers convince Piero that he and Maria should dine in private with 
them. Antonio shouts—perhaps accusatorially, perhaps gleefully—“Murder and torture!” 
and, as the stage directions inform us, “The Conspirators bind Piero, pluck out his tongue, 
and triumph over him.  In removing Piero’s tongue, the masquers mimic the actions Tereus 
and Chrion and Demetrius from Titus Andronicus. In so doing, Antonio and his friends align 
themselves with literature’s most notorious rapists.103 They also prevent Piero from 
repenting; Antonio asserts that there will be no “prayers” or “entreats” on his behalf 
(V.iii.64).104  
It quickly becomes obvious that Antonio and his friends are not content with killing 
Piero, but must delight in torturing him first. Simply cutting out Piero’s tongue, for example, 
does not suffice; Antonio must also hold it aloft and cry: “I hav’t, Pandulfo; the veins panting 
bleed, / Trickling fresh gore about my fist” (V.iii.66-7). Upon serving Julio’s limbs to Piero, 
they take turns taunting him: “Was he thy flesh, thy son, thy dearest son? / So was Andrugio 
my dearest father” (V.iii.81-2). In response, Piero “seems to condole his son” (sd V.iii.82). 
This act pleases Antonio, who affirms that the dish is indeed Piero’s “true-begotten, most 
legitimate / And loved issue” (V.i.95-6). This tableau—a bound, tongue-less man attempts to 
comfort his son’s mutilated limbs while a gaggle of bloody, costumed revengers mock him—
                                                 
103 This scene also echoes the death of the Duke in The Revenger’s Tragedy; see the discussion of that scene in 
chapter 1.  
 
104 It is, of course, impossible to know whether Piero would have actually repented. Furthermore, his swift 
apology at the end of Antonio and Mellida obviously proves insincere. However, as we have seen in the 
discussion of The Unnatural Combat, God seems willing to wait for quite some time to hear a villain’s 
confession. For an incisive discussion of tonguelessness in revenge tragedies, see J.L. Simmons. “The Tongue 
and Its Office in The Revenger’s Tragedy.” PMLA 92:1 (1977): 56-68.  
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presents a vivid portrait of human anger gone horribly awry. The masquers further vex Piero 
and then take turns stabbing him. Antonio exclaims that “pity, piety, [and] remorse” are 
“aliens to our thoughts,” and asserts that “grim fire-eyed rage / Possess us wholly” (V.iii.89-
91). Proudly devoid of mercy, holiness, or guilt, Antonio invokes demonic imagery to 
describe their acts. Even if Antonio had not made this observation, there is little chance 
anyone would mistake their actions for anything resembling the hand of God. This fact does 
not prevent Antonio from summing his behavior up thusly: “Thus the hand of heaven chokes 
/ The throat of murder” (V.iii.108-9), to which the Ghost adds: “Sons that revenge their 
father’s blood are blest” (V.iii.114).  
Antonio and his cohort have already established themselves as unreliable interpreters 
of divine justice. Their assertion that they have done heaven’s work may therefore be 
disturbing, but it is certainly not surprising. The reaction of the Senators, however, is 
certainly another matter.  As Piero breathes his last, all of the other characters return to the 
scene. One of the senators demands to know who is responsible for the “gory spectacle.”105 
The three men clamor like schoolchildren to receive credit for the deed before Alberto finally 
admits that that it was a group effort. Galeazzo and the Senators—presumably 
representatives of legal and moral authority—do not sentence them to death, but instead heap 
them with praise: 
 2nd SENATOR  
  Blest be you all, and may your honours live 
   Religiously held sacred, even for ever and ever.  
 GALEAZZO To ANTONIO  
   Thou art another Hercules to us 
                                                 
105 It is not certain if the Senators are aware of the extent of Antonio’s violence. Were the Senators were too 
busy sifting through Piero’s “beadrolls of mischief” to hear the tumult in the banquet hall? Was there a dish of 
cooked limbs in full view next to Piero’s bloody corpse?  Could they tell that Piero’s tongue had been ripped 
out?  The only thing we know for sure is that it was indeed a “gory spectacle” and that they heartily approved.    
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    In ridding huge pollution from our state. 
                                      ………………. 
  1st SENATOR 
    What satisfactions outward pomp can yield, 
    Our chiefest fortunes of the Venice state, 
    Claim freely.   
       (V.iii.124-129; 137-140) 
 
The second Senator even attempts to offer pity for Antonio, calling him a “poor orphan.” 
Remarkably, Antonio rejects this pity because, for the first time in the play, he is content: 
“Poor? Standing triumphant over Beelzebub? / Having large interest for blood, and yet 
deemed poor?” (V.iii.135-137). Happiness comes to Antonio at last, not because he has 
somehow regained his father or his beloved, but because he has satisfied his bloodlust.  
 Despite being “amazed” at the “benignity” of the offer, Antonio swiftly refuses it, 
explaining that “other vows constrain another course” (V.iii.143-4). Limited by the Christian 
proscription against suicide, the revengers are prevented from shuffling off their own mortal 
coils.  Religious seclusion—devotions to the soul at the expense of the body—thus provides 
the next best option.  In eschewing death in favor of holy exile, Antonio and his followers 
overturn the customary ending to a revenge tragedy.  The traditional plight of a revenger is to 
purify the community by killing the tyrant who has done him some grave personal wrong.  In 
the process, the revenger himself is usually corrupted. With a few notable exceptions, all 
revengers are necessarily murderers. More often than not, these murders are grisly, gory, 
twisted affairs that startle, disgust, or even delight the spectators.  In committing such an act, 
the revenger himself is morally compromised and, in order to truly purify the community, 
must then die himself.  As Fredson Bowers notes, “the audience is sympathetic to [a] 
revenger so long as he does not become an Italianate intriguer, and so long as he does not 
revenge.  At the conclusion the audience admits its sentimental satisfaction with the act of 
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personal justice but its ethical sense demands the penalty for the infraction of divine 
command.”106 Of course, we might very well want certain revengers to live—perhaps we 
sympathize with their plight or simply enjoy their marvelous cleverness.  Antonio, however, 
is neither particularly sympathetic nor exceptionally clever. His death at the end of the play 
should not only be warranted, but maybe even desired.  That Antonio, having corrupted 
himself with heinous acts of brutality, remains alive at the play’s end marks a shocking 
deviation from generic norms. However, the idea that Antonio’s fate would disturb an 
audience only because it departs from convention is perhaps too simple. While numerous 
critics have similarly regarded this skewed ending as a sign of Marston’s incompetence as a 
dramatist,107 others argue that it serves a number of ethical and/or aesthetic purposes. If, as 
many critics argue, Antonio’s Revenge is a burlesque of revenge tragedies, then this 
anomalous ending merely serves to enhance the parody.   
There always exists the possibility that an audience’s disappointment at Antonio’s 
failure to die stems from their own appetite for carnage.  Spectators well seasoned in revenge 
tragedy were used to extravagant carnage and massive body counts. Samuel Schoenbaum 
suggests that Marston was only too happy to feed his audience’s bloodlust, as “he was 
fortunate in that his own maladjustment coincided with the malaise of his age, and that he 
was temperamentally suited to gratify the tastes of his spectators.”108 However, in allowing 
not only Antonio, but also Alberto, Pandulfo, Balurdo, and Maria to live, Marston deprives 
                                                 
106 Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy. Princeton : Princeton UP, (1966), 95. 
 
107 See especially T.F. Wharton’s “Old Marston or New Marston: The Antonio Plays” Essays in Criticism 25 
(1975): In response to Antonio’s desire to cleanse his hands after the murder, Wharton argues that “the naïve 
cathartic assumptions of these lines betray an ethic of revenge as involuntarily sanctimonious as it is collusively 
brutal.  To find the detachment of parody in this play is to substitute for it the play we wish Marston had 
written, and to perceive less clearly than his own astuter contemporaries where his true force lay” (368). 
 
108“The Precarious Balance of John Marston.” PMLA, 67 (1957): 1078. 
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his playgoers of five potentially spectacular stage deaths.  Perhaps in denying his audience 
this violent end, Marston would bring them to a realization of their own sick fascination with 
bloodshed. Barbara J. Baines argues for viewing the ending as Marston’s solution to the 
“moral and aesthetic problems” of a dramatist responding to this popular thirst for bloody 
revenge tragedies.109  Maintaining that Antonio’s Revenge is inherently metadramatic, Baines 
contends that the characters are completely aware of their own status as characters in a 
revenge tragedy.  This self-awareness compels them to follow a code of aesthetics, not ethics. 
Thus constricted by the demands of aesthetics, Antonio is forced to act in a manner befitting 
a violent revenger.  In creating an aesthetic work, Marston, like Antonio himself, is limited 
by generic constraints. Therefore, Marston’s “treatment of the revenge conventions, 
culminating in his outrageous exoneration of his revenge protagonist at the end of the play, 
indicates his dissatisfaction with the dramatic genre and particularly with the sympathetic 
response that it fostered.”110  
But one might also argue that the play’s conclusion is disturbing because in 
remaining alive, Antonio avoids paying his debt to both society and justice at large.  If 
Antonio’s murder of Piero was at least partially to purify the community—which is exactly 
how Galeazzo and the Senators view it—then one would assume that the revengers had some 
sort of vested interest in their society. As Gorden Braden observes, "the avenger is much 
more fully and consciously a member of the society whose restraints he violates than is the 
villain hero, and the avenger's dilemma can thus bring his dignity and the life around it to 
                                                 
109 “Antonio’s Revenge: Marston’s Play on Revenge Plays.” Studies in English Literature 23.2 (1983): 294. 
 
110 Ibid., 294.  
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extraordinarily close quarters.”111  But, as other critics have noted, because the community 
has betrayed the revenger by allowing a tyrant to murder his loved ones, the revenger often 
perceives himself as a social outcast.  Jonathan Dollimore argues that as victims of the 
corrupt society, “bereaved, dispossessed, and in peril of their lives,” these revengers “suffer 
extreme disorientation and are pushed to the very edge of mental collapse. Self-reintegration 
can only be achieved through social reintegration, the creation of a sub-culture dedicated to 
revenge.”112 According to Dollimore, every violent action done in the name of vengeance is 
also (or even actually) done in the name of reintegration.  Alienated since the beginning of 
Antonio and Mellida, Antonio endures his grief by “translating it into action, into an active 
search for reintegration. And by IV.ii he realises that the only path to reintegration is through 
the role of revenger.” He only achieves this reintegration, and thus his identity, “by 
purposefully re-engaging with society – albeit at the cost of brutalisation.”113  
Dollimore’s argument, however incisive, fails to address the question of why Antonio 
and his co-conspirators reject society—especially a society ready to offer them rewards and 
praise instead of alienation—after successfully reintegrating themselves through 
“brutalisation.”114  The community does not demand justice in the form of Antonio’s death; 
rather, they laud him as a hero.  But perhaps, as Dollimore also suggests, therein lies the rub. 
As Dollimore maintains, the surprising fate of Antonio results from Marston’s understanding 
                                                 
111 Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition: Anger’s Privilege, New Haven: Yale UP, 1985, p 113. 
112 Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries. 
Chicago: Chicago UP, (1984) 29. 
 
113 Ibid 34-6.  
 
114 Raymond J. Rice proposes that by the play’s end, Antonio comes to recognize “all ideology, including that 
of revenge, as empty constructs.” Antonio’s voluntary religious exile, therefore, is a rejection of the society that 
has corrupted his morality by upholding a “symbolic Law that legitimates itself by means of revenge.” In 
denying this society, Rice contends that “Antonio points the way to the only absolutely ethical act, one that 
changes the definition of community—of reality—itself.” “Cannibalism and the Act of Revenge in Tudor-Stuart 
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that vengeance is at odds with Christianity.115  In having the revenger Antonio become a 
religious hermit, Marston thrusts Christianity and vengeance into “an open disjunction in a 
deadly serious challenge to providentialist dogma as it related to revenge.”  Insisting that 
“Providence has been discovered to be inoperative in a dislocated world where men destroy 
and alienate each other,” Dollimore explains Antonio’s revenge as a means for the alienated 
to re-create their identities. Moreover, as revengers, “far from being the instrument of divine 
providence, they actually take over its retributive function, appropriating it with a gesture of 
defiance and deliberate subversion.”116  Dollimore therefore suggests that because the 
revengers survive and are heralded as heroes, Marston obliterates the popular notion that 
Providence eliminates evil via similarly evil agents.  In line with Dollimore’s argument, the 
ending is disturbing because it subverts the idea that Providence would demand the lives of 
Antonio and his fellow murderers.   However, this perhaps creates the same problem of 
impatience with divine justice that leads many revengers (except, of course, Charlemont) to 
commit their bloody deeds.  If Piero had been struck by lightning immediately after his first 
wicked act, one would ascribe that to divine justice at work.  But, as in The Unnatural 
Combat, is the lack of said immediate lightning bolt an (in)action of either divine 
indifference or divine approval?  Just because God does not immediately demand the life of 
Antonio should not necessarily suggest to the audience that Marston was attempting to 
subvert Providence. 
                                                 
115 Quotes here are taken from Dollimore’s article “Marston’s ‘Antonio’ Plays and Shakespeare’s ‘Troilus and 
Cressida’: The Birth of a Radical Drama. Essays and Studies. (1980): 58-9.  Dollimore later expanded this 
article into a chapter in Radical Tragedy. 
 
116 Ibid, 59.  To this point, Geoffrey Aggeler argues: “Marston does not wholly reject the providential scheme 
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of his own point of view is questionable at best” (Nobler in the Mind: The Stoic-Skeptic Dialectic in English 
Renaissance Tragedy. Newark: University of Delaware P, 1998. p 47). 
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Indeed, perhaps the most troubling aspect of the ending of Antonio’s Revenge is not 
that Antonio remains alive, but that he seems to feel no remorse for his actions. Geoffrey 
Aggeler contends that “the avengers are clearly prompted by a moral sense to seek atonement 
that has survived their vengeful abandonment.”117 However, the text does not support any 
sense of the revengers seeking “atonement” by becoming religious exiles. By his own 
admission, Antonio has collected “large interest” on the blood Piero has owed him.  He 
rejects the pity of the Senators, instead asserting his pride in “standing triumphant over 
Beelzebub.”  Consequently, his decision to take holy orders strikes a deeply dissonant chord. 
Antonio and his band of revengers make no expression of guilt.  On the contrary, they revel 
in their bloody deeds. When a Senator asks who is responsible for the “gory spectacle” of the 
Revengers’ Masque, Antonio, Pandulfo, and Alberto each clamor to be held accountable. 
Antonio himself proclaims: “I will not lose the glory of the deed, / Were all the tortures of 
the deepest hell / Fixed to my limbs. I pierced the monster’s heart / With an undaunted hand” 
(V.vi.3-6).  Far from seeking atonement, Antonio instead exhibits pride at the “glory” of his 
violence.  When the Senators offer them rewards, Antonio does not refuse because he feels 
too corrupted by his bloody deed to deserve such an offer, but because he and his 
companions have already made other plans. Pandulfo clarifies:  
  We know the world, and did we know no more 
  We would not live to know; but since constraint  
  Of holy bands forceth us to keep this lodge 
  Of dirt’s corruption till dread power calls 
  Our souls’ appearance, we will live enclosed 
  In holy verge of some religious order, 
  Most constant votaries.  
      (V.iii.145-151) 
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It would seem, therefore, that Antonio et al. are not exiling themselves as penance, but as a 
matter of preference. The decision to enter seclusion is not out of guilt, but contemptus 
mundi. In the words of Fredson Bowers, “they have lived enough to see the vanities of the 
world at their true value and to despise them and to wish to escape the world.” 118 They 
disdain life, but cannot kill themselves; thus they will ascetically remove themselves from the 
world to prepare their souls for judgment. The language used by Pandulfo in these lines 
deliberately recalls Antonio’s earlier reference to shedding the weight of the “human dirt 
clog.” Because they are constrained by Christianity to keep their “dirt’s corruption,” they 
instead become votaries—essentially devoting the rest of their lives to spiritual pursuits at the 
expense of bodily comfort.  
This abnegation of the flesh is a complete reversal of Antonio’s passionate behavior 
throughout the rest of the play. It also, of course, stands in sharp contrast to the murder that 
he and the others have just committed; as he speaks these words, Antonio is covered with 
Piero’s blood. Antonio’s newfound interest in Christianity does not erase the fact that he has, 
for the better part of the play, been acting more like a villain than Piero. Many critics have 
noted the similarities between Piero’s entrance at the beginning of the play and Antonio’s 
appearance in his mother’s closet: both enter smeared in blood, carrying a torch and poniard, 
and reveling in their vicious deeds.  These critics also traditionally cite Julio’s murder and the 
overwhelmingly sadistic punishment of Piero as indefensible acts that categorically taint 
Antonio’s character. While Fredson Bowers shrugs this action off as “a purely gratuitous 
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piece of business brought in merely to make the audience shudder,”119 other critics have 
noted the more serious ramifications of this event. Philip J. Finkelpearl observes that before 
murdering Julio, Antonio speaks the same lines as the bloodthirsty Atreus of Thyestes:  
“Gracious, O bounteous heaven! / I do adore thy justice: venit 
in nostras manus / Tandem vindicta, venit et tota quidem” 
(III.iii.6-9).  In referencing one of the most well-known stage 
villains and then committing his ghastly deed, Antonio 
“becomes a bloody conscienceless killer.  He has come to 
resemble Piero, who thinks that Heaven approves his 
actions.120  
 
In a similar vein, Geoffrey Aggeler observes that Antonio justifies his actions by comparing 
himself to Machiavelli (IV.i.23-5), which “simply confirms what the actions themselves have 
already revealed, that he has descended to Piero’s moral level.”121   
While most critics share in this condemnation, there have been several “apologists” 
who contend that early modern audience member would have most likely viewed Antonio’s 
behavior as just, perhaps even god-like. Karen Robertson, for example, argues that the 
stabbing of Julio can be “seen as heroic.”122 She contends that the triumph of Antonio at the 
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122 “Antonio’s Revenge: The Tyrant, the Stoic, and the Passionate Man.” Medieval and Renaissance Drama in 
England. 4 (1989). Robertson argues that the murder of Julio had “contemporary English significance” for those 
men in the audience who swore to “take vengeance on an heir in punishment for the sins of the parent” when 
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modern audiences do. While she admits that “that those in Marston’s original audience who demanded their 
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ambiguous actions” (93). This argument is interesting, but I believe that she is forcing a comparison between 
two wholly distinct situations. The Bond of Association was intended to protect the Queen and prevent an 
assassin’s heirs from benefiting from his crimes. This is a matter of national security, not private blood revenge. 
Robertson further undercuts her own argument by pointing out that the murder of Julio “dramatizes a dilemma 
conceptualized, though not enacted, in Elizabethan society” (94, emphasis added). Being theoretically 
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end shows that “the cleansing of the state is effected only through Antonio’s engagement in 
right passion, a ritual purification through the blood of Julio that is condoned by the entire 
onstage audience at the end of the play.”123 Antonio’s brutal actions are done in the name of 
fulfilling a promise to his father: not just to avenge his murder, but to exceed it. Quoting 
Seneca’s Thyestes, Andrugio reminds Antonio: “Scelera non ulcisceris, nisi vincis” [you do 
not avenge crimes unless you surpass them] (III.ii.45-51). In so doing, Antonio not only kills 
Piero, he makes him weep, thereby achieving the seemingly impossible: stirring a villain’s 
emotions. This “true justice,” Robertson, is achieved through the “right passion” of 
Antonio’s actions, and not the “cool reason” espoused by Pandulfo.124 
Robertson bolsters her argument by drawing parallels to the Old Testament code of 
holding the son culpable for the sins of the father.  Drawing on Andrugio’s command that 
Antonio “revenge my blood” and Antonio’s attempts to locate the parts of Julio that are 
“father all,” Robertson notes that “assertion of the equivalence of blood between father and 
son eradicates the differences between father and son.”125 This argument problematically 
relies on the assumption that early modern readers subscribed to the belief that the Old 
Testament condoned punishing the sons for the sins of their father. There are several 
passages in the Old Testament that deal with the inheritable nature of a father’s sins. Exodus 
34:6-7 states: 
The Lord, thy Lord, strong, merciful, and gracious, slow to 
angre, and abundant in goodness and trueth, Reserving mercie 
                                                                                                                                                       
committed to execute the heirs of one who attempts regicide is not the same as murdering your innocent young 
brother-in-law.  
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for thousands, forgiving iniquitie and transgressions and sinne, 
and not making the wicked innocent, visiting the iniquities of 
the fathers upon the children, and upon childrens children, unto 
the third and fourth generation.126 
 
In his commentary on this passage, Calvin is quick to point out we must first read this as 
evidence of “the greatness of His clemency, inasmuch as He not only pardons light offenses, 
but the very grossest sins; and again, remits not only sin in one case, but is propitious to 
sinners by whom He has been a hundred times offended. Hence, therefore, appears the extent 
of His goodness, since He blots out an infinite mass of iniquities.”127 Nevertheless, Calvin 
does admit that punishing a child for his father’s transgressions does seem somewhat unjust, 
“for nothing is more unreasonable than that the innocent and guilty should be involved in the 
same punishment.”128 To this point, Calvin argues that  
  when God declares that He will cast back the iniquity of the 
  fathers into the bosom of the children, He does not mean that 
  He will take vengeance on poor wretches who have never  
  deserved anything of the sort; but that he is at liberty to punish 
  the crimes of the father upon their children and descendents, 
  with the proviso that they too may be justly punished, as being 
  the imitators of their fathers.129   
  
Calvin then characteristically adds that if this still doesn’t seem “agreeable” to us, “we 
should remember that His judgments are a great depth; and, therefore, if anything in his 
dealing is incomprehensible to us, we must bow to it with sobriety and reverence.”130 Calvin 
thus argues that it is God’s special prerogative to punish the children of a wicked father, no 
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matter how unjust this seems to mere mortals. He stresses, however, that because God is 
merciful, He never takes measures against the truly innocent.  
 If God may justly carry out this sort of judgment, is it therefore lawful for human 
beings to punish the children of guilty fathers? This question is addressed in Deuteronomy 
24:16 and Ezekiel 18:20. The passage from Deuteronomy states: “The fathers shal not be put 
to death for the children, nor the children put to death for the fathers, but everie man shalbe 
put to death for his own sinne.” Here, the Geneva commentary directs the reader to 2 
Chronicles 25.4, where King Amaziah has the men who killed his father executed, but does 
not punish their sons. Ezekiel 18:20 provides that “the same soule that sinneth, shal dye: the 
sonne shal not beare the iniquitie of the father, nether shal the father beare the iniquitie of the 
sonne, but the righteousnes of the righteous shalbe upon him, and the wickedness of the 
wicked shalbe upon himself.” One of the ways Calvin interprets these passages is by 
reminding the readers of original sin. Because we are all “polluted form our birth,” we all die 
through the iniquity of our common father: Adam.131 Furthermore, no human being is truly 
innocent in the eyes of God. Since, therefore, all are responsible in some way for their own 
guilt, “it follows that the son does not bear his father’s iniquity, since he has to bear his own 
at the same time.”132 
Calvin interprets these passages as explicit condemnations of punishing a son for a 
father’s actions. I quote this passage at length because of the implications it has for the 
present discussion of Marston’s play: 
Here also God manifests how great is His regard for human 
life, so that blood should not be shed indiscriminately, when he 
forbids that children should be involved in the punishment of 
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their parents. Nor was this Law by any means supererogatory, 
because on account of one man’s crime his whole race was 
often severely dealt with. It is not without cause, therefore, that 
God interposes for the protection of the innocent, and does not 
allow the punishment to travel further than where the crime 
exists. And surely our natural common sense dictates that it is 
an act of barbarous madness to put children to death out of 
hatred to their father. If any should object, what we have 
already seen, that God avenges ‘unto the third and fourth 
generation,’ the reply is easy, that He is a law unto Himself, 
and that he does not rush by a blind impulse to the excess of 
vengeance, so as to confound the innocent with the reprobate, 
but that He so visits the iniquity of the fathers upon their 
children, as to temper extreme severity with the greatest equity. 
Moreover, He has not so bound Himself by an inflexible rule as 
not to be free, if it so pleases Him, to depart from the Law.133 
 
The crux of Calvin’s argument rests on the essential difference between God’s anger and 
man’s: God is just, wise, and merciful, whereas man is hasty, cruel, and excessive. These 
passages in Deuteronomy and Ezekiel are included to curb man’s impulse to “allow the 
punishment to travel further than where the crime exists,” which is precisely what 
Andrugio’s ghost advises Antonio to do, and also precisely what Antonio actually does. 
Calvin’s claim that “our natural common sense” informs us that it is “barbarous madness to 
put children to death out of hatred to their father” suggests that, contrary to what Karen 
Robertson argues, early modern audience members would not indeed be likely to cheerfully 
applaud the murder of Julio.  
 It is this mention of “natural common sense” that makes me wary of Phoebe S. 
Spinrad’s claims that we should not view Antonio as a purveyor of “barbarous madness.” 
Spinrad notes that although we have ample warrant to see Antonio as a villain, “we simply 
cannot get away from the fact that no one in the play ever says [that we should], as would be 
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customary in such plays.”134 Furthermore, at end of the play, “the Second Senator has 
virtually canonized Antonio and his friends, making them not just good citizens but patron 
saints of Venice …. And Antonio himself refers to himself as ‘Standing triumphant over 
Beelzebub,’” language that evokes both Saint Michael and Christ.135 This evidence, coupled 
with other Judeo-Christian imagery in the play, 136 creates  
a religious stamp of approval on what Antonio has just called 
an act done ‘by the hand of heaven.’ We are not to pretend that 
our standards to not apply to pagans, but rather to accept 
revenge as Christian …. No one contradicts Andrugio’s claim 
that revengers are ‘blest,’ let alone claims that they are 
‘curs’d.’ No one at all condemns Antonio and his friends; 
everyone celebrates them. 137 
 
Spinrad is correct in her observation: indeed, no one on stage criticizes the murderers at the 
end of the play. However, this does not necessarily extend out into the viewing audience. Just 
because all of the other characters applaud the revengers’ actions does not mean that we must 
accept these characters as indubitable judges of moral behavior. Nor would early modern 
audiences be likely to “celebrate” Antonio and his friends if they subscribe to the views of 
Thomas Jackson, who contends:  
Severe punishment for doing evil, without precedent loving 
instructions or good encouragement to do well, is the natural 
offspring of unnaturalness: it bears no shadow of that justice or 
equity whose glorious pattern shines most brightly in our 
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heavenly Father …. To take pleasure in the pain or torture of 
notorious malefactors, is a note of inhumanity; their just 
punishment is only so far justly pleasant, as it procures either 
our own or others’ welfare, or avoidance of those grievances 
which they more justly suffer than we or others of the same 
society should do.138 
 
An audience could be—and, in light of Jackson’s and Calvin’s comments, I contend would 
be—just as disturbed by the Senators’ approval as they are with the revengers’ actions 
themselves. 
 Moreover, I would argue that the audience has more reason to castigate Antonio’s 
behavior than that of the other characters in the play. Antonio apologists are often quick to 
point out that Piero and Antonio commit murder for two vastly different reasons: Piero kills 
Andrugio because he won the affection of Piero’s love, Maria, years ago. He kills Felice and 
falsely imprisons Mellida to hurt Antonio. The wickedness of these actions is compounded 
by the fact that as the Duke, Piero’s villainy implicates the entirety of Venice. Antonio, on 
the other hand, suffered a personal loss at the hands of Piero. His actions are not only 
justified, but, as Robertson puts it, are “marked by grave and honorable purpose.”139 These 
obvious differences in motive, however, do not mitigate the exaggerated brutality of 
Antonio’s actions. Furthermore, all of Piero’s violent deeds are done offstage. Although we 
see the Felice’s blood and corpse, we never see Piero stabbing him. Nor do we see the 
murder of Andrugio or the death of Mellida.  The bloody murders of Julio and Piero, 
however, are on full display for the audience. The notion that we should ignore (or applaud) 
the grisly violence that we have seen and condemn the violence that we have merely heard 
about is, in many ways, impossible.  
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 Finally, Piero is, at the very least, aware that he is a villain. We can attribute his 
violent impulses to the fact that he is evil. Antonio is an overdramatic collector of woes who 
fancies himself a hero. To what does he owe his violent impulses?  I believe that Marston is 
suggesting that Antiono’s passions are the culprit. At the end, blood blurs the line between 
good and evil: human anger is human anger, no matter whose body it inhabits. The “open 
disjunction,” to borrow a phrase from Dollimore, at the play’s end only makes this notion 
more apparent. Without checks from the reason of Stoicism or the mercy of an earnest 
Christian, the passion of human anger begets what Calvin rightly terms “barbarous madness.”
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
 “When thunder claps, heaven likes the tragedy”: The Influence of the Imprecatory 
Psalms on Hoffman and The Revenger’s Tragedy 
 
 
The Geneva editors’ introduction suggests that David’s140 primary authorial concern 
in Psalm 58 is “shewing that the juste shal rejoice, when they se the punishement of the 
wicked to the glorie of God.”  The psalmist’s method of revealing this particular truth 
involves petitioning God for a vividly violent display of His wrath: 
 Break their teeth, o God, in their mouthes: breake the jawes of 
  the yong lions, o Lord. Let them melt like the waters, let them 
  passe away …. Let him carie them away as with a whirle  
  winde in his wrath. The righteous shal reioyce when he seeth 
  the vengeance: he shal wash his fete in the blood of the wicked. 
  And men shal say, Verely there is frute for the righteous:  
  doutles there is a God that iudgeth in the earth.141 
 
In his commentaries to the Psalms, Calvin admits that David’s invocation seems to lack 
mercy. However, he reminds his readers that “the affection which David means to impute to 
them is one of a pure and well-regulated kind; and in this case there is nothing absurd in 
supposing that believers, under the influence and guidance of the Holy Ghost, should rejoice 
in witnessing the execution of divine judgments.” Furthermore, Calvin stresses that those 
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as “the psalmist.” 
 
141 Ps 58:9-11. 
 
86 
 
who feel “cruel satisfaction” when they witness the destruction of their enemies are 
possessed not by holy zeal, but by “unholy passions of hatred, anger, or impatience, inducing 
an inordinate desire of revenge.” But those who are filled with a righteous spirit receive the 
“frute” of God’s wrath: it is therefore “only natural that they should rejoice to see it inflicted, 
as proving the interest which God feels in their personal safety.”142  
 Here, Calvin draws a distinction between the “unholy passions” of human beings and 
the “pure and well-regulated” anger inspired by the Holy Spirit. Because David is 
unquestionably a vessel for the Holy Spirit, his words are not blasphemy, but righteousness. 
In taking such pains to explain this to readers, however, Calvin necessarily admits how easily 
one might mistake David’s anger for the sinful human variety. Calvin thus also recognizes 
the perils of misappropriating David’s satisfaction in bathing in his enemies’ blood. This sort 
of reveling is permissible to David, because his main concern is God’s glory. Those 
distracted by more personal concerns are in danger of “inducing an inordinate desire of 
revenge.”   
  Calvin’s commentary on Psalm 58 illuminates Fredson Bowers’ observation on the 
differences between a villainous protagonist and the villain revenger. Bowers contends that 
villainous protagonists, such as Barrabas, “had always been conscious of their villainy—that 
they were damned souls—and gloried in their evil deeds because they were evil.”  The villain 
revenger, on the other hand, may take satisfaction in achieving vengeance, but “always 
believes that his cause is pure.”143 If we follow Bowers’ argument, the villainous protagonist 
succumbs to what Calvin terms “unholy passions of hatred.” But what of the villainous 
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revenger? Does believing that “his cause is pure” give him any claim to righteousness? Or 
does the villain revenger need to acquaint himself with Calvin’s warning about mistaking 
holy anger for its corrupt human counterpart?  
 The ease with which one might misappropriate this psalm is, in fact, what made the 
psalms themselves so popular. In his Preface to his commentary, Calvin describes the Psalms 
as“ ‘An Anatomy of all the Parts of the Soul’” because “there is not an emotion of which any 
one can be conscious that is not here represented as in a mirror. Or rather, the Holy Spirit has 
here drawn this to the life all the griefs, sorrows, fears, doubts, hopes, cares, perplexities, in 
short, all the distracting emotions with which the minds of men are wont to be agitated.”144 
The psalms are such a rich source of inspiration because they reflect the breadth of human 
emotion, providing prayers appropriate for times of joy, despair, glory, shame, and anger. It 
was this wide appeal that, according to Lily B. Campbell, led to a massive dissemination of 
vernacular translations of the psalms. Campbell notes that “defenders of putting the Psalms 
into English all claimed that in the Psalms could be found guidance for men’s lives as well as 
a response to every emotional need.”145  Nearly every major writer of the English 
Renaissance penned translations of psalms, including Thomas Wyatt, the Earl of Surrey, 
George Wither, Sir John Oldham, Sir Philip Sidney, Sir John Harington, King James I,  and 
John Milton, just to name a few. Indeed, as scholar Hannibal Hamlin notes,  
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the Psalm in England, see Campbell pp 34-54. 
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The Reformation opened the door to both vernacular 
translation and individual interpretation of the Bible, and one 
of the immediate and lasting results was a widespread “psalm 
culture,” in which poets, theologians, and devoted dilettantes 
produced hundreds of translations, paraphrases, and 
adaptations of the psalms, as well as meditations, sermons, and 
commentaries. Countless others turned to the psalms for 
inspiration, consolation, entertainment, and edification.146 
 
 Among these psalms, some of the most popular—and, most troubling—have been the 
ones like Psalm 58: the imprecatory or “cursing” psalms.  Often filled with vividly violent 
language, the imprecatory psalms implore God to barrage the psalmist’s enemies with His 
wrath. Although heathen nations such as Babylon are a frequent target, the psalmist 
sometimes has more specific concerns. Psalm 55, for example, is a bit more personal, as the 
psalmist asks the Lord to strike down a friend who has betrayed him:  “Surely mine enemie 
did not diffame me: for I colde have borne it … But it was thou, o man, even my companion, 
my guide and my familiar: [we] went into the House of God as companions. Let death sease 
upon them: let them go down quicke into the grave.”147    
 The main concern most Christians have with these psalms is, of course, that they 
seem quite antithetical to the Christian commands to love and forgive our enemies.  Early 
modern theologians attempted to reconcile Jesus’ teachings with the imprecatory psalms in a 
variety of ways. Hannibal Hamlin’s analysis of early modern English translations of Psalm 
137 (also called the “Psalm of Exile”) provides an excellent case study for this phenomenon. 
                                                 
146 Hannibal Hamlin. Psalm Culture in Early Modern England.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP. (2004): 225. 
Hamlin further observes that “The fact that Hebrew was so little known in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
England meant that there was essentially no ‘original,’ no accessible, authoritative text with which to compare a 
translation, and as a result, for the vast majority of their readers, the English Psalms were the only Psalms 
(supplemented for some by ‘cognate’ versions in Latin, German, or French) …. Because of the central place of 
the Psalms in English daily life, and their vital functions within the body of English culture, they were thus, in a 
powerful if peculiar sense, English works” (6, emphasis in original). 
 
147 Ps. 55:12-15. 
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According to Hamlin, Psalm 137 was “one of the most widely known biblical texts in 
Renaissance England,” perhaps because it “provided consolation for spiritual and political 
exiles.”148 Hamlin notes that “despite the historical specificity of Psalm 137, it has from the 
earliest times been interpreted as also prophesying the contemporary circumstances of its 
readers, both Jewish and Christian.”  The enemy “Babylon” could be interpreted to refer to 
any oppressive party, “and it was in large part the ease with which this label could be applied 
to any temporal or spiritual oppressor which made the psalm so powerful a resource for those 
who felt alienated or oppressed.”149  In addition to providing comfort for exiles, however, 
Psalm 137 also features one of the grisliest images in the Psalter. In the Geneva translation, 
the psalmist writes “O daughter of Babel, worthei to be destroyed … Blessed shal he be that 
taketh and dasheth thy children against the stones.”150   
 Some early modern authors were uncomfortable with this level of violence and 
allegorize the violence. Hamlin credits the inception of this tradition to St. Augustine, who 
wrote that the Babylonian babies were “evil desires at their birth.”151 Other writers “retain the 
curse, but avoid the children, like Edwin Sandys, who substitutes the more inclusive 
metonymy ‘thy cursed seed,’”152 However, as Hamlin astutely observes,“Other translators 
simply wallow in the gore. Fletcher, Davison, and Carew vie for the grisliest verson, but 
Oldham, elsewhere a master of satiric invective, surpasses them all: 
                                                 
148 Hannibal Hamlin. “Psalm Culture in the English Renaissance: Readings of Psalm 137 by Shakespeare, 
Spenser, Milton, and Others.” Renaissance Quarterly 55:1 (2002): 224.  
 
149 Hannibal Hamlin. Psalm Culture in Early Modern England.  217-9. 
 
150 Ps. 137:8-9 
151 Hamlin, Hannibal. “Psalm Culture in the English Renaissance.” 252. Hamlin here cites St. Augustine. 
Expositions on the of Psalms.  Vols 5 and 6. Translated by H.M. Wilkins. Ed. John Henry Parker. Oxford, 
(1853), 176.  
 
152 Ibid., 251. 
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  Blest, yea thrice-blest be that barbarous Hand 
  (O Grief! That I such dire Revenge commend) 
  Who tears out Infants from their mother’s Womb, 
  And hurls ‘em yet unborn unto their Tomb. 
  Blest he, who plucks ‘em from their Parents’ Arms, 
  That Sanctuary from all common Harms; 
  Who with their Skulls and Bones shall pave thy Streets all o’er 
  And fill thy glutted Channels with their scattr’d Brains & Gore. 
 
Oldham’s parenthetical grief at having to utter such a curse hardly mitigates his obvious 
relish in the charnelhouse details of his paraphrase.”153 
Notwithstanding these efforts to justify, sanitize, or embellish upon the psalmist’s 
words, the imprecatory psalms serve as evidence that God accepts prayers of anger just as He 
accepts prayers of praise, thanksgiving, or supplication. The imprecatory psalms are prayers 
of venting; there is never an indication that the one praying them should take any action on 
his own. There is nothing wrong with anger per se; the important thing is what you do with 
that anger.  The psalms suggest that the only legitimate recourse is to bring that anger to God 
and let Him decide if, how, and when to dispense justice.  A desire for vengeance is 
legitimate as long as one understands that the vengeance belongs to God alone. It is perhaps 
this legitimization of revenge that made the imprecatory psalms so well-received by the early 
moderns.  The vogue for revenge plays, coupled with the political and religious turmoil of 
the time made prayers for vengeance quite appealing. As Hamlin argues, “the last verses of 
[Psalm 137], sanctioning and offering a model for vengeful cursing, proved especially 
attractive during these centuries of violent religious conflict.”154  
                                                 
153 Ibid., 252.  Hamlin here cites The Poems of John Oldham. Ed. Harold F. Brooks and Ramen Selden. Oxford: 
Oxford UP (1987), 143.  
 
154 Ibid., 254. 
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The danger, then, lies not in the wrath itself, but in the universal applicability of these 
psalms.  Although theoretically only “righteous” anger is warranted, who could help but read 
himself into the psalmist’s situation?  The psalmist’s problems are not just with heathen 
nations, but with deceitful friends, slanderous rivals, flattering courtiers, and unjust authority 
figures. Any reader could feel justified in praying for his own enemies to be flung into pits. 
And, if the Lord is slow in exacting vengeance, one might perhaps feel justified to help speed 
things along.  Furthermore, the psalms are unique among other books of the Bible in that they 
are explicitly human language—they are meant to be prayed or sung by human beings to the 
Lord. As John Calvin writes,  
The other parts of Scripture contain the commandments which 
God enjoined his servants to announce to us. But here the 
prophets themselves, seeing they are exhibited to us as 
speaking to God, and laying open all their inmost thoughts and 
affections, call, or rather draw, each of us to the examination to 
himself in particular, in order that none of the many infirmities 
to which we are subject, and of the many vices with which we 
abound, may remain concealed.155  
 
Unlike other Biblical texts, the psalms are a unilateral conversation; readers see the prayers, 
but not the Lord’s replies. This one-sidedness creates another array of problems for the 
imprecatory psalms. Without God’s response, the psalmist’s anger is sanctioned for both him 
and the reading audience. Moreover, there is no differentiation between divine wrath and 
human anger. There is ample evidence elsewhere in scripture that God is angered by 
injustice, but the psalms presume that He is angered by the private indignities suffered by one 
man rather than the irreverence of heathen nations or the transgressions of the Israelites.  In 
psalm 59, for example, the psalmist exclaims: “God wil let me se my desire vpon mine 
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enemies.”156 In this sense, the psalms are anthropopathic, as they suppose the Lord feels the 
same way the psalmist feels.  
This assumed homogeny between heaven’s reaction and one man’s response to 
personal injustice is also a defining characteristic of villainous revengers, particularly Henry 
Chettle’s Hoffman and Cyril Tourneur’s Vindice.157  Both The Tragedy of Hoffman, or A 
Revenge for a Father (1602) and The Revenger’s Tragedy (1607) feature protagonists who, 
like the psalmist, believe that heaven—or, at the very least, a supernatural force—shares in 
their personal outrage.  Thus, in these plays and the imprecatory psalms, human anger is 
mediated through its divine counterpart. By perceiving or creating a link between their 
responses and divine wrath, these figures transform a sinful, passionate human emotion into a 
sacred, righteous one.  
 Chettle’s Hoffman features the most overtly villainous revenger in English drama. 
Hoffman gleefully murders his enemies without the slightest hint of remorse. Indeed, The 
Tragedy of Hoffman is perhaps the least aptly-named play of the era, as the death of Hoffman 
at the play’s end is not so much a tragedy as an obvious consequence of his insatiable 
bloodlust. Critics have long noted the two-dimensional nature of Hoffman’s character and 
other flaws in the play itself. In 1902, Ashley Thorndike lamented that Chettle “made little 
effort to give the story either imaginative intensity or philosophical significance.”158  
                                                 
156 Ps. 59:10. Emphasis in the original. 
 
157 The authorship of The Revenger’s Tragedy is a matter of long-standing critical debate. For a recent account 
of this discussion, see Brian Jay Corrigan, “Middleton, The Revenger’s Tragedy, and Crisis Literature.” SEL 
38:2 (1998): 281-95. An interesting, if somewhat outdated study of the topic can also be found in  M.W.A. 
Smith. “The Revenger’s Tragedy: The Interpretation of Statistical Results for Resolving Disputed Authorship.” 
Computers and the Humanities. 21:1 (1987): 21-55. Because the precise identity of the author does not 
seriously impact my discussion, for the sake of simplicity I will follow Brian Gibbons’ lead in ascribing 
authorship to Tourneur.  
 
158 “The Relations of Hamlet to Contemporary Revenge Plays.” PMLA 17:2 (1902): 193. 
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Hazelton Spencer’s 1936 critique described Hoffman as “devoid of merit of any kind; a 
revenge melodrama of unrelieved sensationalism, [and] not even successfully macabre.”159  
Like The Revenger’s Tragedy after it, Hoffman begins long after the murder of the 
protagonist’s loved one. The play’s first lines introduce the protagonist and his plight 
seemingly at the moment where he decides to end his period of revenger’s hesitation: 
Hence Clouds of melancholy  
Ile be no longer subiect to your schismes,  
But thou deare soule, whose nerues and arteries 
In dead resoundings summon vp reuenge, 
And thou shalt hate, but be appeas’d sweete hearse  
(ll. 1-5)160 
 
In these lines, Hoffman resolves to throw off the melancholy that has presumably been 
afflicting him since his father’s death.  He describes embracing vengeance as an almost 
physical enterprise, willing revenge to be siphoned into the nerves and arteries of his soul.161 
Hoffman apparently does not need a ghost to inform him of the crime, identify the murderer, 
or urge him to vengeance.  He already knows what has happened, who is guilty, and what he 
must do. What makes now the ideal time to do it is a mystery.  All the audience knows is that 
his father’s corpse has been egging him on in some fashion:  
The dead remembrance of my liuing father, 
And with a hart as aire, swift as thought 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
159 Review of The Life and Work of Henry Chettle by Harold Jenkins. Modern Language Notes 51:8 (1936): 
549-550, 550.  
 
160 All quotes from this play are taken from The Tragedy of Hoffman, edited by F. P. Wilson. Wilson conflated 
twelve versions of the 1631 quartos to form the text.  I have modernized the long “s” and fixed obvious 
reversals of the “n” and “u.”  All other spellings are Wilson’s. The text itself is in poor shape; as John Payne 
Collier notes, “it has been handed down to us in a state of deplorable mutilation, and the printer murdered the 
author with as little remorse as the author murdered his characters” (The History of English Dramatic Poetry to 
the Time of Shakespeare, 53). 
 
161 This rejection of melancholy is certainly a jab at Hamlet, who spends most of the play in a state of 
melancholic vacillation. Hoffman’s desire to summon revenge into his soul is reminiscent of Hamlet’s reaction 
to the reports of his father’s Ghost: “My fate cries out, and makes each petty Arterie / As hardy as the Nemean 
Lion’s nerve” (I.iv.81-2). For further discussion of the physical valence of wrath, see chapter two.   
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I’le execute iustly in such a cause. 
Where truth leadeth, what coward would not fight? 
Ill acts moue some, but myne’s a cause that’s right. 
       (ll.8-12) 
Hoffman here separates himself from those who are driven by “ill acts,” averring that his 
cause is spurred by justice, truth, and righteousness. Thus assured of his motivations, 
Hoffman interprets the “thunder and lightning” that follow these lines as evidence of divine 
anger at his delay: 
See the powers of heauen in apparitions, 
And fright full aspects as incensed, 
That I thus tardy am to doe an act 
Which iustice and a fathers death excites, 
Like threatening meteors antedates destruction.  thunder 
Again I come, I come, I come. 
     (ll.12-20) 
 
Hoffman then addresses the “effigies of faire virtue” in his cave, promising to take revenge 
on their enemies so that “hand in hand” they will walk to paradise.  In these first twenty lines, 
Hoffman has resolved to take up the just cause of avenging his virtuous father’s death. He 
believes that heaven is on his side, interpreting the thunder only as a sign of displeasure with 
his inaction. The audience has no reason to think otherwise, until it is revealed in line 128 
that Hoffman Senior was not murdered in cold blood, but executed for piracy by the Duke of 
Luningberg.  
Although we do not know what has suddenly compelled Hoffman to seek revenge 
(unless, of course, this was the first time he has heard thunder since his father’s death), it 
does seem like quite a fortuitous time to make that decision, as he soon discovers that his 
enemy’s son Otho has been shipwrecked near his cave. Hoffman marvels at his good fortune 
and explains his situation to Lorrique, Otho’s servant: 
 Wouldst thou hauing lost a father as I haue, 
 Whose very name dissolves my eyes to teares 
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 Could duty and thy loue so different proue, 
 Not to auenge his death whose better part  
 Was thine, thou his, when he fell part of tehe  
 Fell with him each drop, being part thine owne 
 And wouldst not be reveng’d. 
    (ll. 64-70) 
 
The explanation Hoffman gives to Lorrique mirrors his earlier soliloquy: his father has been 
murdered and it has fallen upon him as the dutiful son to take vengeance. Lorrique readily 
sympathizes with Hoffman’s plight, and is, in fact, not even dissuaded when Hoffman ups 
the ante by promising to advance beyond a simple “eye for an eye” and to murder anyone 
who “Has but one ounce of blood, of which hees part” (l.72).  
Hoffman’s vow to exact revenge on the murderer’s progeny has a precedent in the 
Psalter. In Psalm 109, the speaker petitions:  
Let there be none to extend mercie unto him: nether let there be 
anie to shewe mercie upon his fatherless children. Let his 
posteritie be destroyed, and in the generacion following let 
their name be put out. Let the iniquitie of his fathers be had in 
remembrance with the Lord: and let not the sinne of his mother 
be done awaie.162 
 
The concept of the sons bearing the sins of their fathers is a common theme in the Old 
Testament, one that is both supported and renounced by scripture.163 The difference between 
the psalmist and Hoffman, of course, is that the psalmist asks God to punish sinner’s 
offspring, whereas, Hoffman assumes the role of not only the beseecher, but the enforcer.  He 
assigns virtue to his father, guilt to Luningberg, and determines the proper course of justice.  
Hoffman easily persuades Otho’s servant Lorrique to join him in his revenge.  And, 
just as easily, the two of them murder Otho with a burning crown, the same device used to 
execute Hoffman’s father. Within the space of 234 lines, the protagonist has promised 
                                                 
162 Ps. 109:12-14. 
 
163 For further discussion of this theme, see chapter 2, pages 80-81. 
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vengeance, found a co-conspirator, and taunted, tortured, and killed an enemy in a creatively 
cruel manner.  Unfortunately for everyone (the audience perhaps included), Hoffman sees 
this as merely “the prologue to the’nsuing play,” as the Duke of Luningberg has plenty of 
living relatives and Chettle has over 2000 more lines to write.  Hoffman and Lorrique 
travel back to Luningberg, where Hoffman impersonates Prince Otho. No one there has 
apparently ever actually looked at the prince, because his disguise fools everyone. Hoffman 
himself acknowledges the ridiculousness of this situation: 
  So run on fate, my destines are good 
  Reuenge hath made me great by shedding blood: 
  I am suppos’d the heire of Luningberg, 
  By which I am of Prussia prince elect. 
  Good: who is wrong’d by this? onely a fool:  
  And ‘tis not fit that idiots should beare rule. 
      (ll. 642-648) 
 
Hoffman proclaims that revenge has made him “great,” having propelled him from a cave-
dwelling orphan to the apparent heir of Luningberg in record time.  The fact that he has so 
easily duped the royal family is proof of their idiocy; their idiocy is proof that they are unfit 
rulers. According to this logic, Hoffman’s “good” actions harm only those who deserve 
punishment.  His easy success justifies his deeds and supports his notion that taking 
“reuenge” is making him great. Lorrique observes: “this Clois is an honest villain, ha’s 
conscience in his killing of men: he kils none but his father enemies, and there issue, ‘tis 
admirable, ‘tis excellent, ‘tis well ‘tis meritorious, where? in heaven? No, hell” (ll. 660-4). 
As an “honest villain,” Hoffman is led by his “conscience” to kill none but Luningberg’s 
relatives.  Although Lorrique admires Hoffman’s panache, he does not buy into his perverse 
logic, proclaiming his actions “admirable,” “excellent,” and “meritorious,” but only 
according to hell’s standards.    
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 Like Hoffman, the psalmist assumes the righteousness of his motives and considers 
the downfall of his enemies proof of God’s like-mindedness. Unlike the psalmist, however, 
Hoffman sees no problem in being the agent of their downfall.  This, of course, might stem 
from the fact that Hoffman is not a Christian. He does, however, believe that various 
supernatural entities support his actions. When Hoffman learns that Luningberg has died of 
natural causes, thus eliminating Hoffman’s entire raison d’etre,  he responds to this news 
with both frustration and swift resignation: “Had I Briareus hands, i’de striue with heauen / 
For executing wrath before the houre, / But wishes are in vaine, hee’s gone” (1687-80). 
Hoffman’s assumption that the Duke has died as a result of heaven’s wrath belies a belief in 
a divine justice that is perfectly aligned with his own sense of justice. His half-hearted offer 
to strive with heaven over this untimely death quickly becomes an almost congenial 
acceptance of the fact, perhaps because he recognizes that his motivations have transformed 
from simple revenge to an unwavering obsession to extinguish his enemy’s family line.  
Accordingly, as his plot to kill Luningberg’s brother-in-law Ferdinand advances, 
Hoffman exclaims: 
  Now Scarlet Mistris from thicke sable clouds 
  Thrust forth thy blood-staind hands, applaud my plot, 
  That giddy wonderers may amazed stand 
  While death smites downe suspctless Ferdinand. 
        (ll. 1356-1360)  
 
Hoffman’s entreaty to his Scarlet Mistris (probably Revenge, although he never specifies) is 
for approval, not aid.  This applause, coupled with the plot itself, will “amaze” the witnesses 
of Ferdinand’s untimely murder. His vengeance is done both to please heaven and to give 
him the satisfaction of gloating over his enemies. As we have seen, this reveling in bloodshed 
appears in several psalms, most notably 58 and 137. Although the psalmist himself is not 
98 
 
killing his enemies, he does both envision a future where he will bathe in their blood and 
beatify those who murder infants. These grisly scenes will reassure the righteous and prove 
God’s existence to the heathens.  Hoffman’s motives may not be as “pure,” but his 
imagination is no less gruesome.   
 Hoffman’s plans proceed swimmingly until the arrival of Martha, Otho’s mother. 
Because Martha would presumably be able to see through Hoffman’s disguise, her 
appearance throws quite a wrinkle into Hoffman’s scheme, and it is not because she is the 
only one who actually remembers what Otho looks like. As Hoffman prepares to strangle 
Martha in her sleep, he is inflamed with desire. When she wakes up, he informs her that Otho 
died in a shipwreck near his cave, and somehow convinces her to adopt him as her son and 
heir. This good fortune is only temporary, however, as Lorrique turns on Hoffman just as 
quickly as he earlier turned on Otho, and the remaining royal family of Luningberg 
immediately conspire to murder Hoffman.  They have no intention of arresting, trying, or 
even simply killing Hoffman; rather, they believe that he must be captured and tortured. 
Saxony suggests that they “seeke out the hated wretch, / And with due torture let his life be 
forc’d / From his despised body” (ll. 2161-3).  Even Martha, who showed young Hoffman 
mercy during his father’s execution, exclaims: “hope of reuenge in wrath doth make mee 
smile” (l. 2130).   Mathias argues that Hoffman should be deceived so that his punishment 
fits his crimes:   
Reuenge should have proportion, 
By slye deceit he acted euery wronge, 
And by deceit I would haue him intrapt; 
Then the reuenge were fit, iust, and square  
And t’would more vex him that is all compos’d 
Of craft and subtilty to be outstript 
In his owne fashion, then a hundred deaths.  
    (ll. 2200-2206) 
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The justice in their revenge plot is not divine, but poetic.  They are not concerned with 
reforming a sinner or glorifying God, but in vexing Hoffman “in his owne fashion.”  Saxony 
and the others proceed to dupe Hoffman, restrain him, and fit him with a burning crown, 
thereby killing him in the same way that both Otho and Hoffman Senior were killed.  
Hoffman himself recognizes an added “justice” in his own demise by burning crown, as it 
punishes his “foolish idle braine / for giuing entertainement to loues thoughts.”164   
 In using deceit and torture to mirror Hoffman’s murder methods, Luningberg’s 
relatives must necessarily mirror Hoffman’s wickedness. After setting the crown on his head, 
they offer Hoffman forgiveness and urge him to repent. For his part, Hoffman refuses the 
pardon and will not forgive them in return. In his final words, he appears to be looking 
forward to an eternity in hell, although the text is too corrupt to know for sure: 
  Soe doe not I for yours, nor pardon you; 
  You kild my father, my most warlike father, 
  Thus as you deale by me, you did by him; 
  But I deserue it that haue slackt reuenge 
  Through fickle beauty, and a womans fraud; 
  But Hell the hope of all dispayring men , 
  That wring the poore, and eate the people vp, 
  As greedy beasts the haruest of their spring: 
  That Hell, where cowards haue their seats prepar’d, 
  And barbarous asses, such as haue rob’d soldiers of  
  Reward, and punish true desert with scorned death …  
        (ll. 2608-ff) 
 
Like most other villains in revenge tragedy,165 Hoffman is given a chance to repent; unlike 
other villains, however, he is also given the opportunity to forgive his murderers. 
Considering the poor state of the manuscript, we can only assume that he never does either.  
                                                 
164 ll. 2598-9. 
 
165 At least, of course, the villains who have intact tongues in the last scene.  
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He does, however, seem to believe that he deserves his fate, albeit not because he has killed 
so many people, but because he made the fatal error of choosing sex over murder.  This may 
be a dubious display of morals, but at the very least, Hoffman does indeed prove himself an 
“honest villain” in his death. Hoffman rejects repentance and forgiveness because he knows 
that his prayers would be empty words: these notions are “to no purpose without charity,” a 
virtue he obviously lacks (l. 2605).166  Hoffman’s enemies do not possess this same level of 
self-awareness. Their behavior at the end of the play only becomes more unsettling when one 
considers it alongside their final words to Hoffman.  Martha advises him to “call vpon 
heauen” while Mathias offers pardon and prays for his soul, reminding the audience that they 
are Christians. This Christian posturing is certainly undercut by the fact that they have just 
set a burning crown upon Hoffman’s head.  
This conflation of good and evil, vengeance and cruelty, and justice and “fitness” 
echoes the ambiguous nature of the imprecatory psalms. Taken out of context, Hoffman’s 
motivations seem just: he has suffered while his enemies have prospered.  His desire to wipe 
out Luningberg’s issue reflects the psalmist’s plea for God to destroy his enemy’s posterity in 
psalm 109.  The psalms themselves are also taken out of context, but in two different ways. 
Those who pray the psalms insert themselves into the psalmist’s position, turning his pleas 
into personal grievances by forgetting or disregarding the original circumstances. More 
importantly, however, the psalms are devoid of a divine response: we see only the psalmist’s 
entreaties.  There is no way to gain contextual evidence of the psalmist’s righteousness, other 
than to assume that his calls for vengeance are indeed just.  Something like psalm 35, for 
example, could be prayed by any offended party:  
                                                 
166 Compare the failed repentance of Claudius in Hamlet, discussed in chapter four of this manuscript.  
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Let their waie be darke and slipperie and let the Angel of the 
Lord persecute them. For without cause thei haue hid the pit 
and their net for me: without cause haue they digged a pit for 
my soule. Let destruction come vpon him at vnawareds, and let 
his net, that the hathe laied priuely, take him: let him fall into 
the same destruction.167  
 
The commentary in the Geneva Bible does little to dissuade open interpretation: “we may not 
call God to be a reuenger, but onely for his glorie, and when our cause is juste.”168 There are 
no guidelines provided as to when one’s cause is “juste,” save the notion that the vengeance 
must be done for God’s glory. Ultimately, the reader may make assumptions, but must 
remember that the final judgment is left in the hands of God. The psalmist does not act on his 
anger, but brings it to the Lord. In this way, the imprecatory psalms legitimize human anger, 
but also reaffirm God’s just nature.   
Furthermore, while the psalmist does beg the Lord to send His wrath, he also reminds 
himself to have patience. Psalm 37 acknowledges the allure of turning to evil, as the wicked 
seem to thrive while the righteous suffer. However, the psalmist enjoins: “freate not thy self 
because of the wicked men, neither be envious for the evil doers. For they shal soone be cut 
done like grasse, and shal wither as the grene herbe. Trust thou in the Lord and do good.”169 
The Geneva commentary adds: “The godlie are assured that the power and the craft of the 
wicked shal not prevail against them, but fall on their owne neckes, and therefore oght 
paciently to abide Gods time, and in the meane while bewaiele their sinnes and offer up their 
teares as a sacrifice of their obedience.”170 The righteous are sure to prosper and the wicked 
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168 Ps. 35:7e, 241. 
 
169 Ps. 37:1-3. 
 
170 Ps 37:20-22. 
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are sure to fall, but only when God decides the time is right. There is nothing for the victim 
to do but wait, pray, and be repentant in the meantime.  Psalm 37’s promise that the wicked 
will “fall on their owne neckes” may indeed suggest that Hoffman’s death is an act of divine 
justice. 171 After all, he is killed with his own murder weapon, much like Barrabas before him 
and D’Amville after him. Mathias and the others might then be considered divine 
instruments, as they effected Hoffman’s just deserts. However, the fact that it is so difficult to 
distinguish the righteous revengers from the villain sheds some doubt on that assertion. After 
Hoffman becomes Martha’s adopted son, he begs “iust heauen” that “the ground I wrong you 
in, may turne my graue” (ll. 1898-9).  Hoffman’s insincerity aside, this is the only instance in 
the play of a character asking for divine justice. Hoffman’s Christian enemies never seek 
God’s assistance or approval in their quest for retribution. Thus, the only plea for justice in 
this play is sought—and granted—ironically. 
In addition to promising “fitting” divine justice, Psalm 37 also reinforces the 
importance of patience. As was noted in chapter one, patience is important not just because it 
demonstrates obedience and faith, but because it prevents the victim of injustice from 
becoming a villain himself. Psalm 37 underscores this idea:        
Waite paciently vpon the Lord and hope in him: freat not thy 
self for him which prospereth in his way: nor for the man that 
bringeth his enterprises to passe. Cease from angre and leaue 
of wrath: freat not thy selfe also to do euil. For euil doers 
shalbe cut of, and they that waite vpon the Lord, they shal 
inherite the land.172 
 
                                                 
171 See also Ps.37:14-15: “The wicked haue drawne their sworde, and haue bent their bowe, to cast downe the 
poore and nedie, and to slay suche as be of vpright conuersation. But their sworde shal entre into their owne 
heart, and their bowes shal be broken.”  
172 Ps. 37:7-9. Psalm 69 also considers the impact of wrath on others: “O God, thou knowest my foolishness, 
and my fautes are not hid from thee.  Let not them that trust in thee, o Lord God of hostes, be ashamed for me: 
let not those that seke thee, be confounded through me.”  The Geneva commentary explains: “Let not mine evil 
intreatie of the enemies be an occasion, that the faithful fall from thee” (Ps. 69:5-6. Commentary: 69:6, 249k). 
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Charlemont's patience in The Atheist's Tragedy is rewarded rather quickly; it seems that only 
a few days pass between the discovery of his father's murder and the culprit’s execution. This 
brief time span is less a test of his faith in divine justice than a test of his impulse control. 
The audience also never learns exactly how much time has passed between the execution of 
Hoffman’s father and Hoffman’s decision to take vengeance; we can only assume it was at 
least as long as it took Hoffman Senior’s body to skeletonize. In The Revenger’s Tragedy on 
the other hand, we learn early in the play that Vindice has been toting Gloriana’s skull 
around with him for nine years, an act that has become so familiar that his brother 
Hippolito’s only reaction is to tease him about it: “Still sighing o’er Death’s vizard?” (I.i.49). 
Traditionally, scholars have counted this waiting period against Vindice, arguing that 
Vindice spends precious time brooding and plotting instead of forgiving and forgetting. 
Fredson Bowers, for example, ascribes this nine-year moratorium not to patience, but 
creative maliciousness: “Seldom is this period of inactivity well motivated, for the revenger’s 
ultimate course of action could as well have been adopted at the beginning as at the end.”  
This waiting period is then only intended to “illustrate their over-bloodthirsty characters.  No 
normal, sympathetic person by Elizabethan standards would harbor his wrath for such a time 
and withstand the promptings of religion for forgiveness.”173   
Perhaps, however, this deferral of revenge can also make Vindice a more sympathetic 
figure. Lactantius reminds us that “the anger of man ought to be curbed, because he is often 
angry unjustly; and he has immediate emotion.”174 Similarly, Thomas Aquinas stresses 
because anger is caused by the memory of indignation, the strength of anger “is impaired 
                                                 
173 Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy 136n. 
 
174 “A Treatise on the Anger of God” 41.  
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little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether.”175 Seneca too suggests 
that “the greatest remedy for anger is postponement, which allows its initial heat to abate and 
the darkness that oppresses the mind to subside or thin out.”176 Vindice obviously did not act 
upon “immediate emotion,” but at the same time, it is clear that his anger has not vanished 
altogether. Nine years have elapsed since the murder of his beloved. During this time, 
Vindice has watched the lecherous Duke and his depraved family flourish, turning the court 
into a den of sin and debauchery.  The innocent are violated and the guilty freed by acts of 
nepotism. Vindice has exercised patience—even if it is more of an excuse to brood and 
scheme than a pious faith in God—for an admirably long time. 
But what is the reason for Vindice’s delay?  We have no evidence that he is 
deliberating over whether or not to kill the Duke, nor does the play give us any reason to 
think that he has simply been waiting for the perfect time to take revenge.  This notion of 
“timing” is key, as it seems that many of the events that propel Vindice from malcontent to 
murderer happen by accident or coincidence, prompting Vindice, like Hoffman, to believe 
that a higher power approves. To address this issue, we must first examine Vindice’s idea of 
his role in the process of divine justice.  Like other revengers, Vindice notes the corruption of 
his society.  Disguised as Lussurioso’s servant Piato, Vindice laments: 
Any kin next to the rim o' the sister  
Is man's meat in these days, and in the morning,  
When they are up and dressed and their mask on,  
Who can perceive this, save that eternal eye 
That sees through flesh and all?   
                                          (I.iii.63-7)   
 
                                                 
175 Summa Theologica, Q 48, Article II, p 535. 
 
176 Moral and Political Essays (III.12.iv) (88). 
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Vindice’s rant against false woman has numerous Biblical antecedents.  In Kings 9:30, for 
example, the heathen princess Jezebel is described as painting her eyes and arranging her hair 
in an attempt to distract Jehu. Jeremiah and Ezekiel both portray women who adorn 
themselves with cosmetics and jewelry as shameless harlots.177 Vindice’s disgust with the 
current social climate partially stems from the fact that no one else seems perturbed. Women 
have gotten so good at dissembling that once they put their morning “masks” on, only God 
knows that they’ve spent their nights in lechery. Of course, although Vindice intimates that 
only God knows about this debauchery, he also necessarily includes himself by making the 
observation: both God and he see the truth. This “eternal eye,” however, seems to observe 
without taking any sort of punitive action. Women continue to paint over their sins instead of 
reforming themselves, suggesting that society’s perception is more important than God’s 
because society’s judgment is more present than God’s.  
 Vindice notes this absence of divine punishment at several other points.  Disgusted 
that his mother would allow his sister to be Lussurioso’s whore, he exclaims: “Why does not 
heaven turn black or with a frown / Undo the world?  Why does not earth start up / And 
strike the sins that tread upon it?” (II.i.250-3).  Here, heaven either does not notice the sins of 
the world or does not care.  Later, Lussurioso tells Vindice that Piato has solicited his sister 
and claims to have pushed Piato away in anger. Vindice replies: “Has not heaven an ear?  Is 
all the lightning wasted?” (IV.ii.156). Although this could possibly be an aside, this could 
also be feigned outrage at Piato’s behavior. Either way, Vindice’s comment suggests a lack 
of divine justice, or, at the very least, palpable divine anger. Although Vindice earlier 
described an “eternal eye” that could see through masks of propriety, there is apparently no 
“eternal ear” that can hear any of it.  The question “Is all the lightning wasted” can be 
                                                 
177  For further discussion on Jeremiah’s castigation of women, see chapter four, pages 125-8.  
106 
 
interpreted two different ways.  In one sense, if the entire supply of lightning is “wasted,” 
then the finite supply of God’s wrath has been tapped dry.  If we read “wasted” as a verb in 
the present tense, however, the question becomes about whether the lightning is “wasted” on 
targets who do not deserve punishment.   
Vindice’s problem, therefore, is not a lack of faith in divine justice, but a frustration 
with divine patience. Like the Psalmist, Vindice assumes that there is a divine force who 
shares his anger with the royal family’s wickedness. In the play’s first lines, Vindice portrays 
“Vengeance” and “Revenge” as deities capable of both action and appeasement:   
Vengeance, thou Murder's quit-rent, and whereby 
Thou show'st thyself tenant to Tragedy, 
Oh keep thy day, hour, minute, I beseech, 
For those thou hast determined. Hum, who e'er knew 
Murder unpaid, faith give Revenge her due 
She's kept touch hitherto! 
                                  (I.i.39-44)   
Here, Vindice asks Vengeance to keep her specified day of reckoning for the wicked and 
expresses complete faith that Revenge will prevail. Although this “prayer” is not addressed to 
Yahweh, its sentiment is notably similar to numerous passages in the Hebrew Bible, most 
notably the imprecatory psalms. Psalm 94, for example, begins: “O Lord God the advenger, o 
God the advenger, shewe thy self clearely” (94.1).  Throughout the Psalter, the psalmist 
portrays the Lord as a destroyer of the wicked.  His prayers are not only of entreaty, but of 
affirmation: in addition to asking the Lord for vengeance, he also confidently proclaims that 
He will indeed punish the wicked.  
Instead of merely expressing frustration with this divine patience, Vindice finally 
decides to take action. Like the Psalmist, Vindice believes that a divine force will exact 
justice against the wicked, but unlike the Psalmist, Vindice views himself as either a 
colleague or a willful agent of divine vengeance instead of a passive instrument, bystander, 
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or supplicant. After Lussurioso’s exit, Vindice once again expresses his frustration with the 
fact that such a sordid bunch have been allowed to live so long:  
Oh thou almighty patience ‘tis my wonder, 
That such a fellow, impudent and wicked, 
Should not be cloven as he stood 
Or with a secret wind burst open! 
Is there no thunder left, or is’t kept up 
In stock for heavier vengeance?  
      (IV.ii.192-7) 
Here, Vindice is not cursing God for inaction, begging Him to send His wrath, or asking 
whether he himself should have more patience. He simply marvels at the “almighty patience” 
with ironic admiration.  This “wondering,” while perhaps frustrated, is not so much an 
entreaty as an observation, putting Vindice on roughly equal footing with the Almighty. It 
seems to Vindice that the wicked should have been cloven and burst open by “secret wind” 
long ago, but God’s exasperatingly infinite patience allows them to live.  Because Vindice 
himself has already killed the Duke a few scenes earlier, he might be curious as to whether 
God is going to take care of the rest of the family. Vindice sees two reasons for why God has 
not acted: either there is no vengeance left or He is saving it up for something even worse.  
Both suggest a frustrated “wondering” at God’s inscrutable patience similar to Psalm 35:17, 
where the psalmist exclaims: “Oh Lord! How long wilt thou look on?”  In his commentaries 
on the Psalms, Calvin notes that “although God inculcates upon the faithful the duty of 
quietly and patiently waiting till the time arrive when he shall judge it proper to help them, 
yet he allows them to bewail in prayer the grief which they experience on account of his 
delay” (IV.i.590). In other words, we have to wait for God to act, but we are allowed to 
complain to Him about it.   
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Perhaps the more pressing question, then, is: why is God waiting?  As discussed 
earlier, the answer could indeed be mercy; but it could also be what Vindice himself 
suggested: “heavier vengeance.” Calvin’s interpretation of several of the imprecatory palms 
paints Yahweh as a revenger with an interest in both divine and poetic justice: 
 The wicked plotteth against the righteous, and gnasheth upon 
  him with his teeth. But the Lord shall laugh at him;  for he 
 seeth that his day is coming. The wicked draw their sword, and 
  bend their bow, to cast down the poor and needy, and to slay 
  those that are of upright ways. But their sword shall  enter into 
  their own heart, and their bow shall be broken.   
     (Ps. 37:12-15;  Calvin’s translation)   
 
The evil-doers are here depicted as “plotting,” but God is shown to be the master schemer, 
laughing while they make their plans. Just as in Hoffman and The Atheist’s Tragedy, the 
wicked are not simply killed; they are killed by their own weapons. This may not be 
immediate vengeance, but it is indeed ironic vengeance.  
 In Psalm 59, David actually asks God to hold off on smiting the reprobates. While 
this may initially seem similar to Malefort Jr.’s request in The Unnatural Combat, David asks 
not so he can take action himself, but so that the revenge lasts longer:  “Slay them not, let my 
people forget: scatter them by thy power; and bring them down, O Lord!” (Ps.59:11).  Calvin 
considers this a very “proper” request, observing that “We are apt to think, when God has not 
annihilated our enemies at once, that they have escaped out of his hands altogether; and we 
look upon it as properly no punishment, that they should be gradually and slowly 
destroyed…. Were the wicked exterminated in a moment, the remembrance of the event 
might speedily be effaced” (V.ii.389).  Here, patience is rewarded by an even greater act of 
wrath. According to Calvin, David suggests we favor gradual destruction over instant 
eradication, thus providing a more “constant illustration of the wrath of God” (V.ii.390).    
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 In these two psalms, God waits to take revenge not out of mercy, but in order to 
deliver a more fitting or more lasting punishment. Yahweh acts similarly to most stage 
revengers, most of whom, like Hamlet or Antonio, wait for particularly satisfying moments 
to avenge, and some of whom, like Hoffman or Vindice, wish to exterminate entire 
bloodlines. Of course, God’s sense of irony is not always important to those waiting for Him 
to intervene, and “constant illustration” of God’s wrath is not going to placate everyone.  
Calvin calls it a “proper trial of our patience” when “God does not come forth at once, armed 
for the discomfitures of the ungodly, but connives for a time and withholds his hand” (V.ii. 
28), but does admit that the patience is difficult even for David to muster.  A lack of patience 
on David’s (and, by extension, Vindice’s) part is certainly forgivable: after all, they are only 
human. As Calvin notes, this Psalm is not only an exhortation for patience and a promise of 
justice, but an illustration of the difference between God and man.  The psalmist shows us 
that   
  it is not meet that God, who sees the destruction of the wicked 
  to be at hand, should rage and fret after the manner of men.  
  There is then a tacit distinction here made between God and 
  men, who, amidst the troubles and confusions of the world, do 
  not see the day of the wicked coming, and who, oppressed by 
  cares and fears, cannot laugh, but because vengeance is  
  delayed, rather become so impatient that they murmur and fret. 
  (V.ii.29)   
 
God’s omniscience and omnipotence allow him to laugh at the wicked; human beings, 
bogged down by doubt, passion, and irrationality, can only “murmur and fret.”178   
 There is, of course, certainly an alternative to merely murmuring and fretting: the 
taking matters into one’s own hands. This proposition seems most enticing to Vindice, 
                                                 
178 As we have seen in the work of Thomas Jackson, this infinitely long view of history also partially informs 
the essential difference between God’s wrath and human anger.  
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especially after he receives what he perceives to be a sign from the heavens.  Let us return to 
and expand upon an excerpt quoted above: 
  VINDICE 
 Is there no thunder left, or is’t kept up 
 In stock for heavier vengeance?  [Thunder] There it goes!   
HIPPOLITO 
 Brother, we lose ourselves. 
VINDICE 
 But I have found it, 
 ‘Twill hold, ‘tis sure, thanks, thanks to any spirit 
 That mingled it ‘mongst my inventions. 
      (IV.ii.196-201) 
The thunder is problematic because it exists only as an editorial stage direction, and therefore 
could very well be a figment of Vindice’s imagination.179 Hippolito does not mention it, and 
there is no other textual evidence that suggests thunder had sounded.  If it is indeed a figment 
of his imagination, then it’s either a symptom of Vindice’s growing mental instability or a 
self-created delusion that God approves (or both).  Thunder is a sign of either divine anger or 
divine complicity; imagined thunder is a way for Vindice to imbue himself with divine 
authority by imagining complicity. Even if the thunder is not “real,” Vindice views it as a 
divine response, and is suddenly inspired. Whether Vindice actually hears and interprets the 
thunder or imagines and interprets the thunder, it still belies a faith in and reliance on 
external signs of heaven’s opinion.  
 A far less ambiguous clap of thunder sounds in the final scene. Vindice, Hippolito, 
and two nobles disguise themselves as masked revelers and crash Lussurioso’s coronation 
party. The stage directions read: "The revengers dance. At the end steal out their swords and 
these four kill the four at the table, in their chairs. It thunders."  (V.iii.41 sd).  Vindice, 
reacting to both the thunder and Lussurioso’s death-knell, says: "Mark: thunder! Dost know 
thy cue, thou big-voiced cryer? / Duke's groans are thunder's watchwords" (V.iii.42-3). 
                                                 
179 Thanks are due to Alan Dessen for suggesting this reading to me.   
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Vindice’s command for all to “mark” the thunder adds further doubt to the reality of the 
earlier thunderclap. If the thunder in IV.ii was not heard by anyone else, Vindice would 
likely want to draw everyone’s attention to this “real” thunder, as it proves some sort of 
divine audience is indeed observing. Furthermore, this thunder signals an actual event—the 
murder of Lussurioso, while the possibly imaginary thunder signaled an imperceptible 
event—the formulation of a plot to kill Lussurioso. Vindice interprets this thunder the same 
way he did before: divine approval.  He adds: "No power is angry when the lustful die: / 
When thunder claps, heaven likes the tragedy" (V.iii.46-7).  Vindice is obviously punning on 
thunder“claps” and applause, and clearly suggests that heaven appreciates his actions.  But 
his use of the double negative here is somewhat perplexing: why assert that “no power is 
angry” instead of saying that “heaven is happy?”   The double negative subtly suggests that 
“no power” is indeed in control above, giving Vindice even more agency in the act of 
vengeance. Heaven watches and applauds, but it is Vindice who both directs and acts.180   
After the possibly imaginary thunderclap in Act IV, Vindice tells his brother that he is 
certain that his plot will succeed, “thanks to any spirit / That mingled it ‘mongst my 
inventions.” The term “spirit” has a number of connotations, including the animating 
principle, breath, the soul, an evil spirit, the Holy Spirit, or, according to the OED, “The 
emotional part of man as the seat of hostile or angry feeling.”181  Whether this “spirit” is 
demonic, holy, or simply a creative spark, Vindice sees it as a supernatural force that has 
intervened to perfect his plans.  This is somewhat reminiscent of Calvin’s frequent 
reiterations that the Psalms were inspired by the Holy Spirit, as he often justifies any seeming 
                                                 
180 For a lively discussion of metatheatricality in this play, see Howard Pearce. “Virtu and Poesis in The 
Revenger's Tragedy.” ELH 43:1 (1976): 19-37. 
 
181 "spirit, n" The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 20 Aug. 
2008 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50233653>.  
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bloodlust on the part of David by reminding the readers that the Holy Spirit has been guiding 
him.  In the commentary for Psalm 35, for example, Calvin notes:     
David pleads not simply his own cause, nor utters rashly the 
  dictates of his  passion, nor with unadvised zeal desires the  
  destruction of his enemies; but under the guidance of the Holy 
  Spirit he entertains and expresses against the reprobate such 
  desires as were characterised by great moderation, and which 
  were far removed from the spirit of those who are impelled  
  either by desire of revenge or hatred, or some other inordinate 
  emotion of the flesh. (IV.i. 579)  
 
This comparison is certainly problematic, as Vindice never claims to follow any sort 
of Christian guidance, but there are important commonalities. To an observer, David’s wish 
to see his enemies destroyed can indeed come across as a desire for revenge.  Prayers like 
this: “Let the table before them be for a snare; and their prosperity for a net. Let their eyes be 
darkened, that they may not see; and make their loins continually to tremble forever …. Let 
their habitation be desolate …. Let them be blotted out from the book of the living” 
(Ps.69:22-23; 25;28)182 sound not only immoderate, but downright passionate.  Calvin’s other 
point is that David’s anger is impersonal, as it is “not simply his own cause.”  This can mean 
that David pleads either on behalf of the Israelites, or on behalf of God Himself, as a “holy 
zeal for the divine glory” impels him to “summon the wicked to God’s judgment” (V.iii.67). 
Calvin also argues that the Holy Spirit prevents David from taking the rein of revenge into 
his own hands, and indeed even places these imprecations into his mouth. Since David has 
not acted rashly, and because the Holy Spirit has actually penned these cursing psalms, David 
has done nothing wrong.   
                                                 
182 Calvin’s translation.  Here, in his commentary for Psalm 35, Calvin assures us that “David did not allow 
himself recklessly to pour out his wrath, even as the greater part of men, when they feel themselves wronged, 
intemperately give way to their own passion; but, being under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, he was kept from 
going beyond the bounds of duty, and simply called upon God to exercise just judgment against the reprobate” 
(V.iii.67). 
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Because David possesses “uprightness” and “moderation,” and, most importantly, 
because he does not “devote himself exclusively to his own private interests,” David is both 
blameless and justified. While this may be true for most psalms, that is not the case for Psalm 
55, where a close friend has betrayed him:   
 It was not an enemy that cast reproach upon me, for then I  
  could have borne it: it was not an adversary  that did magnify  
 himself against me, for then I would have hid myself from him. 
  But it was thou, a man of mine own order, my leader, and  
  mine acquaintance. We sweetly exchanged our most secret  
  thoughts; we walked into the house of God in company. Let 
  death  seize upon them, let them descend alive into the grave: 
  for wickedness is in their dwelling, and in the midst of them.   
    (Ps.55:12-15; Calvin’s translation) 
 
Although Calvin maintains that David’s words in this psalm were motivated by “holy and 
religious fervor,” and not private indignation, this claim seems to be undercut by the personal 
nature of the injuries. Calvin considers David’s imprecation to be motivated by the desire for 
justice: the offending party should be punished because he is a reprobate, not just because he 
has hurt David. However, there are many other psalms where David asks for God’s 
intervention in much more general terms.  The reprobate in Psalm 55 is not only David’s 
friend, he’s a confidante and a fellow believer. Furthermore, David does not just wish for this 
person (or group of people) to be struck down, he asks God to “let them descend alive into 
the grave.”  Contrary to Calvin’s argument, David’s prayer is not a dispassionate entreaty for 
justice in general, but an ardent plea for God to punish someone who has hurt him 
specifically.  
 In light of this, Vindice’s troubles seem somewhat more in line with Calvin’s defense 
of David.  Although the Duke has wronged him personally by murdering Gloriana, the entire 
populace is affected by the corrupt court. Royal criminals go unpunished while lechery, 
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greed, envy, and deceit run rampant. It was precisely this atmosphere of injustice that 
inspired the most vicious imprecatory psalms; Vindice’s prayers for thunder are as justifiable 
as David’s. However, although Calvin and others would presumably take issue with the fact 
that Vindice takes revenge into his own hands instead of relying on divine intervention, 
Vindice’s methods do, in some ways, mirror Yahweh’s. Like Yahweh in Psalms 37 and 59, 
Vindice avenges with attention to timing and irony.  By using the poisoned “lips” of Gloriana 
to force a corrosive kiss upon the Duke, Vindice not only achieves his revenge, but he also 
presents a morbid tableau that warns against the dangers of lechery, prostitution, cosmetics, 
and, perhaps, women in general.  Just as David prayed for God to ensnare the wicked in their 
own nets, Vindice uses the Duke’s lust to entrap him. As the Duke writhes in pain, Vindice 
and Hippolito prop his eyes open, forcing him to watch his wife and son have a romantic 
liaison. Vindice says that he’s doing this “To stick thy soul with ulcers; I will make / Thy 
spirit grievous sore, it shall not rest / But like some pestilent man, toss in thy breast” 
(III.v.171-3).  Simply murdering the Duke is not enough to constitute vengeance; Vindice 
must torture him and then exterminate the rest of the royal family.  Some critics have counted 
the exquisite “fitness” of this punishment against Vindice. Maurice Charney, for example, 
argues that the more Vindice “applauds his own plotting as an approximation of the perfect 
logic and economy of God’s, the more he undermines his claim to ethical integrity.”183 
Likewise, Richard T. Brucher argues that “Vindice and Hippolito care less about the moral 
efficacy of the Duke’s suffering than about its intensity and their freedom to inflict 
                                                 
183 Maurice Charney, “The Persuasiveness of Violence in Elizabethan Plays,” Renaissance Drama. 2 (1969): 
67. 
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punishment.”184 Furthermore, although the spectacle of the Duke’s punishment “aptly fits the 
crime,” the fact that Vindice “treats the Duke’s anguish comically … but he insists on 
extreme suffering” ensures that “Vindice’s role as an agent of divine retribution remains 
ambiguous.”185 On the contrary, as we have seen, Vindice’s interest in inflicting punishment 
both severe and “apt” punishment is reflected in the Psalter, where the Lord uses timing and 
irony to punish the wicked and reward His followers for faith.   
Moreover, in both the Psalms and The Revenger’s Tragedy, vengeance is not only an 
act of justice, but tangible proof of the executor’s power.  In the Psalms, the reprobates learn 
too late that Yahweh is the one true God and the faithful can rejoice in His glory. This 
revelation can only come, however, when someone (either the wicked or the righteous) 
recognizes the Lord as the source of said vengeance.  This does not seem particularly 
challenging for Him to achieve, for in the Hebrew Bible, almost every major act, sign, or 
event is ascribed to God.  Vindice has a more difficult time establishing himself as the author 
of the royal family’s downfall.  Because he has spent much of the play disguised as Piato, 
Vindice actually has to announce his identity to the dying Duke: “‘Tis I, ‘tis Vindice, ‘tis I!” 
(III.v.165). Furthermore, Vindice’s plot to dress the dead Duke as Piato, thus framing Piato 
for the murder, prevents anyone else from crediting the murder to him. His plan to kill 
Lussurioso also involves disguise: he and three nobles invade Lussurioso’s dinner party in 
masque garb.  The four of them kill Lussurioso and his followers.  The nobles escape, but 
Vindice remains to watch events unfold.  As soon as Vindice’s cohorts exit, Lussurioso’s 
murderous brothers arrive wearing similar costumes. Their plan was the same as Vindice’s; 
                                                 
184 Richard T. Brucher. “Fantasies of Violence: Hamlet and The Revenger’s Tragedy.” Studies in English 
Literature, 1500-1900. 21:2 (1981): 261 
 
185 Ibid, 259. 
116 
 
their timing, however, was not particularly good. In the masqued melee that follows, two 
brothers end up stabbing each other and the third is killed by Ambitioso’s loyal lord.  Vindice 
encourages further confusion by shouting “Pistols, treason, murder, help, guard!” and then 
pins the death of Lussurioso on Ambitioso’s lord.  As the supposed criminal is dragged away, 
Vindice kneels next to Lussurioso and whispers to him: “Now thou’lt not prate on’t, ‘twas 
Vindice murdered thee! …. Murdered thy father …. And I am he! Tell nobody” (V.iii.76-8). 
 Although quite pleased with his accomplishments, Vindice is ultimately left 
unsatisfied by gloating in asides and whispering to dying dukes.  With the evil brood dead, 
Antonio surveys the scene and marvels at the events that have unfolded, praising the “law 
above” for being “just,” and wondering how the old duke was murdered.  Vindice cannot 
help but gleefully reveal: “ 'twas somewhat wittily carried / Though we say it. 'Twas we who 
murdered him!” (V.iii.97-8).186 In the Old Testament, God is acclaimed for effecting every 
major event. In order for the concepts of Providence and divine justice to be legitimate, God 
must be seen as the prime mover behind wars, famines, plagues, or even errant axe-falls.  
God takes credit for these incidents (or, perhaps, has credit thrust upon Him) so as to perfect 
the notion of divine vengeance. Here, Vindice must identify himself as the perpetrator for a 
similar reason. If he is not recognized as the author of these murders, then his revenge 
becomes illegitimate. Throughout the play, Vindice has portrayed himself as a cohort of 
divine justice, working alongside (or in front of) heaven in righting society’s wrongs. 
Vindice’s tacit agreement with Antonio’s observation of a “law above,” followed by taking 
                                                 
186 Heather Hirschfeld argues that this revelation is not an act of self-aggrandizement, but confession: “After 
each successful trick or murder, [Vindice] announces either to the victim or to a cohort his responsibility in the 
deed;”  this makes his actions “less about obtaining an impossible justice and more about orchestrating scenes 
that allow him to proclaim his own sinfulness.” Ironically, however, “his efforts, designed to efface a sinful self 
and give rise to someone new and pure, only mire him more deeply in his sinful origins” (“Compulsions of the 
Renaissance.” Shakespeare Studies. 33. 2002: 115). While Hirschfeld’s observation is intriguing, it lacks 
entirely persuasive evidence of Vindice’s desire for contrition.  
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credit for the murders reemphasizes his position as heaven’s co-conspirator. At no point does 
Vindice see himself as a passive human instrument of God’s wrath. If he were to allow 
Antonio and the others to ascribe the play’s events to God, then he would negate his own 
active part in the process.    
Antonio responds to this confession by sentencing Vindice and Hippolito to death, 
just in case they one day decide to murder him as well.  Although Hippolito seems distressed 
by this turn of events, Vindice has no regrets: 
   Thou hast no conscience: are we not revenged?  
  Is there one enemy left alive amongst those? 
  'Tis time to die when we are ourselves our foes. 
  When murderers shut deeds close this curse does seal 'em 
  If none disclose 'em, they themselves reveal 'em! 
  This murder might have slept in tongueless brass 
  But for ourselves, and the world died an ass. 
  ……………………. 
  we have enough – 
  I’faith, we’re well—our mother turned, our sister true, 
  We die after a nest of dukes! Adieu. 
                                      (V.iii.108-125) 
 
 Vindice’s peace of mind comes from knowing that he has avenged his loved ones and from 
understanding his role as a dispenser of justice. His vengeance has been perfectly executed:  
all his foes have fallen.  But if no one knows who felled them, Vindice would not specifically 
be avenged.  Confessing to the crime is not merely a mistake made by a proud or loose-
lipped murderer, but an important element to Vindice’s status as a primary agent of divine 
vengeance.  
  Vindice’s revenge thus mirrors the Psalmist’s description of Yahweh’s wrath in three 
key ways: it is “apt,” it severe, and it is specifically ascribed to one executor. These acts of 
vengeance thus both glorify the perpetrator and didactically reform society. Despite these 
similarities, however, Vindice’s actions also show the most important difference between his 
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vengeance and the Lord’s: unlike any models of Biblical anger (either human or divine), 
Vindice enjoys watching his enemies suffer. While Thomas Aquinas admits that the angry 
man “he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance,”187 Thomas Jackson reminds 
us that God is “a revenger of iniquity most severe; yet never moved with jealousy, yet never 
passionate in revenge; because, to such as provoke his punitive justice, he is eternally 
severity and revenge itself.”188 Because God is wrath in the abstract, He acts with neither 
cruelty nor sadistic glee. Vindice’s human vengeance could never be described in the same 
terms. 
 This difference will perhaps be most strikingly illustrated by a return to the Calvin 
commentary that opened this chapter. In his discussion of Psalm 58, Calvin notes that “when 
one is led by a holy zeal to sympathize with the justice of that vengeance which God may 
have inflicted, his joy will be as pure in beholding the retribution of the wicked, as his desire 
for their conversion and salvation was strong and unfeigned.”189 It is, therefore, possible for 
one to experience righteous pleasure in watching one’s enemies suffer at the hands of God, 
provided that one delights not in the vengeance itself, but in the resulting repentance. This is, 
of course, not the case for Vindice, Hoffman, the Luningberg family, or the band of 
murderers in Antonio’s Revenge, all of whom seem to enjoy engaging in the revenge act far 
more than actually avenging their loved ones, and none of whom seem genuinely concerned 
about the souls of their victims. 
 
                                                 
187 Q. 48, Article I, p 532.  
 
188 A Treatise of the Divine Attributes 205. 
 
189 V. 377-8. 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 “O My Prophetic Soul”: Hamlet, Jeremiah, and Prophetic Drama 
 
  
 As we have seen in previous chapters, the problems that plague revengers—a wicked 
tyrant, fatherlessness, and harsh treatment of widows, just to name a few—are also 
encountered by figures in the Old Testament. This pattern continues in Hamlet, as the Danish 
Prince confronts the same basic issues vexing other revengers and prophets alike.  Indeed, 
Hamlet’s tirades against his country for drunkenness, dissembling, and worshipping a false 
King might well be termed “jeremiads.”  But the parallels between Hamlet and the book of 
Jeremiah go beyond the fact that both men inhabit similarly corrupt societies and inveigh 
against that corruption.  Hamlet, of course, is an anomaly among revenge tragedy 
protagonists. And, as many critics have noted, Hamlet is far more talkative than other 
revengers. Indeed, Hamlet chastises himself for spending more time talking than acting. 
Jeremiah is similarly unique amongst his peers. Famous for his introspective, doubt-filled 
soliloquies, Jeremiah uses first-person narration more than any other Old Testament 
prophet.190  In these personal confessions, Jeremiah expresses anger, distress, and extreme 
frustration with the task of admonishing a people who refuse to repent. 
                                                 
190 The so-called “Prophetic ‘I’” employed by Jeremiah is a matter of intense critical debate. Theologians argue 
variously that “I” refers to, among other things: Jeremiah the man, Jeremiah the prophet, God, the community, 
and the personified land of Judah.  In his book, The Prophetic Persona: Jeremiah and the Language of the Self, 
Old Testament scholar Timothy Polk argues that the multivalenced referents of “I” in Jeremiah “articulated the 
prophet’s self-identification with both God and people” (58).   
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 For Renaissance writers, this expression of emotion distinguished Jeremiah from his 
fellow prophets. Jeremiah was often depicted as a model satirist: filled with sadness for his 
fallen society, Jeremiah is led by the Holy Spirit to rebuke the wicked.  The book of 
Lamentations, traditionally ascribed to Jeremiah, was primarily read as a woeful invective 
against Jerusalem’s sins. Because London was often thought of as the New Jerusalem, early 
modern satirists saw immediate correlations between their plights and Jeremiah’s. As 
Raymond-Jean Frontain notes, the expression of grief in Lamentations191 “was regularly 
employed as a source of consolation in times of national calamity,” especially during 
outbreaks of plague, religious schism, and political tumult. However, it was also 
“appropriated when testifying against the sinful behaviors associated with a Renaissance city 
or a specific group of individuals.”192  This use of Jeremiah’s words is seen most clearly in 
Thomas Drant’s A Medicinable Morall (1566), which pairs Horace’s satires with 
Lamentations.193 Although Drant gives no explicit reason for this particular pairing, he does 
note that Horace “jests” where Jeremiah laments, and that it is perfectly appropriate for both 
men to behave this way:  
                                                 
191 Although Lamentations is traditionally ascribed to Jeremiah, modern scholars doubt his authorship because 
of differences in diction and certain religious perspectives. For a thorough discussion of the poetic form of 
Lamentations, see Norman K. Gottwald, Studies in the Book of Lamentations, Studies in Biblical Theology 14 
(London: SCM Press) 1954. 
 
192 Raymond-Jean Frontain. “the man which have affliction seen”: Donne, Jeremiah, and the Fashioning of 
Lamentation.” Centered on the Word: Literature, Scripture, and the Tudor-Stuart Middle Way. Ed. Daniel W. 
Doerkson and Christopher Hodgkins. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004 (136). Frontain argues that 
John Donne in particular was drawn to Jeremiah’s “presentation of himself as the man, the only man who 
survives to speak, the man whose experience is emblematic for others” (137). He further contends that 
“Jeremiah’s self-presentation also dovetails with Donne’s emblematic sense of self—with his presentation of 
himself as the person who is preternaturally aware of the horrors of living in an irredeemably profane world—
and is in keeping as well with Donne’s self-presentation as Jeremiah elsewhere in his life and canon” (137). 
 
193 For a concise history and analysis of this text, see Neel Mukherjee’s “Thomas Drant's Rewriting of Horace.” 
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, Vol. 40, No. 1, The English Renaissance (Winter, 2000). 
 
121 
 
 The holy Prophete Jermeie dyd ruefully and waylingly lamente 
 the deepe and massie enormities of his tymes, and earnestly 
 prognosticate and forspeake the …  consequences that came 
 after, and sauce with teares the hard plagues that had gone 
 before. Therefore as it is mete for a  man of god rather to 
 wepe than to iest: and not undecent for a prophane writer to be 
 iestying, and merie spoken: I hauve brought to passe that the 
 plaintive Prophete Ieremie should  wepe at synne: and the 
 pleasant  poet Horace should laugh at synne (sig. A3r).194  
 
Jeremiah’s tears are part of his divine inspiration: it is “mete” for him to weep at the “massie 
enormities” plaguing Jerusalem. In his remarks to the reader, Drant describes Lamentations 
as: “an holy kynde of sadnesse, an exacte myrrour of a contrite soule, the heauy procedynges 
of iust God, against his vniust creatures.” Drant thus depicts Lamentations in three distinct, 
but interrelated ways: Lamentations is itself a “holy kynde of sadnesse,” but it is also both a 
textual mirror of Jeremiah’s “contrite soule” and a written register of God’s righteous 
judgment. God’s wrath is conveyed through Jeremiah’s words, but so is His sorrow.   
 Early modern English writers who focused on the Book of Jeremiah instead of 
Lamentations were more likely to cast the Prophet as a conduit for God’s anger instead of his 
disappointment with humanity. However, whether these writers drew primarily upon 
Jeremiah’s sorrow or his outrage, they did so in response to the political and social anxieties 
of their time. According to Steven Dobranski, 
 During the seventeenth century, allusions to Jeremiah's rhetoric 
and symbolism developed into a distinct political genre in both 
England and America: preachers and politicians … adopted the 
stance of the Old Testament prophet, lamenting their countries' 
depravity, recalling an ideal past, and urging readers to repent 
and reform. These so-called jeremiads arose, like Jeremiah's 
original pronouncements, in response to the threat of a national 
                                                 
194 Thomas Drant. A Medicinable Morall, that is, the two Bookes of Horace his Satyres, Englyshed accordyng to 
the prescription of saint Hierome. The Wailynges of the Prophet Hieremiah. Also epigrammes. T. Drant. 
Perused and allowed accordyng to the Quenes Maiesties iniunctions , Imprinted at London : In Fletestrete by 
Thomas Marshe, M.D.LXVI. [1566]. Early English Books Online. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Library. 18 January, 2010.  
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disaster .… The genre accordingly became most popular in 
England during the decline associated with the Civil War and, 
as written by Commonwealthmen, on the eve of the 
Restoration. In The Reason of Church-Government (1642), for 
example, Milton models himself after Jeremiah in attacking 
prelacy, and in The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free 
Commonwealth (1660), he alludes to the prophet in warning 
English readers of the impending return to monarchy.195 
 
In Book II of The Reason of Church Government, Milton contends that it is the responsibility 
of anyone who has “obtain'd in more then the scantest measure to know any thing distinctly 
of God” to share this knowledge. This message is a burden “more pressing then any 
supportable toil, or waight, which the body can labour under.”  The people, however, will 
reject these words of truth. It is for this reason, Milton argues, that “the sad Prophet Ieremiah 
laments, Wo is me my mother, that thou hast born me a man of strife, and contention. And 
although divine inspiration must certainly have been sweet to those ancient profets, yet the 
irksomnesse of that truth which they brought was so unpleasant to them that every where 
they call it a burden.”196  
 The prominent twentieth-century theologian Abraham Heschel makes an observation 
similar to Milton’s: “To be a prophet is both a distinction and an affliction.  The mission he 
performs is distasteful to him and repugnant to others; no reward is promised him and no 
reward could temper its bitterness.”197 Contrary to a modern understanding of “prophecy,” 
the role of an Old Testament prophet was not to predict the future, but to deliver God’s 
message. This message was, more often than not, a warning that He would destroy the people 
                                                 
195 Steven Dobranski. “Burghley's Emblem and the Heart of Milton's Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio.” Milton 
Quarterly 34.2 (2000):41. For other views on Milton and Jeremiah, see John Morkan. “Wrath and Laughter: 
Milton’s Ideas on Satire.” Studies in Philology. 69 (1972) 475-95; and especially Reuben Sánchez, Jr. Persona 
and Decorum in Milton’s Prose. (Madison: Farleigh Dickinson UP, 1997), esp. pp 60-76.  
 
196 John Milton. Complete Poems and Major Prose. Ed. Merritt T. Hughes. (Indianapolis: Odyssey Press, 1957) 
665. 
 
197 Abraham J. Heschel. The Prophets. New York: Harper and Row, 1962 (17-18). 
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if they did not repent.  Jeremiah’s message is clear: Yahweh is angry because Judah has 
turned against Him. The common people are ignorant, the leaders are corrupt, false prophets 
abound, and the entire community is infected with dishonesty.  Through Jeremiah, Yahweh 
warns that every man should be wary of his neighbor, as “everie brother wil use deceit, and 
everie friend wil deale deceitfully” (Jer. 9:4). Most damningly, the people have forgotten the 
covenant and worship Baal instead of the true God:   
Thus saith the Lord, What iniquities have your fathers founde 
in me, that they are gone farre from me, and have walked after 
vanitie, and are become vaine? For they said not, Where is the 
Lord that broght us up out of the land of Egypt? That led us 
through the wildernes …. And I broght you into a plentiful 
country … but when ye entred, ye defiled my land, and made 
mine heritage and abominacion. (Jer. 2:5-7) 
 
He further likens their behavior to forsaking “the fountaine of living waters to digge the 
pittes, even broken pittes, that can holde no water” (Jer. 2:13). Ungrateful, falsehearted, and 
faithless, Judah is doomed unless the people repent.   
Although Denmark’s problem is not idolatry per se, Hamlet’s rant against Denmark 
bears similarities to Jeremiah’s rebuke of Judah. Hamlet privately denounces the court for 
switching loyalty so quickly from his noble father to his disgraceful uncle—or, in Hamlet’s 
words, from “Hyperion to a satyr” (I.ii.140).198  He later marvels to Rosencrantz at how 
swiftly the masses have shifted allegiances from his father to his uncle, observing that “those 
that would make mouths at [Claudius] while my father lived give twenty, forty, fifty, a 
hundred ducats apiece for his picture in little” (II.ii.307-309).  But Hamlet’s most caustic 
invective is reserved for his mother, who has gone from loving a man upon whom “every god 
did seem to set his seal” to consorting with “a mildewed ear,” “a murderer and a villain,” “a 
vice of kings, / A cutpurse of the empire and the rule” (III.iv.61; 64; 96-99).   
                                                 
198 This and all further references to Hamlet are from Hamlet, ed. A.R. Braunmuller. New York: Penguin, 2001.  
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Hamlet’s vitriol at Gertrude’s sexual relationship with Claudius has been the subject 
of lively critical discussion for over a century. His tirade against Gertrude—and, to a certain 
extent, Ophelia—has much in common with Jeremiah’s castigation of Judah. Throughout the 
Bible, the relationship between God and His people is described as a marriage. In the Old 
Testament, Yahweh is the groom and the Israelites His bride. It makes sense, therefore, that 
the prophets should use metaphors of sexual infidelity to describe Judah’s betrayal of 
Yahweh. Indeed, comparing the faithless Jerusalem to a harlot is common throughout the 
Hebrew Bible, perhaps most notably in Ezekiel. As Biblical scholar Thomas Jemielity so 
colorfully notes, Ezekiel’s Jerusalem “has certainly done enough sleeping around in the Near 
East to pose a formidable challenge to Messalina, Juvenal’s Olympic gold medalist in sex.” 
199 Jeremiah incredulously notes how quickly the people seem to have forgotten their 
covenant with God: in the space of two generations, they have turned from worshipping him 
to serving Baal.  This fickleness leads Judah to be depicted as a prostitute: dressed in scarlet, 
covered in golden jewelry, and smeared in paint, she vainly seeks lovers who will ultimately 
kill her (Jer. 4:31).  Jeremiah often colors his comparison with bestial overtones.  Faithless 
Jerusalem is a female camel in heat, a wild ass luring a mate, a lusty stallion who “[neyes] 
after his neibours wife” (Jer. 2:23-4; 5:8).  Judah’s animalistic lust is insatiable and 
indiscriminate. Through Jeremiah, Yahweh instructs the people to “lift up thine eies unto the 
high places, and beholde, where thou hast not plaied the harlot … polluted the land with thy 
whoredomes, and with why malice” (3:2).  He identifies Himself as the one who has 
uncovered their sin: 
I have also discovered thy skirts upon thy face, that thy shame 
may appeare. I have sene thine adulteries, and thy neyings, the 
                                                 
199 Thomas Jemielity. Satire and the Hebrew Prophets. (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox. 1992): 103. 
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filthines of thy whoredome on the hills in the fields, and thine 
abominacions. Wo unto thee, o Jerusalem: wilt thou not be 
made cleane?  (13:25-6) 
 
Early modern theologians consistently interpret this adultery as idolatry. The Geneva 
commentary elucidates the phrase “thy hast plaied the harlot with manie lovers” with this 
instruction to readers: “that is, with idoles, and with them, whome thou hast put thy 
confidence in.”200 As for the above passage from Jeremiah 13, the Geneva provides this 
helpful clarification: “he compareth idolators to horses inflamed after mares.”201 Calvin too 
reads “adulteries” as “idolatries” and reminds us of the metaphorical underpinnings – we are 
supposed to see God as “a husband to his people” and the Israelites as his faithless spouse. 
He further concludes that “the Jews in vain tried to escape by evasions, since God declares 
that he had seen them.”202     
 Hamlet’s frequent diatribes against Gertrude’s infidelity—or against women in 
general—are certainly motivated in part by misogyny, a prurient interest in his mother’s 
sexuality, his own sexual frustration, and the particular circumstances in Elsinore. But we 
should not dismiss the link between adultery and idolatry established in Jeremiah and other 
biblical texts.  In Hamlet’s reckoning, his father was Yahweh: devoted, just, loving, and a 
constant provider. Gertrude has renounced him for the idol of Claudius: a vile, worthless 
imposter.  Hamlet imagines their relationship in luridly sexual terms. Like Jeremiah, he 
marvels at how quickly she has forgotten her vows, noting that even “a beast that wants 
discourse of reason / Would have mourned longer” (I.ii.151-2). He describes her betrayal as 
both a replacement of good for evil and as a breach of a covenant: 
                                                 
200 Jer. 3:2. Comment C (307). 
201 Jer. 13:27, Comment N (312).  
 
202 Calvin Vol IX, 200, emphasis in original.  
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    [It is] an act 
  That blurs the grace and blush of modesty,  
  Calls virtue hypocrite, takes off the rose  
  From the fair forehead of an innocent love, 
  And sets a blister there, makes marriage vows 
  As false as dicer’s oaths. O, such a deed 
  As from the body of contraction plucks 
  The very soul, and sweet religion makes  
  A rhapsody of words!  Heaven’s face does glow, 
  O’er this solidity and compound mass, 
  With heated visage. 
       (III.iv.41-50) 
 
 Hamlet’s interactions with Ophelia also play on this theme. He vilifies her for using 
cosmetics and simpering: “God hath given you one face, and you make yourselves another. 
You jig and amble, and you lisp. You nick-name God’s creatures and make your wantonness 
your ignorance” (III.i.143-145). Hamlet accuses Ophelia of disguising herself with paint and 
coyness, replacing her natural, God-created self with an artificial façade so that she may 
more effectively lure men. To borrow from Jemielity’s paraphrase of 4:31, Ophelia is “a 
streetwalker, seeking out whatever passersby appear, ironically unaware that all the street 
traffic despises her and seeks her life.”203 If we consider Jeremiah and other prophetic books 
as valid context for this scene, we need not limit this imprecation only to women. In 
Jeremiah, all of Judah is guilty of adultery/idolatry: in Hamlet, all of Denmark is complicit in 
Claudius’s sins. Fearful of Norway or seeking stability, the court has willfully disregarded 
Old Hamlet’s suspicious death, Gertrude’s hasty marriage, and Claudius’s swift rise to 
power. Elsinore is filled with male and female dissemblers: people eavesdrop, flatter, lie, and 
ignore injustice to gain or maintain favor.204 Hamlet includes himself amongst the catalogue 
                                                 
203 Satire and the Hebrew Prophets 90.  
 
204 I do not mean to suggest that portraying Judah/Denmark as a whore is not inherently misogynistic; it most 
assuredly is. I merely wish to argue that one need not read either as exclusively misogynistic. 
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of sinners, confessing that even though he is indifferent honest,” he could still be accused “of 
such things that it were better my mother had not borne [him]” (III.i.122-4). 
Hamlet’s insistence that Ophelia hasten herself to a nunnery, with its notoriously 
ambiguous meaning, is both a further accusation of harlotry and a prescription for 
purification. Renouncing marriage would prevent Ophelia from becoming “a breeder of 
sinners.” Should she marry, however, Hamlet promises “calumny” as her dowry, even though 
she “be chaste as ice, as pure as snow” (III.i.122;135-7). Jeremiah receives a similar, but 
exponentially more horrifying, directive from Yahweh:  
Thou shalt not take thee a wife, nor have sonnes nor daughters 
in this place. For thus saith the Lord concerning the sonnes, 
and concerning the daughters that are borne in this place, and 
concerning their mothers that beare them, and concerning their 
fathers, that beget them in this land. Thei shal dye of deaths 
and diseases: thei shal not be lamented, nether shal thei be 
buryed, but thei shalbe as dongue upon the earth, and thei 
shalbe consumed by the sworde, and by famine, and their 
carkeises shalbe meat for the soules of the heaven, and for the 
beastes of the earth. (Jer. 16: 1-4) 
 
The Geneva Bible explicates this disturbing decree as follows: “the affliction shulde be so 
horrible in Ierusalem, that wife, and children shulde but increase his sorowe.”205 Calvin adds 
that this dramatic reversal of the command to “increase and multiply” shows that God has 
deemed the land “unworthy of this common and even general blessing enjoyed by the whole 
race of man.”206 Hamlet’s decree that “we will have no more marriage” mirrors this mandate 
from Yahweh. It would seem, then, that both Denmark and Judah have become so sordid, so 
thoroughly corrupted, that any new propagation would only generate more sin.  
                                                 
205 Jer. 16:1, Comment A (313).  
 
206 Vol IX, 302.  Calvin also provides some unsubtle anti-Semitism: “We hence see that in the person of 
Jeremiah God intended to show the Jews that they deserved to be exterminated from the earth.”  
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  As the lone soul charged to reform his society, both Jeremiah and Hamlet are wary of 
their own abilities. Jeremiah’s self-doubt is evident in the very first chapter. The Prophet 
reveals that the voice of God came to him, saying: “Before I formed you in the wombe, I 
knewe thee, and before thou camest out of the wombe, I sanctified thee, and ordained thee to 
be a Prophet unto the nations.” Jeremiah’s response reflects his insecurity: he protests that he 
is a “childe” who “can not speake.”  The Lord gently reproves Jeremiah, urging that he “saie 
not, I am a childe: for thou shalt go to all that I send thee, and whatsoever I commande thee, 
shalt thou speake.” He then touches the Prophet’s lips, declaring: “Beholde, I have put my 
words in thy mouth” and gives Jeremiah his mission: to warn the people that they will face 
His wrath if they do not repent. He also informs the Prophet that he will be scorned and 
assailed, but that the Lord will ultimately deliver him.207 
 The language used in the exchange between Yahweh and Jeremiah is unsurprisingly 
paternal. Indeed, God is portrayed throughout both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament 
as a father figure. As Jeremiah’s Father, Yahweh is responsible for both his physical creation 
and his spiritual vocation. As God’s child, Jeremiah feels inadequate for the task, a sentiment 
Calvin describes as “a laudable feeling” based in “modesty” and forgivable timidity.208  
Calvin also reminds us to take the Prophet’s words metaphorically; he is a child “not in age, 
                                                 
207 Jer. 1:5-19.  This scene is similar to Isaiah’s receipt of vocation in Isa 6:5. Isaiah receives his calling via a 
vision of God on His throne surrounded by seraphs. Upon seeing the glory of the Lord, Isaiah wails: “Wo is me: 
for I am undone, because I am a man of polluted lippes, and I dwell in the middes of a people of polluted lippes: 
for mine eyes have sene the King and Lord of hostes.”  The seraph replies by placing a hot coal on Isaiah’s lips, 
thus cleansing him of any sin. Thus purified, Isaiah immediately volunteers to be God’s servant. Following the 
purification, Isaiah does not reveal any misgivings about his aptitude for the job. 
 
208 Commentaries. Vol IX, 38.  
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but in knowledge.”209  Yahweh’s reproof is a reminder that Jeremiah must obey his Father 
despite any of his own personal misgivings.  
Yahweh’s reassurance comes with a visible sign: He touches Jeremiah’s mouth to 
show that He has imparted His word. Calvin argues that this action was not necessary—there 
is no reason to expect that “the tongues of all the teachers should be touched by the hand of 
God.” Therefore, contemporary prophets, perhaps such as Calvin himself, should not 
consider themselves illegitimate if they have yet to be physically touched by the hand of 
God. This action is simply God’s way of signifying this particular relationship with Jeremiah. 
Calvin elaborates: 
There are here two things—the thing itself, and an external 
sign. As to the thing itself, a rule is prescribed to all God’s 
servants, that they bring not their own inventions, but simply 
deliver … what they have received from God. But it was a 
special thing as to Jeremiah, that God, by stretching out his 
hand, touched his mouth; it was, that he might openly shew that 
his mouth was consecrated to himself.210  
  
The touching itself has no power; it is merely an “external sign” of consecration. As in 
Isaiah, where a hot coal is placed on the Prophet’s lips, God physically interacts with 
Jeremiah, seemingly for no intrinsic purpose. Why then, is this act included?  As one might 
expect, Calvin interprets this as an inscrutable act of God’s will. But in his description of the 
event, Calvin writes: “A visible symbol was added, that there might be a stronger 
confirmation.”211 Calvin does not discuss for whom this confirmation is intended. Does 
Jeremiah require the validation or is it provided as a detail to convince the audience of his 
divine calling? If it is the former, then it underscores the human element in the Prophet that 
                                                 
209 Ibid, 39.  
210 Ibid, 43, italics in original.  
 
211 Ibid, 43.  
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Calvin, as we shall see, sometimes labors to discount. If it is the latter, then it suggests that 
the Israelites, and, by extension, the early modern English Christians, were wary of accepting 
any man with a claim to divine communication prima facie.  Hamlet’s first meeting 
with the Ghost has similar elements to Jeremiah’s consecration.212 This Ghost is—or at least, 
resembles—Hamlet’s father. He therefore has both a paternal and a supernatural claim to 
authority.213 That the Ghost will talk to Hamlet is most likely due to the fact that he is the 
murdered King’s son, and thus the prime candidate to avenge his murder. But the fact that the 
Ghost converses only with Hamlet—though he is seen by the Watch—transforms Hamlet 
into a prophet. He alone is given a mandate directly from a supernatural source. Hamlet 
instantly understands his role, telling the Ghost that he is “bound to hear” his words.  So too, 
the Ghost adds, will Hamlet be bound to act upon hearing his words. For a prophet in the 
Hebrew Bible, a promise to listen is also a promise to act: hearing God’s voice without 
conveying His message is an act of blasphemy. Hamlet’s exclamation upon hearing the 
details of his father’s death—“O my prophetic soul!”—indicates that he has suspected 
Claudius all along, but it also suggests that he recognizes his role as a prophet figure, chosen 
to deliver a message from above (I.v.41).   
                                                 
212 Harold Fisch links this encounter with other events in the Old Testament, such as the revelation at Mount 
Sinai: “There too a Father had appeared to lay his command on his people. Only one of their number is called to 
ascend the mountain whilst the others stay below in terror and seek to distance themselves from the alarming 
sounds and sights. From now on the People of Israel are chosen, burdened with a task which they will forget or 
try to forget but which will never forget them. Hamlet has the same sense of being chosen and the same recoil 
from chosenness” (86). The Biblical Presence in Shakespeare, Milton, and Blake: A Comparative Study. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.) 
 
213 I do not believe that the present discussion requires assurance of the Ghost’s goodness. The fact that it is a 
supernatural being claiming authority and righteousness and directing Hamlet to act on his behalf bears enough 
similarity to Yahweh in the Book of Jeremiah to facilitate this comparison. In stating this, however, I am by no 
means attempting to render moot the rich critical history surrounding the ambiguous nature of this Ghost. 
Excellent recent studies include: Clinton P. E. Atchley, “Reconsidering the Ghost in Hamlet: Cohesion or 
Coercion?” The Philological Review 28.2 (Fall 2002): 5-20; Stephen Greenblatt, “Remember Me.” in Hamlet in 
Purgatory. By Greenblatt. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001. 205-57; Anthony Low. “Hamlet and the Ghost of 
Purgatory: Intimations of Killing the Father.” English Literary Renaissance 29 (1999) 443-67; Phoebe S. 
Spinrad. “The Fall of the Sparrow and the Map of Hamlet’s Mind.” Modern Philology. 102.4 (2005), 453-477.  
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 Hamlet’s immediate reaction to the Ghost is strikingly different from Jeremiah’s 
initial response to God’s call. Where Jeremiah timidly declares himself a “childe” in the 
Lord’s presence, Hamlet’s spirit surges with courage. He proclaims that his “fate cries out / 
And makes each petty artirie in this body / As hardy as the Nemean lion’s nerve” (I.iv.80-3). 
He then urges the Ghost to quickly identify his murderer so that he may enact revenge “with 
wings as swift / As meditation of the thoughts of love” (I.v.29-30).  Where Yahweh comforts 
Jeremiah with promise of deliverance; the Ghost’s only words of assurance are “Fare thee 
well at once” (I.v. 88). Futhermore, while Yahweh reassures Jeremiah with a visible sign, the 
Ghost requires Hamlet to reassure him by means of a visible sign: having the others swear 
upon his sword.  It is perhaps this lack of concrete reassurance that causes Hamlet’s 
enthusiasm to quickly fade when the Ghost departs.  
 Despite his initial zeal for revenge, no sooner does the Ghost exit than Hamlet 
exclaims: “O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!” (I.v.191-2). As the play 
progresses, his emotional state  deteriorates further, no more eloquently evidenced than in the 
famous soliloquy of Act III.  Critics have long identified Job, the righteous man unjustly 
stricken with intense physical and emotional pain, as the most likely Old Testament 
antecedent to Hamlet.  In an 1892 article, George S. Goodspeed contends: 
Shakespeare’s Job is Hamlet, the sunshine of whose sky is 
clouded not at all by physical suffering but by the agonies of a 
mental and moral struggle; who finds himself in a world not, 
indeed, made miserable by degradation, poverty and pain but 
polluted by lust and crime … and made horrid by the necessity 
laid upon him, as the destined minister of vengeance.214 
 
                                                 
214 George F. Goodspeed. “The Book of Job in other Literatures. II. The Old and New Testament Student. Vol. 
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A more modern example comes from Arthur McGee, who links Hamlet’s reference to the 
“slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” to Job 41:28-9, which reads: “The arrow cannot 
make him flee; for him slingstones are turned to stubble.”215  Harold Jenkins sees an echo of 
Job 10:21 (“I go and shal not returne, even to the land of darkenes and shadow of death”) in 
Hamlet’s allusion to the “undiscovered country.”216 Such resonances are certainly possible; 
Steven Marx’s incisive analysis of King Lear and the Book of Job suggests that Shakespeare 
was indeed conversant with that particular text.217  And indeed, Hamlet’s “O cursed spite” 
does sound similar to Job’s lament in 3:3-11: “Let the day perish, wherin I was borne, and 
the night when it was said, There is a manchilde conceived …. Why dyed I not in my birth? 
Or why dyed I not, when I came out of the wombe?” However, the dissimilarities between 
Hamlet’s and Job’s situations, thoroughly noted above by Goodspeed, make Jeremiah a more 
compelling candidate for an Old Testament predecessor.  Hamlet and Jeremiah share what 
Hamlet and Job do not: a charge to reform an unrepentantly corrupt society.  
 Jeremiah’s efforts are met with contempt, imprisonment, and revulsion. He asks of 
the Lord: “Why is mine heavines continual? And my plague desperate and can not be healed? 
Why art thou unto me as a lyer, and as waters that faile” (15:18). His despair then grows 
more dire, leading him to make a declaration similar to, but perhaps even more blasphemous 
than, Job’s:  
O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I am deceived: thou art 
stronger then I, and hast prevailed: I am in derision daiely: 
everie one mocketh me. For since I spake, I cryed out of 
                                                 
215 Arthur McGee. The Elizabethan Hamlet. (New Haven: Yale UP, 1987). In the Geneva translation, this line is 
rendered “The archer can not make him flee; the stones of the sling are turned into stubble unto him” (Job 
41:19). 
216 Harold Jenkins. Hamlet. (London: Methuen, 1982). 491. 
 
217 Stephen Marx. Shakespeare and the Bible. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 59-78.  See also Robert Pack, 
“Betrayal and Nothingness: The book of Job and King Lear,” The Long View (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1991), 251-76.  
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wrong, and proclaimed desolation: therefore the worde of the 
Lord was made a reproche unto me, and in derision daiely. 
Then I said, I will not make mencion of him, nor speake any 
more in his Name. But his worde was in mine heart as a 
burning fyre shut up in my bones, and I was wearie with 
forbearing, and I could not stay. (20:7-9) 
 
Cursed be the day wherein I was borne: and let not the day 
wherein my mother bare me, be blessed. Cursed be the man, 
that shewed my father, saying, A man childe is borne unto thee 
…. Because he hath not slayne me, even from the wombe, or 
that my mother might have been my grave, or her wombe a 
perpetual conception. How is it, that I came forthe of the 
wombe, to see labor and sorowe, that my daies shulde be 
consumed with shame? (20:14-18) 
 
Here, Jeremiah bemoans not only his wretched life, but also his God-given vocation. Cursing 
the day of his birth is a thinly-veiled suicide wish: an obvious sacrilege.  In addition, 
however, Jeremiah accuses the Lord of deceit and wishes to cease prophesying. Jeremiah 
thus reverses the Lord’s first words to him: “Before I formed you in the wombe, I knewe 
thee, and before thou camest out of the wombe, I sanctified thee, and ordained thee to be a 
Prophet unto the nations.” In essence, Jeremiah is struggling to deny the Lord and ignore His 
commands—precisely what he has been charged to reform in Judah. 
 Early modern readers saw the prophet’s anguish as both troubling and comforting. 
While it was indeed disturbing that such a holy man would feel such emotional torment, it 
did provide a model for their own suffering. A 1618 sermon by John Barlow uses Jeremiah’s 
struggle as an inspirational account for “young Converts” enduring the “pangs of 
regeneration.”  Barlow reminds the audience of how “Ieremiah complained, that his Mother 
had brought him forth, a man of Contention; he heard the rayling of many, all his familiars 
watched for his halting; saying, It may be that hee is deceiued; so shall wee preuaile against 
him, and execute our vengeance, vpon him,” but despite this emotional torture, the prophet 
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remained faithful.  As a result of his faith, God delivered him.  This example should provide 
comfort to even those who imagine that “neuer any person hath found comfort in [their] 
condition,” as it promises that “thy feare shall be expelled, thy spirit healed, thy corruption 
weakned.”218 The Geneva commentators see Jeremiah’s despair as more of an embarrassment 
than a potential for inspiration: the gloss ushers us swiftly past Jeremiah’s death wish, 
marveling: “How the children of God are overcome in this barrel of the flesh and the Spirit, 
and into what inconveniences they fall til God raise them up again.”219  Here, 
“inconveniences” is best understood as “moral or ethical unsuitableness; unbecoming or 
unseemly behaviour; impropriety.”220  
Calvin takes Jeremiah’s imprecation far more seriously. He begins by providing an 
apology for Jeremiah’s despair, writing that the Prophet is “not wholly exempt from sorrow 
and fear and other feelings of the flesh,” and reminding us that we must distinguish “the 
truth, which was pure, free from every imperfection” from the human being that spoke it.  
Calvin adds that even though they are holy men, prophets retain “some remnant of the flesh.”  
This inescapable human element causes Jeremiah to be “disturbed with anxiety and fear, and 
affected with weariness.”221At first, Calvin tries to undercut the blasphemy in Jeremiah’s 
outcry by arguing that it is essentially about gratitude. By showing the audience the depths of 
his sorrows, Jeremiah illustrates how truly magnificent God is to deliver him.  Calvin does, 
                                                 
218John Barlow, Hierons last fare-well (12, 19). 
219 Jer. 20:14,  Comment H (315). 
 
220“inconvenience, n2”The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. 20 July 2009. The OED also 
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struggle against the Papists: “We indeed see at this day that the doctrine of the Gospel does not restore all to 
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however, address the gravity of Jeremiah’s lamentation. He observes that in addition to being 
harangued by his enemies, the prophet is  
distressed inwardly in his own mind, so that he was carried 
away contrary to reason and judgment, by turbulent emotions 
which even led him to give utterance to vile blasphemies. For 
what is here said cannot be extenuated; but the Prophet most 
grievously sinned when he became thus calumnious towards 
God; for a man must be in a state of despair when he curses the 
day in which he was born.222  
 
Celebrating your birthday, Calvin argues, is a way of thanking God for bringing you to life. 
Cursing your birthday, therefore, is ungrateful, disrespectful, and profane. Calvin’s only 
explanation is that Jeremiah has been “seized as it were with a sacrilegious madness.”223 He 
then immediately softens his censure, contending that “the origin of [Jeremiah’s] zeal was 
right.”  Jeremiah’s lament was borne not out of material discomfort, but out of a Cassandra-
like frustration and a desire to do God’s will. Calvin further observes that if a Prophet is thus 
tempted to curse his birth and ignore his calling, weaker human beings must be doubly strong 
against despair.224  Hamlet’s “O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!” thus has 
more in common with Jeremiah’s lament than Job’s. Although Hamlet has lost his father, his 
physical well-being, material wealth, and relationships with friends and family are, thus far, 
completely intact.  He curses not only his birth, but his vocation: righting the wrongs of his 
society. Indeed, the nature of this vocation—namely, murder—perhaps makes Hamlet’s 
outcry initially less blasphemous than Jeremiah’s.  As the play develops, Hamlet embraces 
his role as a revenger, in spirit, if not in action.  
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 The spiritual gap that separates Jeremiah from his less holy peers is also a physical 
one: we learn that he is ostracized from society, but the Prophet suggests that this is, at least 
partially, his design. He informs the Lord in 15:17: “I sate not in the assemblie of the 
mockers, nether did I reioyce, but sate alone because of thy plague: for thou hast filled me 
with indignation.”  Jeremiah is either blaming his exile on his unpopular prophesies or, as the 
Geneva commentary suggests, saying that he separates himself from society because he 
shares the Lord’s revulsion for “the wicked contemners of the worlde,” and instead 
“lamented bitterly for the plagues: shewing what the failthful shulde do with these tokens of 
Gods angre.”225 Calvin’s explanation sheds further light on Jeremiah’s self-exile. He notes 
that the Prophet “was hated by the whole people because he pleased God,” but adds that 
Jeremiah’s disgust is not so much for “wicked contemners” in general as it is for “the chief 
men, who exercised authority and administered justice; for when he speaks of the assembly 
of the ungodly, he no doubt refers to wicked rulers.”  Furthermore, Jeremiah separates 
himself because “he could not otherwise have obeyed God.”226 Righteousness demands 
disassociation from the community: to be integrated with society implies approval of its 
misdeeds. 
We see a similarly strong demarcation between self and society in Hamlet. When we 
first meet the Prince, he stands apart, brooding and dressed in black. His appearance and 
biting sarcasm distinguish him instantly from the rest of the court, identifying him as a 
dissident mourner, not a reverential reveler. Both Claudius and Gertrude notice this display: 
Claudius asks how it is that “the clouds still hang” on Hamlet, while Gertrude urges him to 
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cast thy nighted color off.” These reactions suggest that Hamlet’s non-conformity is 
voluntary, peculiar, and unsettling to onlookers. When Gertrude asks why “it seems so 
particular” with him, Hamlet contends that his behavior and dress imperfectly reflect an inner 
righteousness: 
  Seems, madam? Nat, it is. I know not “seems.” 
‘Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother, 
Nor customary suits of solemn black, 
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath, 
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye, 
Nor the dejected havior of the visage, 
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief, 
That can denote me truly. These indeed seem. 
For they are actions that a man may play, 
But I have that within which passes show – 
These but the trappings and the suits of woe. 
(I.ii.75-86) 
 
Hamlet here rejects being characterized solely by his outward signs of grief: black clothes, 
sighs, tears, and a solemn countenance. He suggests that physical marks alone are incapable 
of truly defining him, as they are but superficial “actions” that any man might put on.  His 
inner self, however, “passes show”: it surpasses, or perhaps transcends, any externalization of 
emotion, however sincere. But if this is the case, then why does Hamlet bother with the black 
clothes and “windy suspiration”?  Hamlet’s flagrant mourning is a means of protest: his black 
clothes and loud sighs call attention to the fact that the rest of the court has accepted his 
father’s death, mother’s remarriage, and uncle’s crowning too quickly. Hamlet’s didactic 
grieving requires people to notice his “suits of woe;” without these outward appearances, 
everyone will assume that he approves of Claudius and Gertrude’s conduct. Hamlet, like 
Jeremiah, honors his father by standing apart from the “the assemblie of the mockers.” 
Hamlet’s ostentatious grieving differentiates him from the court. Moreover, his 
insistence that this grief goes beyond “seeming” calls attention to the duplicity and hypocrisy 
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of the Danish court. Here, even before Hamlet has received his mission from the Ghost, he 
engages in what may be termed “prophetic drama.” Throughout the Hebrew Bible, the 
prophets deliver their messages not just with words, but with actions. Isaiah, for example 
walks barefoot and naked through the streets of Jerusalem for three full years as a sign of 
Egypt and Cush’s eventual destruction (Isa. 20), while Jeremiah breaks a piece of pottery to 
simulate the destruction of Jerusalem (Jer. 19). Modern theologians refer to these and similar 
events as “prophetic drama,” “symbolic actions,” “prophetic acts,” “prophetic symbolism,” 
“the acted sign,” “demonstration actions,” or “sign acts.”  These acts do more than just 
convey information; they also invite the audience to participate in the emotion of the 
information.  Old Testament scholar Kelvin Friebel explains that sign acts were 
“intentionally designed not only to communicate message-contents, but also to be interactive 
in the sense that they sought to alter the people’s thinking and subsequent behavior.”227 
David Stacey, who prefers the term “prophetic drama,” argues that “an action intended 
simply to announce that the city would fall could well be called a sign, but an action intended 
to arouse the same anguish, the same shocked horror as the disaster itself is more than a 
simple sign.” He further contends that the prophets “were provoking, as they believed under 
divine compulsion, the same disquiet, fear, and remorse that the further acts of God would 
create when they eventually came to pass.”228  Stacey’s notion that prophetic drama portrays 
future emotion is by no means a critical consensus. Kelvin Friebel argues that some sign acts, 
such as Ezekiel groaning in 21.11, “did not represent the people’s future emotional reactions 
which they would perform when the destruction occurred, but rather were admonitions of 
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how the people should be reacting in the present to the sinfulness and to the news of the 
coming destruction.”229  
 While modern scholars disagree on the terminology and precise significance of these 
prophetic acts, early modern theologians generally read them as literal actions carried out as 
per Yahweh’s directive.  In book 19, Yahweh instructs Jeremiah to bring “an earthen bottle” 
to the city’s east gate.  There, Jeremiah is to inform the audience that the Lord will lay waste 
to the city and its inhabitants if they do not reform their ways:   
And I wil make this citie desolate and an hissing, so that everie 
one that passeth thereby, shalbe astonished and hisse because 
of all the plagues thereof. And I will fede them with the flesh 
of their sonnes and with the flesh of their daughters, and everie 
one shall eat the flesh of his friend in the siege and streitnes, 
wherewith their enemies that seke their lives, shal holde them 
strait.  Then shalt thou breake the bottle in the sight of the men 
that go with thee, And shalt saie unto them, Thus saith the Lord 
of hosts, Even so wil I breake this people and this citie, as one 
breaketh a potters vessel, that can not be made whole againe. 
(Jer. 19:8-11) 
 
Although Jeremiah had already delivered several equally horrific prophecies, the people had 
yet to repent, perhaps, as Calvin opines, because they were “not only ignorant and stupid, 
but, which is worse, perverse and obstinate.”230  The Prophet therefore here warns the people 
not only with words, but with action: just as Jeremiah destroys the bottle, so will God destroy 
Jerusalem.  Calvin notes that breaking the vessel was more than a symbolic act: “it was also a 
solemn sealing of the prophecy” and a way to show, “by a visible act, the near approach of 
God’s vengeance, of which the Jews had no apprehension.”231 The shards of the flask 
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tangibly represent the remnants of a ruined city, the fragmentation of society, the broken 
covenant between man and God, and the physical destruction of the people themselves. 
Furthermore, as Friebel observes, “the message stressed not only the city’s shattering, but 
also the irreparable nature, and therefore, the finality, of the destruction.”232  
 Although Hamlet never receives direct instructions from either God or the Ghost to 
perform sign acts, we can read both his “antic disposition” and his plan to use The Murder of 
Gonzago as prophetic drama.  Both are visible acts that invite the audience to participate in 
and be moved by the emotion propelling them.  We first hear report of Hamlet’s “antic 
disposition” in action when Ophelia describes his surprise visit to her sewing closet. She tells 
Polonius that he came to her  
with his doublet all unbraced, 
  No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled, 
  Ungartered, and down-gyved to his ankle, 
  Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other, 
  And with a look so piteous in purport 
  As if he had been loosed out of hell 
  To speak of horrors.  
  …………………………. 
  He took my by the wrist and held me hard. 
  Then goes he to the length of all his arm, 
  And with his other hand thus o’er his brow 
  He falls to such perusal of my face 
  As a would draw it. Long stayed he so, 
  At last, a little shaking of mine arm 
  And thrice his head thus waving up and down, 
  As it did seem to shatter all his bulk 
  And end his being. That done, he lets me go,  
  And with his head over his shoulder turned 
  He seemed to find his way without his eyes, 
  For out o’ doors he went without their helps 
       (II.i.85-98) 
 
Although Hamlet’s intent may be to distract the court with feigned madness, his chosen guise 
conveys more than his own supposed personal insanity: it also communicates the dreadful 
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nature of the Ghost and his message. Hamlet’s physical appearance—disheveled, pale, and 
frightened—recalls his recent encounter with the Ghost. His countenance suggests to Ophelia 
that he has been let out of hell “to speak of horrors:” to warn, or, at the very least, impart the 
misery of damnation with others.  Hamlet’s pantomime, with its ritualized nodding and 
ominous stare, mirrors the Ghost’s encounter with Horatio and the watchmen.  Horatio 
reported that the apparition walked “thrice” around the men “with solemn march … slow and 
stately.”  He described the Ghost’s face was “very pale” and that it stared at them “most 
constantly” (I.ii.197-235). By acting and looking like his father’s apparition, Hamlet 
externalizes both the sense of foreboding inspired by the Ghost and his own inner anxiety.   
In breaking the pottery, Jeremiah symbolically performs the destruction of Jerusalem 
for his audience.  In this bit of drama, Jeremiah takes on the role of Yahweh, the shatterer, 
while the flask stands for the audience themselves.  Although the prophet’s message would 
have been quite clear without the prop, adding the sign act invites a greater degree of 
emotional participation from the audience. In seeing their symbolic selves fragmented upon 
the ground, the audience experiences, to return to Stacey’s phrase, “the same shocked horror 
as the disaster itself.”  Hamlet’s antic disposition creates a similarly intense sense of anxiety 
in the court, one that would perhaps not be possible with mere words of warning or derision.  
Perplexed and troubled by Hamlet’s behavior, the other characters become consumed by 
discovering the “method” in Hamlet’s madness.  
In the cases of both Jeremiah and Hamlet, prophetic drama takes a toll on the 
messenger, often creating in them the same distress they attempt to provoke.  We learn in 
Jeremiah 20 that the Prophet has been imprisoned for his spectacle with the pottery. The 
prophet is beaten and placed into the stocks, his suffering mirroring the impending 
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punishment he proclaimed at the gate.  As Stacy elaborates, “Jeremiah is broken long before 
the people whose fate he sees so clearly are broken. As a true representative, he takes the ills 
of the people first upon himself, even though, personally, he is not guilty of the sins which 
have brought doom upon them.”233  
 Similarly, many critics argue that Hamlet himself does indeed go mad; if this is the 
case, then he, like Jeremiah, suffers the anxiety that he attempts to project. In his discussion 
of the Hebrew Prophets, David Stacey contends that prophecy is not “a mechanism to bring 
about a particular effect,” bur rather “the performance and the reality to which it relates are 
seen as different aspects of the same entity.”234 In the case of Jeremiah, the prophet’s 
breaking the flask does not cause the destruction of Jerusalem, but it is an integral part of the 
impending destruction. We can understand Hamlet’s antic disposition in the same fashion: 
the Prince’s feigned madness does not cause his actual madness; rather, as in prophetic 
literature, “the drama is bound up with what it represents so closely that it is reasonable to 
say that one is part of the other.”235 
 This entwinement between prophetic drama and reality in Hamlet is most clearly 
illustrated in The Murder of Gonzago. In staging a play to “catch” Claudius’ conscience, 
Hamlet eschews a direct approach in favor of dissembling, a practice thoroughly similar to 
Polonius and Claudius’ use of Ophelia, Rosencrantz, and Guildenstern to investigate the root 
of Hamlet’s madness.  The Murder of Gonzago thus functions as a type of prophetic drama in 
two ways. In a broad sense, the artifice of the theater itself represents the deceit of the Danish 
court; additionally, the duplicitous and violent events of the play mirror the court’s anxiety, 
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perfidy, and, of course, bloodshed.  More specifically, of course, the particular events of the 
play—a nephew murders his uncle—functions as a rather clear prophecy for what will surely 
happen to Claudius. On another level, the purpose of the play is to incite a particular 
emotional reaction from the audience—or, at the very least, from Claudius. On both of these 
levels, The Murder of Gonzago resembles prophetic sign acts to such a degree that the 
following comment by David Stacey might indeed have been written about Hamlet:   
Drama and reality stand over against each other, mutually 
dependent and interpreting each other. The drama presents, 
focuses, interprets, and mediates the reality. It also modifies the 
reality, because, in so far as the attitude of the people is a 
significant element in the total event, response to the drama 
contributes something to the reality.236 
 
The Murder of Gonzago stands over Hamlet, which in turn stands over reality itself, and all 
indeed depend upon and interpret one another.  The king’s response to The Murder of 
Gonzago completely changes the reality of Hamlet by revealing Claudius’ guilt, heretofore 
hidden in a calculating, collected exterior.   
  Unlike Jeremiah, Hamlet does not deliver the prophetic drama himself, but instead 
leaves it in the hands of the players. He does, however, make significant additions to their 
script and dole out meticulous acting advice. Here, Hamlet takes on the role of Yahweh, 
allowing the players to function as his prophets. The players are Hamlet’s intermediaries, 
speaking his words in their voices. In so doing, Hamlet runs the risk of having his prophecy 
distorted by his “mortal” intermediaries.  To obviate this danger, Hamlet tells the players that 
the purpose of acting is “to hold, as ‘twere, the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her 
feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.  
Now this overdone, or come tardy off, though it makes the unskillful laugh, cannot but make 
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the judicious grieve” (III.2.21-6). These instructions are ostensibly provided to improve the 
play, but also function to ensure the success of the prophetic drama.  If the players’ missteps 
serve only to amuse the “unskillful,” they fail as artists and as prophets.  
Hamlet likely realizes the power of this drama because of his own reaction to the 
player’s monologue.  Frustrated with his own inertia, Hamlet is deeply moved by the player’s 
seemingly intense emotion in relating the woes of Hecuba: 
  Is it not monstrous that this player here, 
  But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,  
  Could force his soul so to his own conceit 
  That from her working all his visage waned,  
  Tears in his eyes, distraction in his aspect, 
  A broken voice, and his whole function suiting  
  With forms to his conceit?  And all for nothing, 
  For Hecuba! 
  What’s Hecuba to him, or he to her, 
  That he should weep for her? What would he do  
  Had he the motive and the cue for passion 
  That I have? He would drown the stage with tears 
  And cleave the general ear with horrid speech, 
  Make mad the guilty and appall the free, 
  Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed  
  The very faculties of eyes and ears. 
      (II.ii.489-505) 
 
It is “monstrous” to Hamlet that the player is so deeply affected by mere fiction while Hamlet 
himself has yet to act. On one level, Hamlet is chastising himself for inaction, but on another, 
he is recognizing the power of this fictive drama. The player has so convincingly portrayed 
the pain of Hecuba that it overtakes his visage, voice, and “whole function.”  To Hamlet, this 
amounts to “nothing,” as Hecuba is a fictional character and the player is but carrying out “a 
dream of passion.” The actor is talented; however, his invented emotion pales in comparison 
to Hamlet’s own “real” feelings. Were this skilled player to have the same motivation as 
Hamlet, the impact of his drama would be monumental. Hamlet imagines that the effects 
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would extend beyond the actor himself, instead reaching “the general ear,” and stirring guilt, 
fear, confusion, and amazement in the audience watching.  This, as we have seen, is the heart 
of prophetic drama. This realization propels Hamlet to formulate his plan. As Hamlet 
ruminates on the players, he muses: 
I have heard that guilty creatures sitting at a play 
Have by the very cunning of the scene 
Been struck so to the soul that presently 
They have proclaimed their malefactions. 
    (II.ii.528-31) 
 
Hamlet does not attribute this information to any particular source. The audience, of course, 
can see that it is precisely what has just happened to Hamlet himself: his own conscience was 
just stirred by the player’s feigned emotion.  The player’s masterful portrayal of but a “dream 
of passion” has reminded him of his failed vocation.  Banking on this prophetic power of 
drama, Hamlet makes his additions to The Murder of Gonzago. Like Yahweh, Hamlet selects 
his vessels, composes his message, and watches the players deliver the message to the 
community.  Like prophets, the players do not “foretell” doom or punishment, but instead 
“forthtell” by presenting the deceit and villainy of the King. And, like prophecy, the purpose 
of The Murder of Gonzago is to so profoundly affect the audience’s emotion that they will 
recognize their sins. The major difference between Jeremiah and Hamlet is what each man 
hopes will happen after this epiphany: Jeremiah seeks the sinners’ reconciliation with God, 
Hamlet thirsts for certainty of purpose and personal vengeance. 
 The motif of using drama or other fiction to bring about an epiphany in the listeners is 
a common motif in classical literature, but it also has roots in the Old and New Testaments 
alike.237 While Jesus used parables to teach the masses, prophets most often used them to 
                                                 
237 In 2 Samuel, David has his loyal solder Uriah murdered so that he may wed Uriah’s wife, Bathsheba. 
Prompted by the Lord, the prophet Nathan tells David of a rich man who owned many sheep and a poor man 
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convey messages to kings. Although The Murder of Gonzago is more a simulacrum than an 
allegory, Claudius’ response to the performance bears a striking resemblance to King 
David’s reaction to Nathan’s parable of the sheep in 2 Samuel 12:5-6.238  Upon hearing the 
moral of the parable, David immediately admits his sin. Nathan conveys the Lord’s 
forgiveness, but also reveals that David and Bathsheba’s first-born son will die. The 
commentary to the Geneva Bible here credits “the louing mercie of God” with sending 
Nathan to deliver this message, lest David become further “drowned in sinne.” The 
“similitude” of this story to David’s transgressions “waketh his conscience” and leads him to 
repent.239 The Lord forgives him, but promises the death of his first-born son as recompense.  
 The Murder of Gonzago has a similar effect on Claudius. His reaction resembles King 
David’s in its haste and virulence: he rises, calls for lights, and storms off in anger.  Whereas 
David immediately orders the death of the rich man, Claudius instead immediately orders the 
exile (and execution) of Hamlet.  However, like David, Claudius’ conscience is indeed 
awakened, albeit not enough to actually make him repent. Alone in the castle, Claudius 
admits his crime: 
  O, my offense is rank, it smells to heaven; 
  It hath the primal eldest curse upon’t, 
  A brother’s murder. Pray can I not, 
  Though inclination be sharp as will.   
  …………………………….. 
   What if this cursed hand 
Were thicker than itself with brother’s blood, 
Is there not rain enough in the sweet heavens 
                                                                                                                                                       
who had only one small ewe. According to the story, the poor man treasured his ewe, even allowing it to share 
his family’s food. When a stranger arrived looking to buy a sheep, the rich man refused to sell his own animals 
and instead had the poor man’s ewe killed. David is outraged by this story, declaring that “As the Lord liueth, 
the man that hathe done this thing shal surely dye, and he shal restore the lambe foure folde, because he did this 
thing, and had no pitie thereof.” 
 
238 2 Samuel 12.5-6. 
 
239 Geneva commentary 2 Samuel 12.1, Comment A (140).  
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To wash it white as snow? Whereto serves mercy 
  But to confront the visage of offense? 
  And what’s in prayer but this twofold force, 
  To be forestalled ere we come to fall, 
  Or pardoned being down? Then I’ll look up. 
      [III.iii.36-50] 
According to Claudius, there is a limitless supply of mercy in heaven that can—and will—
wash away even the most heinous sin. Furthermore, prayer can both keep us from 
transgressing and bring pardon if we fail. Encouraged by these remedies, Claudius decides to 
try praying, but quickly learns that there is indeed a catch: 
   O, what form of prayer  
  Can serve my turn? “Forgive me my foul murder”? 
  That cannot be, since I am still possessed  
  Of those effects for which I did the murder, 
  My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen. 
  May one be pardoned and still retain th’ offense?  
      [III.iii.51-56]  
 
Claudius realizes that absolution would require him to give up everything he gained by 
murdering his brother. He then considers the benefits of life on earth, where wicked men like 
himself can prosper, versus life in heaven, where “there is no shuffling” and justice reigns. 
He finally decides to attempt to pray, or at the very least, force his body into the physical 
posture of prayer, hoping that bending his knees will in turn soften his heart. Unbeknownst to 
Claudius, this guise of prayer temporarily saves his life, as Hamlet refuses to kill the kneeling 
king. Hamlet exits and Claudius observes: “My words fly up, my thoughts remain below. / 
Words without thoughts never to heaven go,” revealing that his display of repentance has 
been superficial and thus ineffective.  
Hamlet believes that killing his uncle mid-prayer would send Claudius’ soul to 
heaven, and therefore instead decides to overtake him drinking, raging, gambling, or 
fornicating so as to ensure damnation. In essence, Hamlet wishes to catch Claudius as 
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Yahweh has caught Jerusalem in Jeremiah 13:25: with his “skirts upon [his] face.” Yet, as 
the audience knows, Claudius does not actually repent in this scene: he merely realizes that 
penance would necessitate sacrifice on his part.  Hamlet here thus mistakes Claudius’ 
external appearance—his “trappings and suits of woe,” so to speak—for genuine piety, 
thereby allowing “seeming” to triumph over what actuality is.  The greater irony, however, 
lies in Hamlet’s perception of his role as an instrument of divine justice. In believing that his 
actions alone will determine the fate of Claudius’ soul, Hamlet usurps God’s prerogative as 
judge.  
In attempting to negate Claudius’ apparent repentance, Hamlet unequivocally 
separates himself from Biblical prophets. Both Hamlet and Jeremiah are disgusted by states 
of their respective communities.  Jeremiah notes that the world was once a “noble vine, 
whose plants were all natural,” but has now turned into “a strange vine” that grows wild (Jer. 
2:21). Hamlet denounces the world as “an unweeded garden / That grows to seed” (I.ii.135-
6).  But while both men seek to reform their societies, only Jeremiah is truly invested in 
reconciling each sinner with God.  In addition to railing against Judah’s sins, Jeremiah also 
bemoans the people’s fates. He begs the Lord to have mercy on the people and urges 
Jerusalem to “wash thine heart from wickedness, that thou maiest be saved” (Jer. 4:14).  The 
Prophet’s distress at their impending doom is so great that he bears it as physical pain: “My 
bely, my bely, I am peined, even at the very heart: mine heart is troubled within me: I can not 
be styl” (Jer. 4:19). The Geneva commentary deems Jeremiah’s reaction as that of a “true 
minister,” one who is “lively touched with the calamaties of the church, so that all the partes 
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of their bodie fele the grief of their heart, albeit with zeale to Gods glorie thei pronounce his 
judgements to against the people.”240  
Other early modern theologians interpret Jeremiah’s pain in 4:19 similarly to the 
Geneva editors. Nehemiah Rogers, for example, attributes his suffering to grief at “at the 
transgressions of the people.”241 Calvin disagrees fervently with this assessment.  He admits 
that the prophets were often moved by compassion for sinners, even as they delivered 
gruesome promises of destruction. He describes this contrast between compassion and 
vocation as a conflict between “two feelings.” When they acted as “the heralds of God’s 
vengeance, they necessarily forgot their own sensibilities; but this courage did not prevent 
them from feeling sorrow for others; for they could not but sympathize with their brethren, 
when they saw them, even their own flesh, doomed to ruin.”242 Prophets therefore possess 
bifurcated selves: they have enough “courage” to ignore their own “sensibilities” and deliver 
God’s message, but they still grieve for their brethren, the reprobates. In this particular case, 
however, Calvin contends that Jeremiah  
seems not so much to mourn the calamities of the people, but 
employs the figurative terms in order to awaken their stupor, 
for he saw that they were torpid, and that they neither feared 
God nor were touched with any shame. Since then there was 
so much insensibility of the people, it was necessary for 
Jeremiah and other servants of God to embellish their 
discourses, so as not simply to teach , but also forcibly and 
strongly to rouse their dormant minds.243 
 
Whether Jeremiah’s pain was real or merely a prophetic “embellishment,” Hamlet’s 
plan to ensure Claudius’ damnation—coupled, of course, with his murder of Polonius and the 
                                                 
240 Jer. 4:19. Comment  Q (308).  
 
241 A strange vineyard in Palaestina, 202.  
 
242 Calvin Vol. IX, 228. 
243Ibid.  
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remorseless execution of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern—indeed prevents him from being 
considered a “true minister,” despite his claim to be heaven’s “scourge and minister” 
(III.iv.175).244 Although several critics interpret “scourge” and “minister” to be synonymous 
terms,245 Fredson Bowers argues that “Shakespeare always means minister in a good sense 
unless he specifies that the minister is of hell.” In this case, “minister” is meant as a scourge 
who carries out a retributive function of divine justice: one who “may visit God's wrath on 
sin but only as the necessary final act to the overthrow of evil.”246 Bowers elaborates that the 
difference between a wicked scourge and a righteous minister is the difference between 
personal revenge and positive law.  Hamlet’s conundrum is that  
he must contrive a public vengeance which will demonstrate 
him to be a minister of Heaven's justice. Yet the secret murder 
of his father, so far as he can see, prevents all hope of public 
justice; and therefore the circumstances appear to him to 
enforce a criminal private revenge even after he realizes that he 
has been supernaturally appointed as a minister.”247  
 
Bowers here condenses Hamlet’s dilemma to a struggle between private desire and 
public good. “Minister” and “scourge” are thus two sides of the same coin, but either way 
you flip it, the coin is “justice.” Reading “minister” according to the Geneva commentary to 
Jeremiah 4:19, however, makes the word less about vengeance and more about mercy.  As a 
                                                 
244 For a thorough discussion of this line, refer to Fredson Bowers, “Hamlet as Minister and Scourge,” PMLA 70 
(1955), 740-749.  For a response to Bowers’ argument, see R.W. Dent in “Hamlet: Scourge and Minister.”  
Shakespeare Quarterly 29:1 (1978), 82-84; see also Eleanor Prosser. Hamlet and Revenge. Stanford: Stanford 
UP. (1967) 200-1.  Prosser’s main argument here boils down to the fact that : “So long as Hamlet loathes 
Claudius, so long as he desires to kill, so long as he consciously intends still further ‘knavery,’ it is doubtful that 
Shakespeare’s audience could consider him the minister of divine justice.” 
 
245 Philip Ayres, for example, argues that Elizabethans “occasionally distinguished between the minister of God 
and the scourge. Both are agents of God’s retribution, but the scourge acts wantonly without any desire to be, 
and usually without any realization that he is,an agent. The minister, unlike the scourge, is not tainted by 
executing God’s vengeance.” “Degrees of Heresy: Justified Revenge and Elizabethan Narratives.” Studies in 
Philology. 69:4 (1972): 468.  
 
246 “Hamlet as Minister and Scourge,” 743-4. 
 
247 Ibid, 744.  
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“true minister,” Jeremiah scourges the people with his words, but never commits any 
violence himself.  Hamlet’s interaction with Gertrude in her closet reflects this notion of 
ministering: he delivers a scathing verbal attack, but never physically accosts her. Hamlet’s 
diatribe against the Queen, like Jeremiah’s call to Judah, is biting, humiliating, and 
graphically sexual. He accuses her of living “in the rank sweat of an enseamed bed / Stewed 
in corruption, honeying and making love / Over the nasty sty.” This invective apparently hits 
the mark: Gertrude says that Hamlet has turned “[her] eyes into [her] very soul,” allowing her 
to see the “black and grained spots” of her sin (III.iv.89-94).  Hamlet urges Gertrude to 
“confess [herself] to heaven / Repent what’s past, avoid what is to come, And do not spread 
the compost on the weeds / To make them ranker” (III.iv. 149-152).  It would seem, then, 
that Hamlet does not view murder as the panacea for a sinful nation; for some, such as 
Gertrude, repentance would suffice.  A selective apportioning of mercy based on personal 
preferences, however, is not righteousness or “ministry” par excellence. 
 If we follow the Geneva editor’s assessment, the “true minister” we encounter in 
Jeremiah 4:19 feels physical pain at Jerusalem’s separation from God. He derives no pleasure 
from “scourging” Judah with his words, nor does he relish his task as a messenger of doom. 
His sole goal is the reincorporation of Judah into God’s kingdom. But the desire for revenge 
is not alien to the Prophet. Unheeded, imprisoned, beaten, and derided, on several occasions 
Jeremiah implores Yahweh to take vengeance upon his persecutors. In Jeremiah 11:20, for 
example, the Prophet learns that the citizens of Judah have been plotting to kill him. He prays 
to the Lord, “let me se thy vengeance on them: for unto thee have I opened my cause.” The 
Geneva editors swiftly assure readers that “he spake not for hatred, but being moved with the 
Spirit of God, he desireth the advancement of Gods glorie and the verifying of his worde, 
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which is by the destruction of his enemies.”248 Calvin agrees, stressing that Jeremiah was not 
interested in retaliation against “private wrongs.” He adds: 
And doubtless, whosoever allows his own feelings to prevail 
in the least degree, cannot teach in sincerity; for he who 
prepares himself for the prophetic office, ought to put off all 
the affectations of the flesh, and to manifest a pure, and, so to 
speak, a limpid zeal, and also a calm mind, so that he may seek 
nothing, and have no object but the glory of God and the 
salvation of those to whom he is sent a teacher. Whosoever 
then is under the influence of private feelings cannot act 
otherwise than violently.249 
 
According to Calvin, human beings are subject to “the influence of private feelings.” The 
intrusion of human emotion creates the presence of other desires besides God’s glory. Born 
of passion, these desires are necessarily sinful. In this case, they manifest themselves in 
violence. But because Jeremiah is a true prophet, his cry for vengeance is not tainted by his 
mortal coil. His desire for vengeance is the product of “a limpid zeal,” and is therefore pure. 
This argument gets somewhat more complicated as the book progresses. In Jeremiah 
15:15, the Prophet prays:  
O Lord, thou knowest, remembre me, and visit me, and 
reuenge me of my persecuters: take me not awaie in the 
continuance of thine angre: knowe that for thy sake I have 
suffered rebuke.   
 
As in 11:20, the Geneva commentary discounts any desire for revenge in Jeremiah’s words, 
arguing that Jeremiah merely wishes “that God wolde deliver his Church of those whome he 
knewe to be hardened and incorrigible.”250 Jeremiah’s entreaty is less a prayer for personal 
vengeance than a desire to see his community purged of the reprobates. Calvin begins by 
                                                 
248 Jer 11:20, Comment P (311). 
 
249 Commentaries Vol IX, 110. 
 
250 Jer. 15:15-16, Comment O (313).   
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apparently taking a harder tack: he argues that Jeremiah “seems here to have been more 
angry than he ought to have been, for revenge is a passion unbecoming to the children of 
God. How was it, then, that the Prophet was so indignant against the people that he desired 
revenge?”  But instead of answering this question, Calvin instead emphasizes the disparity 
between Jeremiah and ourselves.  Echoing his earlier comments, he says that readers must  
distinguish between private and public feelings, and also 
between the passions of the flesh, which keep within no limits, 
and the zeal of the Spirit. It is certain that the Prophet had no 
regard to himself when he thus spoke; but he dismissed every 
regard for himself, and had regard only to the cause of God: for 
inconsiderate zeal often creeps in, so that we wish all to be 
condemned of whom we do not approve …. But it is necessary 
not only to be moved by a pious zeal, but also to be guided by a 
right judgment.251   
 
He then adds that because Jeremiah had both zeal and judgment, “it was lawful to ask for 
vengeance on the reprobate,” and reminds the readers that any time we see a Prophet praying 
for revenge, we must understand that he is “filled by the Spirit of Christ,” the same spirit that 
inspired David’s imprecatory psalms.252   
 This holy mindset—which Calvin typologically understands to be Spirit of Christ—
allows Jeremiah to transcend the desire for personal vengeance, but he also describes the 
Prophet as transcending compassion. Although Calvin hinted at this notion in his discussion 
of Jeremiah 4:19, he expands upon this idea more fully in his commentary on Jeremiah 
15:16.  In this passage, the Prophet expresses joy at delivering the message of God’s wrath, 
saying: “Thy words were sounde by me, and I did eat them, and thy worde was unto me the 
ioye and reioycing of mine heart.”  Calvin wonders how the apparently contradictory 
                                                 
251 Commentaries Vol IX, 278.  
 
252 Ibid.  
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emotions “the grief and sorrow which the holy man felt for God’s judgments and the joy and 
gladness which he now mentions” can simultaneously exist in Jeremiah’s heart.  He explains: 
These two feelings, though apparently repugnant, were 
connected together in the Prophets; they as men deplored and 
mourned for the ruin of the people, and yet, through the power 
of the Spirit, they performed their office, and approved of the 
just vengeance of God. Thus then the word of God became joy 
to the Prophet, not that he was not touched by a deep feeling 
for the destruction of the people, but that he rose above all 
human feelings, so as fully to approve of God’s judgments.253  
 
According to Calvin, although Jeremiah might be aggrieved by Judah’s destruction, his holy 
zeal allows him to triumph over “all human feelings.” Because of this transcendent spirit, he 
rejoices in delivering a message of doom. He feels neither sorrow nor spiteful glee; rather, he 
is so perfectly in tune with the mind of God that he completely understands and “approves 
of” the need for God’s wrath.  
 Old Testament scholar Abraham Heschel describes this mindset experienced by 
Jeremiah and other prophets as “sympathy with the divine pathos.”254 It is this connection 
that makes prophecy “a crossing point of God and man.”255 Without the window into divine 
pathos, a prophet is entirely too susceptible to being consumed by passion and personal 
biases. This, of course, is Hamlet’s problem. God does not reach out and touch Hamlet’s 
mouth; instead, he is visited by a frightening, perhaps demonic, apparition of his dead father.  
Hamlet is not told to warn Denmark, but to revenge his father’s death. His mission is 
therefore more personal than Jeremiah’s: his response, therefore, is far more passionate. He 
                                                 
253 Ibid, Vol IX, 284-5. 
 
254 The Prophets 26. Heschel further argues that the prophet “dwells upon God’s inner motives, not only upon 
His historical decisions. He discloses a divine pathos, not just a divine judgment. The pages of the prophetic 
writings are filled with echoes of divine love and disappointment, mercy and indignation. The God of Israel is 
never impersonal” (24, emphasis in original).  
 
255 The Prophets 5.  
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boils with rage against Claudius, rails against his mother, torments Ophelia, hastily murders 
Polonius, and remorselessly orders the deaths of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. None of 
these acts bear the marks of prophetic holiness.  But while Hamlet is not a play about 
dispassionate judgment, neither is the Book of Jeremiah about a dispassionate vessel of 
God’s word. Despite Calvin’s efforts to portray Jeremiah as so moved by holy zeal, so fully 
in tune with divine judgment, and so filled with a typological “Spirit of Christ” that he is 
“above all human feelings,” even Calvin admits that Jeremiah is fully human, and thus 
vulnerable to the “remnant of the flesh” that causes anxiety, fear, and even blasphemy.  
 Furthermore, according to early modern humoral theory, it is this “remnant of the 
flesh” that allows Jeremiah to physically feel God’s anger as Yahweh channels it through 
him. But perhaps more importantly than this fleshly connection, a prophet has an ineffable 
spiritual link with God Himself. God speaks to and through the prophet. A prophet is not 
merely God’s messenger, but God’s vessel. Revengers, like Hamlet, may perceive a 
sympathy with heaven, but never experience the intense spiritual communication that 
prophets have with Yahweh. Perhaps, then, Hamlet is best understood as latter-day prophet 
without the direct, consuming connection to God that Jeremiah experienced: indeed, a 
prophet of an early modern era replete with epistemological crises, identity shifts, and 
religious upheaval. Without this certain connection, Hamlet is just like any other human 
being: acutely susceptible to his passions, and therefore an imperfect conduit for God’s 
wrath. 
In Hamlet and the Rethinking of Man, Eric Levy suggests that one of the play’s 
central conflicts is between “Stoic insistence on the elimination of emotion” and the 
“hyperbolic display of emotion” showcased by the Player. Levy further explains that neither 
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option is optimal: “the defects in the Stoic and theatrical moralities competing in the play can 
be compactly summarized: the first encourages the denial of emotion that is felt; the second 
encourages dramatic expression of emotion that is not sincerely felt.”256 According to Levy, 
Hamlet ultimately rejects both Stoic and overly theatrical approaches to emotion, coming 
instead to embrace the notion that “pain is not merely an affliction to be endured (as with 
Stoicism) or hyperbolically flourished.”257   
I believe that Levy’s deduction can be translated onto a larger consideration of human 
anger in early modern England. Despite the pervasive influence of Neostoicism, there was a 
strong undercurrent of support for human anger amongst theologians and poets alike. 
Because anger is necessarily tied to vengeance for both God and human beings, many 
authors suggest that the elimination of anger would also yield an elimination of justice. 
Extravagant displays—or, perhaps, “hyperbolical flourishes”— of this anger, however, is 
never sanctioned for human beings. Instead, human beings are advised to adopt some sort of 
middle ground that both allows for anger and restricts their expression of it. As Thomas 
Jackson writes, while revenge is never truly warranted, when one “tempers” an “excess of 
anger” with “matter of equity,”   
it makes those actions of patient men much abused seem 
excusable which in others would be intolerable. The ideal 
perfection of this rule of equity, though often corrupted by 
human passions, is in the divine nature without mixture of such 
passion or perturbation as is pictured out to the terror of the 
ungodly in the prophetical characters or descriptions of his 
anger.258 
 
                                                 
256 Hamlet and the Rethinking of Man 114. 
 
257 Ibid, 115. 
 
258 A Treatise of the Divine Attributes 195-6. 
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Here, Jackson observes that people who are continually vexed are rightly moved to anger. By 
bearing these indignities with patience, however, the individual earns a greater license for 
anger. One who takes actions after suffering injuries over a great period of time is more 
easily excused than one who reacts immediately.  
 Jackson admits that achieving this “equity” of mind is difficult, if not impossible for 
human beings, who are necessarily “corrupted by human passions.” God, who can experience 
anger without “passion or perturbation,” continually suffers indignities at the hands of men. 
However, while God is infinitely patient, He is also a righteous judge: God does not suffer 
indignities without also wreaking wrath. To do so would infer a collapse in divine justice. 
Therefore, when God does enact His wrath, He does so in a way that is not only utterly 
“excusable,” but also moderate and dispassionate.  
 But this passage from Jackson does more than just reiterate the differences between 
God’s wrath and man’s: it also acknowledges a place where the two intertwine: in the words 
(or person) of the Prophet. As Jackson argues, the true portrait of divine anger is revealed in 
descriptions of “the terror of the ungodly in the prophetical characters or descriptions of his 
anger.”  As a conduit for God’s wrath, a Prophet is charged with translating God’s anger into 
human language. Even though Jeremiah shares in the divine pathos, he cannot help but 
respond to both his task and the message with intense emotion. Perhaps, then, Jeremiah’s 
actions represent the only righteous way for a human being to experience anger: as an 
impetus for nonviolent social reform. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study of one dominant passion in Renaissance drama incorporates discussions of 
theological problems and questions into a field currently dominated by medical discourse. 
While anger does have its roots in physiology, there is also an undeniable theological 
valence. Divine wrath was an actual force that could—and did—intercede in human affairs.  
The lightning bolt that strikes down Malefort Senior is just one symbolic instance of the way 
early moderns perceived God as wreaking vengeance through forces of nature. But God 
could also use human beings as intermediaries. This fact, coupled with the idea that human 
beings were created in the image of God, gave rise to the notion of a human wrath that is 
inextricably bound together with its divine analogue, something we see in both the 
imprecatory psalms and plays like Chettle’s Hoffman.  However, it is the way human beings 
experience this wrath—as a visceral, bodily, passionate response to personal indignity, that 
makes them profane vessels. To the early moderns, divine wrath was a legitimate force that 
could be felt by a human being, but our mortal coil muddies it, making it impossible for us to 
safely or sacredly enact this wrath. 
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